

MANNER S.

TRANSLATED FROM THE

FRENCH.

The FOURTH EDITION.

PANAGEK

RESPICERE EXEMPLAR VITÆ MORUMQUE.

HOR. AD PISONES.

Thy Jones




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M A N N E R S

FR E M O N T

THE F O R T H E D I T T O N



THE F O R T H E D I T T O N
M A N N E R S
FR E M O N T

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
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TO

T O
Mrs. M. A. T*****

M A D A M,

I T is not to a great man, a prince, or a minister of state that I inscribe this work; but to you, whose rank is not superior to my own. But, though not distinguished by birth or fortune, you have a superiority of a nobler kind arising from your personal merit, from your understanding and virtue. Considered in this light, the lovely MENOQUI appears far more worthy of my respect and veneration, than those vain objects of popular admiration, who have nothing but their pomp and splendid titles to recommend them. I have somewhere in this book observed, "That if virtue were
" to become visible, we should see the
" DEITY himself in all the glory of his
" majesty and holiness:" and I add here, that if in condescension to our weakness she were to appear in a human form, she would assume yours; at least she could not chuse any more fit to render herself amiable and engaging to mankind. To whom then, more properly than to you, madam, can I address a work consecrated to her honour?

And,

ii DEDICATION.

And, certainly, a discourse of this kind cannot but meet with a favourable reception from one, whose manners and character are so pure. Nay, I will venture to add, that the author himself deserves some regard from you. The morality which prevails through this book is strict and unexceptionable; and this morality is truly mine, it is the genuine expression of the sentiments of my heart. A friend, who is governed by such principles, may be safely encouraged; however strong his passion for you may be, you need have no apprehensions of being seduced by him. I freely allow you all the honour of your virtue, but do not envy me the exercise of mine. I know, madam, your prudence would sufficiently guard you against the snares of a lover; but be assured, that my virtue will never suffer me to lay any in your way. You would do me a signal injury in imagining, that I am virtuous only because you are so; this would be to form a very wrong judgment of that affection and respect, with which I have the honour to be, madam,

Your most humble

and most obedient servant,

PANAGES.

P R E F A C E.

I SHALL not begin with telling my reader, as authors commonly do, that one of my friends had, by some means or other, got a copy of the following work, and was just going to put it to the press, when my good fortune giving me timely notice of the affair, I rather chose to publish it myself, than to have loose uncorrected papers exposed to the view of the world; because all this would be entirely false: and besides, I think the artifice is now grown too stale. The truth is, my genius is somewhat turned towards moral philosophy; and as an inclination to write books, and to publish all our thoughts whether good or bad, is the prevailing distemper of the age, the infection has reached me, and I have set myself to moralize by chapters. The motive which determines me is indeed self-love; it would be vain to deny it; but however another and a nobler is joined with it, which is the love of virtue. Burning with a sacred zeal in her cause, my desire is to render all my readers virtuous. I know well that I shall not succeed; but were I sure of gaining only one in a thousand, however laborious the occupation may be, my only employment for the future, should be to write books, and all upon the same subject.

IF the reader considers the title of the following treatise, he will not expect more from me than I have

have promised. MANNERS are the subject of it : religion is no farther considered than as it is necessary to morality ; and natural religion being sufficient for moral purposes, I consider no other. I would have a Mahometan read me, as well as a Christian ; I write for all mankind.

SOME perhaps might think it more modest, had I entitled this work MORAL ESSAYS ; but this would have been imitating a divine of the last century : now I must own I have no inclination to interfere with any of those gentlemen. The title of MORAL REFLECTIONS could by no means be allowed ; it has been in too ill-repute for five and thirty years past ; and I do not much chuse to expose myself to ecclesiastical censure. I might also have called it AN ESSAY ON MANNERS ; but besides that the booksellers shops are already overstocked with ESSAYS, it is in my opinion an unpardonable rudeness for a man to profess, that he is making an essay or trial of his genius at the expence of the public : whoever enters the lists publicly, ought, I think, to be sure of his strength beforehand. I have therefore entitled it simply MANNERS ; because I describe the manners of men, both as they really are, and as they ought to be.

I THINK it my duty to protest against any key that may be invented to the characters I have drawn, and any invidious applications that may be made of them. To say that I had no particular persons in view, would be a falsehood ; and a useless one too, because I should not be believed. I have indeed copied all my pictures from nature, otherwise I should have run a risk of painting imaginary beings ; but I have not distinctly marked any of my originals ; their names are an impenetrable

trable secret, which I keep locked up in my own breast. The vicious characters are drawn from vicious men; but the number of the vicious is too great to justify the application to any one in particular.

I HAVE in many places only described a vice, and left the picture to speak for itself, without decanting on its deformity. If, according to Virgil's description, I were to paint the enormous chief of the Cyclops, would there be any need to add, that Polyphemus is a hideous monster? I have done the same with respect to the virtues; and have often delineated their several graces and beauties, without loading the representation with a tedious panegyric.

WHEN I lay down any moral principle which is acknowledged even by the vicious themselves, I do not formally set myself to confirm it by arguments. What occasion is there to prove, that calumny, false witness, and treachery, are criminal?

I HAVE in this work addressed myself more to the affections, than to the imagination; because the former was both easier to me, and more suitable to the nature of morality, which is a practical science. It is of more importance, in the correcting depraved minds, to affect the heart, than to please the fancy; nay even to convince the understanding is not the principal thing. It was this, perhaps, that gave occasion to that pious remark of the celebrated M. Dacier,* "That it is
" unbecoming the majesty of GOD to prove the
" necessity, justice, or truth, of what he requires;
" he makes us love his commandments, and this
" is more than proving them." How could I wish
that

* Preface to PLATO.

that I too had the power of making virtue beloved? it would not then have a single enemy upon earth.

If any of my readers were to tell me with sincerity, That I have wrote a good Book; I should, no doubt, be pleased: but I should be much more so, were he to add, "You have inspired me with the love of virtue."



P R E L I.

Index to Part I.

PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE

CONCERNING

V I R T U E.

THE character of a MAN OF HONOUR may be left to those who chuse to take up with it. The purchase of it is too cheap, to give any just ground of envy to a generous mind. A confident and assuming air, an easy fortune, with the vices in fashion, are what constitute the MAN OF HONOUR: virtue is entirely out of the question. Nor is the WOMAN OF HONOUR much more estimable: all the title that EGLE has to the appellation, is her not having publicly proclaimed that she professes gallantry and intrigue.

AND yet, easy as it may seem to merit either of these characters, in the limited sense which custom has affixed to them; we may still find, upon examination, that there are many who lay claim to them without any just pretensions. An unhappy wretch, pressed by want, stops a passenger in the street and robs him of his purse; this is a man void of HONOUR: if you question it, the gallows will determine the controversy. But the man who has enriched himself by plunder and extortion, and by preying on the necessities of his country; if he has a magnificent house, an equipage, and a

C

title;

title; though he triumphs in the public distress, though his fortune be raised on the ruins of five hundred families, still he is a MAN OF HONOUR, because he is rich, and has not met with the just reward of his crimes. A young and beautiful woman displays, perhaps beyond the bounds of decency, the charms she has received from nature; and farther heightens them by all the elegance of dress, by flowers, paint, and patches; but she is on foot, and without a servant to attend her. This is a woman of NO HONOUR, she is even pointed at. Near to her you may see another, dressed in the same manner; but she rides in a coach and six, and is therefore a woman of unquestionable reputation and character.

ALL the MEN OF HONOUR together are less worth than one VIRTUOUS MAN. The only foundation of their titles, is their prosperity, wealth, and interest in the world; take from them these frail supports, and their honour which depends on them will undergo a like revolution with their fortune. The same word in our language signifies an unfortunate man, and one destitute of honour; we call each of them a WRETCH: and what else indeed is a man of honour, in the usual sense of the expression, when once the charm of his grandeur is vanished? But the virtuous man derives his dignity from his MANNERS: a sure title, which is so far from being destroyed by adversity, that it receives a new lustre from it. The Assyrian minister, the enemy of the Jewish nation, lost his honour with his life; but I esteem Fouquet in his disgrace, and reverence St. Lewis though in chains.

BY MANNERS, I mean a conduct regulated by the knowledge and love of VIRTUE. I say, the knowledge and love: for without the knowledge of

of virtue, we shall have only the manners of the vulgar; and without the love of it, only the manners of the great; or, in other words, none at all. We must be acquainted with virtue, before we can love it; and when we love it, we shall infallibly practice it.

BUT do not form your idea of virtue upon the model of CLEOBULUS, PHILEMON, or any other particular person whom you esteem virtuous. Example is a dangerous guide, and never fails to mislead those who implicitly follow it. It is with example, as with advice; we can reap no benefit from it, unless we are qualified to judge of its value. Bad examples are pernicious, by leading us to the practice of vice; but the good are also sometimes hurtful, by limiting us in the practice of virtue. For unless the examples we propose to ourselves are every way perfect, (and where shall we find such?) while we imitate them, nay, though we should in some respects excel them, our attainments must be low and defective. For this reason, doubtless, the author of CHRISTIANITY did not direct his disciples to imitate such an apostle, anchoret, king, or father of a family; but his command is, "Be perfect, as your heavenly father is perfect." No one can attain to what is truly great by imitation, unless the pattern itself be inimitable.

THEOPHILUS is a pious man, whose desires and affections tend only towards heaven: but the contempt he has for the things of this world, extends to all mankind who inhabit it; and excepting that small circle of the elect who visit him and listen to his edifying instructions, he looks upon all men as profane and worldly, as objects of the divine hatred, and consequently to be hated by him. You think to become a saint by imitating THEOPHILUS; no, you would become hard-hearted, haughty, and

arrogant, incapable of affection, indulgence or pity, a bad father, a bad husband, and which is still worse, incorrigible in your faults, because you would cherish them as virtues.

CLEANTHES is a man of honour, as incapable of a mean compliance as of a criminal action. But his temper is harsh and severe; he is always out of humour with mankind, always ready to think ill of others, unwilling to allow even the good which he sees in them, and perhaps more displeased with the prosperity of the wicked than with their crimes. What would be the consequence of your imitating CLEANTHES? You would be morose and unsociable, a useless friend to virtue, making it rather feared than loved by others, who would think you were virtuous yourself only from a spirit of contradiction.

DAMIS is just the reverse; he is a friend to all mankind without distinction; he never contradicted any body in his life, but conforms to the opinions of all he meets with, let them be ever so opposite to each other. He would be the most strenuous assertor of virtue, if he were to converse only with the virtuous. He has not the courage to be vicious, nor has he resolution enough to blame those who are so. You cannot sure propose DAMIS as a pattern for imitation; for were you to resemble him, you would be only insipidly complaisant, with a weak head and wavering heart, ashamed by turns of vice and virtue, as your company happened to be good or bad.

THEMIRA is often recommended as a compleat pattern of chastity, to those of the fair sex who are exposed to danger, by entering into the world young, unexperienced, and open to the impressions of love. I do not mean to dispute her right to this character: some chaste women, doubtless, there are;

are; Boileau has reckoned up no less than three; and though the number were to be diminished by two thirds, *THEMIRA* might perhaps remain the phoenix of her sex. But let her be imitated only in this single point; for she thinks that chastity supplies the place of every virtue, and that whoever can boast the great merit of maintaining conjugal fidelity, has a right to indulge a capricious clamorous humour, to tyrannize over her children, harass her servants, to ridicule, slander, and cheat at cards. Those who follow her example will indeed be women of *HONOUR*, but certainly not women of *MERIT*. If any one had reason to be pleased with the virtue of *THEMIRA*, it would be her husband; but how dearly does he pay for that virtue!

WE often meet with examples of this kind, which strike at first view: some particular good feature in a character immediately gains our favour and engages our esteem: such a one, are we apt to say, is a virtuous man. By no means. None deserve that character from the practice of a single virtue, but from a sincere regard to all. Hell is full of the *PARTIALLY-VIRTUOUS*; and whoever has not the true touch-stone to distinguish the pure metal from the base, is in danger of increasing the number. Now this touch-stone is no other than the *KNOWLEDGE OF VIRTUE*.

BUT what, it may be said, is *VIRTUE*? It is the faithful steady discharge of those obligations which reason dictates. And what is *REASON* itself but a portion of the divine wisdom, with which the creator has furnished our minds, in order to direct us in our duty?

It may be further asked, what is this duty, whence does it result, and by what law is it prescribed? I answer, the law which prescribes it is

the immutable will of GOD, to which right reason obliges us to conform ourselves; and in this conformity virtue consists. No law which has commenced since the creation, or which may ever cease to be in force, can constitute virtue: for before the existence of such a law, mankind could not be bound to observe it; but they were certainly under an obligation to be virtuous from the beginning.

PRINCES may make laws or repeal them, but they can neither make nor destroy virtue: and how indeed should they be able to do what is impossible to the DEITY himself? virtue being as immutable in its nature as the divine will which is the ground of it. A prince may command his subjects to pay certain taxes and subsidies, may forbid them to export certain commodities, or to introduce those of a foreign country. The faithful observance of these laws makes obedient subjects, but does it make virtuous men? And would any one seriously think himself possessed of a virtue, the more for having never dealt in painted callico? Or if the prince should by his authority abrogate these laws, would any one say that he had abrogated virtue? It is thus with all positive laws; they all had a beginning, are all liable to exceptions, may all be dispensed with, and even abolished. That law alone which is engraven on our hearts by the hand of the creator, is unchangeable, and of universal and eternal obligation. "But, say some, the human mind is like a stormy sea, incessantly agitated by the violence of a thousand impetuous passions, sometimes uniting their force, and sometimes opposing each other. "To engrave laws on the heart of man, is to engrave them, not even on the lightest sand, but on the most inconstant and fluctuating wave. "What

“What eyes are then piercing enough to discern those sacred characters?” Mere rhetorical declamation! It is not the weakness of our sight, but our negligence and inattention, that hinders us from discerning them; or if they ever seem to be quite effaced, it is but for a moment.

THERE are two distinct regions in the human heart; the one is an island just raised above the level of the water, the other is the water itself which surrounds it. On the surface of the island, which is white, hard, and even, like a table of the finest Parian marble, are engraven the sacred precepts of the law of nature. Near these characters stands a youth in a respectful attitude, with his eyes fixed on the inscription which he reads again and again aloud. This is the genius of the island, and is called THE LOVE OF VIRTUE. The water which encompasses the island is indeed subject to frequent ebbs and flows, the gentlest zephyr will put it in agitation; then it grows turbid, it roars and swells, it overflows the inscription, and the characters are no longer seen, nor the voice of the genius heard. But the storm soon ceases, a calm succeeds, the surface of the island rises from the deep fairer than ever, and the genius resumes his employment.

If you suppose mankind obliged to practise the law of nature, you must also suppose them acquainted with it. What would you say of a tyrannical prince who should require his subjects to obey his will, without taking any care to inform them of it? The most arbitrary monarchs never carried their caprice so far as this. Is justice then different from itself? does it vary so much in the divine being from what it is in mankind? or shall we say, that GOD, the tenderest of parents, acts less equitably than a tyrant? “But, say you, it is just in
“GOD

“ GOD thus to leave men in darkness and ignorance. Their own crimes have extinguished the light of nature in their minds; and that they are no longer able to discern the difference between right and wrong, is to be charged upon themselves.”

Very well: let us suppose them ever so deserving of this inability; yet since it is incurred, the practice of their duty is become impossible: the obligation however still remains; and does an infinitely just and merciful being continue to require of them what they do not even know they are obliged to perform? Suppose I have ordered my servant to carry a message; instead of obeying me, he has perhaps spent his time in some dangerous diversion, by which he has broke his leg. This is a fault, and I might justly resent it; but if I were to require him to go on other errands before his leg was set, what character would you bestow upon me.

But I appeal to you yourself, who take so much pains to prove mankind absolutely destitute of all moral discernment; you have doubtless more than once violated the law of nature in some instance or other, and you must allow that your conscience has reproached you for these violations; which is an evident proof that you are not ignorant of its precepts.

THOUGH all mankind without exception were vicious, yet if the vice of hypocrisy were to be found among them, I should be still persuaded that virtue was not unknown to them; for hypocrites, though wicked themselves, are witnesses in favour of the divine law which they transgress, by their dissembled conformity to it.

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* “THE law,” says Cicero, “is not a human invention, nor an arbitrary political constitution; it is in its nature eternal, and of universal obligation. The violence which Tarquin offered to Lucretia, was a breach of this eternal law; and though the Romans at that time might have no written law which condemned such kind of crimes, his offence was not the less heinous. For this law of reason did not then begin, when it was first committed to writing. Its original is as ancient as the divine mind; for the true primitive and supreme law is no other than the unerring reason of the great JUPITER.” And in another place he says, † “This law is founded in nature, it is universal, immutable, and eternal. It is subject to no change from any difference of place or time; it extends invariably to all ages.”

* Hanc igitur video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, neque scitum aliquod esse populorum; sed, aeternum quiddam quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia.---Nec si regnante Sexto Tarquinio nulla erat Romæ scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra illam legem sempiternam Sextus Tarquinius vim Lucretiae Tricipitini filiae intulit: erat enim ratio profecta a rerum natura; et ad recte faciendum impellens, & a delicto avocans; quae non tum denique incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum, cum orta est: orta autem est simul cum mente divina quamobrem lex vera atque princeps, apta ad jubendum, & ad vetandum, ratio est recta summi Jovis. De LEG. Lib. II.

† Est quidem vero lex recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna—nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac: sed et omnes gentes, & omni tempore, una lex, et sempiterna & immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister, et imperator omnium Deus ille, legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator. FRAGM. LIB. DE REP. AP. LACTANT. Lib. VI. Cap. viii.

“ages and nations, like the sovereign dominion of
“that being who is the author of it.”

THIS then may pass for an incontestable truth, that the laws of virtue are imprinted in strong characters on our minds. Violent passions may indeed, for a while, conceal them from our view; but can never efface them, because they are indelible.

THERE is another cause which sometimes hinders us from discerning them, and of which men are generally less aware; and that is a number of laws of an inferior rank, which we learn from our earliest infancy; and being long accustomed to look on them with veneration, we are apt to give them an equal place in our esteem, with that original law which determines our essential obligations.

LAWS are of different kinds; some tend to promote VIRTUE, others are foreign, and others contrary to it.

IN the first class are those laws of which I have been speaking, such as are originally implanted in our minds, are known to all men, and adopted by almost all the religions in the world. Let these be held sacred; the greater reverence you have for them, the more will you improve in virtue.

AMONG the laws of the second class are those which in different religions regulate the external form of divine worship. Though these may have no direct tendency to promote virtue, neither on the other hand have they in general any bad influence on it. But they may be abused; and they unquestionably are so, when upon a competition with the laws of the first class, the preference is given to these. The law of nature is the eldest law; and all religions of later date ought, as younger sisters, to submit to it. It is ignorance of this maxim, which produces so much false devotion and superstition in the world.

ORGON's only companion was his daughter PHILOTHEA. He was one day seized with a fainting fit; his daughter gave him some salts to smell to, which afforded him no relief. Mean while the hour of divine service being come, PHILOTHEA recommends her father to the care of heaven and her servant, snatches her hood and her prayer-book and hurries to church. The service was extraordinary, and lasted long. ORGON dies unassisted, and even unperceived. Had he been laid in a warm bed and proper care been taken, the accident might have been of no consequence. ORGON might still have lived, if his daughter had for once absented from church. But PHILOTHEA thought that the sound of the bells was the voice of GOD, and that it was an heroic action to prefer the divine commands to the tenderest calls of nature. Accordingly, upon her return, she made a most generous surrender of her father's life to heaven, and thought her devotion the more meritorious, as she had sacrificed so much on its account.

LAISS has all her life prostituted her charms to the highest bidder; she has still beauty enough remaining to make new conquests; and you need not fear that she will neglect to improve that advantage. She has indeed some scruples about her manner of life, and intends some time or other to make a decent retreat; but in the mean while, for the repose of her conscience, she orders a mass to be performed once a week to the blessed virgin.

BUT nothing throws such an obscurity on the ideas of virtue originally impressed on our minds, as those false religious opinions, or political laws, which are CONTRARY to the purity of the law of nature. Upon our entrance into the world we find these laws already established, and stamp
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with the venerable seal of religion, or of sovereign authority. How then should any one imagine, that what they command is vice, or that what they forbid is virtue. A young Spartan who had been dextrous enough to commit a theft without being taken in the fact, was so far from thinking it criminal, that he applauded himself for his ingenuity. Or if he had a private intrigue with a married woman, it was a gallantry authorized by the custom of his country, and the example of Jupiter himself. How many even civilized nations have been barbarians in religion, and from a principle of devotion have offered human sacrifices to the DEITY! And if the spirit of fanaticism be not restrained, GOD, even the GOD of the Christians, will every day see his altars smoke with the blood of the like victims. May he have forgot the horrid sacrifices of this kind, which were offered to him by our fore-fathers!

WHILE any crime is looked upon as an offence against the civil government, the example is less dangerous; nor is it likely to be steadily persisted in, as the offender seldom thinks himself innocent: but if it be countenanced by law or universal custom, then it gives a deep and fatal wound to the mind, and not only robs it of its innocence, but, which is infinitely worse, renders it incapable of repentance. Vice gains but a slender advantage, when she only draws some followers into her party; but when she supplants virtue, and usurps her name, her triumph is compleat.

AND what then, say you, can be hoped from these innate principles of morality, when thus buried under the trophies of vice? I answer, that like the sun behind a cloud, though obscured, they still give sufficient light to direct those whose sight is good. A general perversion of morality does in-

deed

deed give credit and authority to vice, but will never corrupt a heart that is truly virtuous; and many of those who, blinded by passion, suffer themselves to be born down by the torrent, would be struck with horror at the dreadful abyss into which they were plunging, if the tumult in their minds would suffer them but for a moment to attend to the voice of reason within them.

I DOUBT not but some of the Lacedemonians abstained from theft, though it was permitted by their laws; and I know that at Rome, where, as well as at Sparta, a lascivious Jupiter was worshipped, adultery was esteemed criminal. The good man complies with the prevailing fashion as well as the bad, except in those things which are contrary to virtue; and a wise man is even more careful to do this than a fool: but the immoral man will not be displeased, if virtue lose somewhat of her influence and credit.

IRENE was born of illustrious, but unfortunate parents: it was her lot to spend her earliest years in the retirement of a cloister, where the virtuous dispositions which nature had implanted in her heart, being cultivated by skilful hands, acquired daily strength and improvement. When the great disposer of human events saw that she was sufficiently furnished with settled principles of wisdom to resist the snares of example, of honour and pleasure; he raised her, by an unexpected turn of his providence, to a rank still more eminent than that of her ancestors, and placed her on the most shining theatre that the world affords: how dangerous a situation, were her virtue less firmly established! But IRENE is immoveable as a rock: tho' surrounded with flatterers, she remains humble; in the midst of tumult and hurry, she lives retired; her piety is not abated, though the air she breathes

is tainted with irreligion ; though adorned with the most magnificent and costly dress, her countenance still retains its native modesty ; and while dissimulation, falshood, and treachery, prevail around her, her lips are the seat of candor, truth, and sincerity. So true is it, that the torrent of example cannot prevail over a heart which is virtuous from principle.

BUT let the young CHLOE be placed in the same scene of life ; the licentiousness which prevails there, far from alarming her, is most exactly suited to her inclinations ; the behaviour of those around her is the same that she would chuse to practise ; it would be a pain to her to be more reserved. If you knew the character of CHLOE, and the principles she has imbibed, you would never apprehend any danger to her from bad examples : she is secured both by nature and education ; all the ill effects of example are anticipated in her by an innate love of pleasure, which her education has only served to render more excessive.

UPON the whole, if we are ignorant of our duty, if our manners are depraved, we must ascribe it solely to the violence of our passions. Let us silence them for a moment, and the voice of REASON will certainly be heard. Let us comply with her kind invitations, she waits only for our consent to make us happy.

“ What then is it she requires ? What should we do ? ” Love GOD, love YOURSELVES, love your FELLOW CREATURES ; these are all your obligations : from the first of them arises PIETY, from the second WISDOM, and the third produces all the SOCIAL VIRTUES.

MANNERS.

M A N N E R S.

P A R T I.

OF PIETY.

SOME perhaps may think, that PIETY is a subject which does not properly belong to philosophy. This I shall readily grant, if it be supposed to consist in the practice of any particular form of external worship; but if we consider it according to my idea of it, as a natural sentiment of love, reverence, and gratitude towards GOD, why may not the philosopher be allowed to treat of it? Whatever does not exceed the sphere of reason and light of nature, is surely within his province.

THERE is something terrible to many people in the word PHILOSOPHER, because there are very few who understand the true meaning of it.

AMONG the Greeks and Romans, but especially the former, philosophers were in some repute; and were thought entitled to the public esteem, on account of their superior penetration and extensive knowledge.

AMONG us, this word conveys a very different idea. In the college-language, philosophers are a set of men distinguished by a long-sleeved gown and a tasseled cap, who teach youth to confound reason by reasoning, to give an air of demonstration to the most uncertain theories, and to render the plainest truths perplexed and dubious. These are not the philosophers that men are afraid of; they are esteemed of so little consequence, as not to be worth even the trouble of censuring.

BUT there is another sort of them not remarkable for any singularity of habit, who firmly believe those truths which are certain, and are sure to suspend their assent where evidence is wanting. If you ask the common people what they think of a philosopher of this kind, they will tell you, he is a fantastical humourist, who takes upon him to controul all our actions, treats most of our opinions with contempt as idle prejudices, believes neither spirits nor witches, and perhaps does not even believe a GOD. But put the same question to a man of sense: a philosopher, he will answer, is one who examines before he believes, and thinks before he acts, and who, consequently, when he is determined, cannot fail of being firm in his belief, and steady in his conduct.

IT is certainly among men of this character, that true and rational piety is to be found; and he who feels it must be allowed to be best qualified to describe it. Piety, then, is within the jurisdiction of the philosopher; and it is from philosophy that I borrow what I shall here lay before my reader on this subject.

THE existence of GOD seems to me a truth which many arguments would only obscure, and which is never made a question but in the schools. If there are any who really doubt of it, their case is to be pitied. This very circumstance proves, that their understanding is disordered; and consequently all reasoning would be lost upon them.

THE idea of the sovereign perfections of GOD is as general and uniform in the minds of men, as that of his existence. We all agree, that he is possessed of every perfection of an intelligent being, in an infinite extent, and without the least allay of any thing wrong or defective; and, in a word, that his majesty, wisdom, goodness, justice, and power, are

are unlimited and perfect. This, I say, is generally acknowledged; but yet there are some dangerous sophists who give us very strange representations of the DEITY.

THE wicked, it seems, in David's time, said in his heart, "There is no GOD:" but he has now learned better; atheism is not his fault; he believes a GOD, but it is one much of the same kind with the Gods of Epicurus; an indolent disdainful being, who thinks it too mean and laborious a task to take any account of the affairs of this lower world; who is neither offended at the crimes of men, nor esteems himself honoured by their adoration; who unconcernedly suffers us to act a short insignificant part upon the stage of the world, and then to be seen no more. This haughty divinity, who makes no difference between a reasonable creature and a brute, has neither rewards for virtue, nor punishments for vice; he looks upon us only as despicable automata, all whose intelligence and activity consist in a well-contrived mechanism; and who like those bubbles which are formed upon the surface of the water by a shower of rain, just rise into being, and in a moment vanish for ever.

SUCH a DEITY is indeed well enough suited to those who consider the practice of virtue as an uneasy yoke; he takes no offence at their vices and impiety, and having promised them nothing, expects no returns of duty from them.

BUT I think far otherwise of GOD. He whom I acknowledge is the creator of the world; my being is his gift, and all the advantages I enjoy either of body, or of mind, are derived from him; he preserves me by his care, and will make me happy by his bounty. His goodness demands my LOVE, his benefits my GRATITUDE, and his majesty WORSHIP and VENERATION.

C H A P. I. OF THE LOVE OF GOD.

TH E R E is no such thing as disinterested love. It was ignorance of the nature of affection, that introduced the notion of loving a person merely for his own sake. Love arises only from the relation between two objects, by which one contributes to the happiness of the other. Let us leave the QUIETIST to love his GOD, even in the moment when his unrelenting justice dooms him to eternal fire: nature knows no such refinement as this. Those perfections of GOD which have no influence upon our happiness, may excite our admiration and reverence, but can never raise our love. It is not because he is great, wise, or powerful, that I love him; but because he is GOOD, because he himself loves me, and gives me proofs of it every moment. If it were otherwise, what would all his perfections signify to me? Though possessed of almighty power, he would never exert it in my behalf; his sovereign greatness would only serve to render me more despicable in his sight; and he would neglect all the means of my happiness, though perfectly acquainted with them. But on the contrary, if I am the object of his love, all his attributes become dear to me; his wisdom will then take all just measures for my happiness; his almighty power will overcome every obstacle to it; and his supreme majesty renders his love infinitely valuable.

“BUT is it certain that GOD loves mankind?” most certain: the innumerable benefits which he showers down upon them, are an incontestable demonstration of it. But as this argument will be considered hereafter, I shall confine myself here to other proofs.

To

To ask if GOD loves mankind, is to ask if he is good ; and if we doubt of this, we call even his being in question : for how can we conceive of a DEITY who is not good ? And can he be good, if he hates the work of his own hands, and delights in the misery of his creatures ? A good prince loves his subjects ; a good father loves his children ; we love even the tree we have planted, the house we have built ; and shall not GOD love his own offspring ? What minds can entertain such a suspicion, except those which conceive of GOD as a barbarous and capricious being who cruelly sports with the fate of mankind ; dooming them irrevocably to hell, even before they are born ; reserving to himself at most only one out of a million, though he has no more deserved that preference, than the rest have deserved their destruction ? Impious blasphemers, who only teach me to hate GOD, by teaching that he hates me !

“ HE owes nothing to mankind.” True : but he owes something to HIMSELF ; he must indispensably be just and good ; his perfections are not the result of his own choice ; he is necessarily what he is ; he is either the MOST PERFECT of all beings, or he is nothing.

BUT I am farther convinced that he loves me, from the love I bear to him. It is because he loves me, that he has impressed upon my heart this sentiment, the most precious of all his gifts. His love, as it ought to be a motive to mine, is at the same time the cause and original of it.

MAY I be allowed to explain the nature of DIVINE LOVE, by a description of that love which devotees call PROPHANE. The parallel in itself has nothing indecent. Love is a vice only in vicious hearts. Fire, though so pure a substance, will yet emit tainted and noxious vapours, if the mat-

ter

ter which feeds it be corrupted : and thus love when associated with vice, produces nothing but shameful desires and criminal designs, and is followed only with trouble, remorse and misery. But if it springs up in an uncorrupted heart, and VIRTUE as well as BEAUTY be the object of it, it is perfectly unblameable; GOD himself is so far from being offended, that he beholds it with pleasure: he made amiable objects, only that they might be loved. I chuse this kind of love as a model of divine love, because of all our affections, this produces the most violent emotions in the mind.

Now what is the situation of one thoroughly possessed with this passion? A powerful impulse constantly determines all his actions in pursuit of the beloved object; whatever separates him from it is painful to him; he dreads to offend it; is solicitous to know its taste and inclinations, in order to comply with and gratify them; he loves to hear it praised; speaks of it with pleasure, and delights in whatever recalls the idea of it to his mind. The art of painting is said to owe its origin to love; and the worship of relicks proceeds doubtless from the same source; even a hair of a person we love is precious.

LET it not be thought that the LOVE OF GOD is essentially different from that now described. Love itself is uniform; and, whether exercised towards GOD, or a fellow-creature, is still the same: the only difference is in the object, and the end proposed. Thus the pious man filled with ardent love for GOD, is desirous to see him, to enjoy him, and be united to him; he meditates on him with delight, speaks of him with reverence; he diligently studies and carefully observes his law; this is the proof of his love, as well as the effect of it,

Whoever

Whoever loves him will obey his commands ; and all who obey them certainly love him.

CLEON lives a retired life ; he has renounced the society of men ; he prays at stated hours, wears a coarse habit, lives on vegetables, eats little, imposes frequent penances on himself, and sees no women. Is it the LOVE OF GOD that animates CLEON ? I much doubt it. I see no virtues in him but such as proceed from caprice. He does many things which are not commanded by the divine law, but he omits many which it prescribes. Let CLEON return to the society of mankind, love them, and be as useful to them as he can ; let him labour to improve his mind, instead of destroying his body ; let him pray with fervour, rather than by rule ; let him believe every thing lawful which GOD has not forbidden ; let him recommend virtue by his example, and have the courage to practice it in open light ; I shall then be more easily persuaded that his love to GOD is genuine.

MANKIND were never able to preserve a just moderation in their principles and conduct, but always run into extremes. The author of CHRISTIANITY has declared to his disciples, " That he loves GOD who does what he commands : " they have imagined it would be a proof of still greater love, to do more than he has commanded : " He requires men to pray to him, to honour him, and give thanks to him for his benefits : " they have thought that the perfection of man consists in abstaining from every other employment. Hence all those pious drones, who pretend that they alone are consecrated to the service of GOD ; and who in reality do nothing in society, but what is at least insignificant if not criminal. " He condemns an inordinate fondness for riches ; " from this they have concluded that it is a virtue to have nothing

nothing of their own. Hence we are eternally pestered with a swarm of religious beggars; true wasps, who support themselves in idleness, by preying upon the substance of the industrious bees. "He forbids adultery and all other violations of chastity:" this prohibition has led them to imagine that a perpetual continency would be extremely pleasing to him. They have not ventured indeed to call marriage a crime; but, which is much the same, they have made virginity a virtue; forgetting, I suppose, that their master cursed a fig-tree, merely because it resembled a virgin. "He blames effeminacy and sensuality:" and what effect has this produced upon them? seized with madness and fury, they arm themselves with whips, scourges, and sharp weapons, and with unnatural hands wound and tear their bodies like the priests of Baal before Elijah. Frantic wretches! what could you do more, had you chosen for your GOD that MALEVOLENT SPIRIT whom you call the Devil?

A SOLDIER who has received an order from his commander, is no more at liberty to add to it; than to omit any circumstance of it; which ever way he offends, the fault may be equally dangerous, and is equally deserving of punishment.

IT is so far from being true, that we must hate ourselves in order to love GOD; that, on the contrary, SELF-HATRED is inconsistent with the LOVE of GOD. Can it be our duty to entertain sentiments opposite to his? He loves us; and let us not expect to obtain his favour, by hating what he loves. "He commands us to love our fellow-creatures as ourselves." This command cannot surely imply that we ought to hate ourselves. Let the flesh be kept in subjection to the spirit, but let it not be destroyed. Live chaste, but do not deny yourselves lawful gratifications. Beware of the
love.

love of riches, but neglect not to provide for your necessities. Lift up your heart frequently in devotion to GOD, but let your hand also be stretched out to relieve the poor when he implores your help.

THIS Notion, that we cannot have a true love for GOD without counter-acting all our natural desires, even those that are most innocent, so generally prevails, that we never think of extolling the piety of a man who makes as many meals as others, eats indifferently flesh or fish, who dresses decently, and lies on a down bed, who loves his wife tenderly and takes pleasure in giving her proofs of his affection; with whatever virtue he may be endowed, or whatever good actions he may perform.

AT Rome they frequently canonize popes, hermits, founders of religious orders, and even nameless skeletons when nothing better offers; but we shall hardly find an instance of their having enrolled among the saints a good father of a family, unless perhaps a king, or at least one whose descendants have been kings. Some enthusiasts imagine, that if we truly love GOD, we must love nothing else; that he is a jealous being, and is displeased when a husband has a tender regard for his wife, or a lover for his mistress. The representation they give of him, is not unlike that of a man so whimsical and peevish as to take offence at his wife's fondness for a canary bird. So false and mistaken are our notions concerning DIVINE LOVE, that we are apt to consider it as an affection of too exalted a nature for the generality of mankind, and wholly confined to persons of extraordinary virtue and sanctity; and to assert that a Turk is capable of loving GOD, would pass among Christians for little less than blasphemy.

ARIS-

ARISTUS at thirty years of age had a large acquaintance in the polite world; he was the favourite of all who knew him, and the life of all the numerous parties of pleasure in which he was engaged. But now he is sixty, his taste is altered: he no longer spends his time in company and gay amusements; the church is the only place he frequents, where he is best pleased when the service is longest; he prays incessantly and fervently, and reflects with sorrow that so many years of his life have been spent in a giddy pursuit of pleasure, while his duty to GOD has been neglected. And, no wonder, say some; the poor man's intellects begin to fail; it is seldom otherwise with old men; when their reason is upon the decline, they commonly turn religious. I should think so too, if at the same time ARISTUS's ordinary conduct betrayed any weakness of understanding; but if his natural good sense still remains, I must conclude that this change is owing to his love of virtue, which is grown stronger as age has rendered his passions more calm and moderate: now THE LOVE OF VIRTUE is necessarily attended with PIETY. I do not make the piety of ARISTUS to consist merely in his frequenting our churches, (for were he a Mahometan, he would frequent the mosques; were he a Protestant, he would worship in protestant churches; if he were of the religion of Job or Enoch, he would worship in all places alike;) but in the sincere devotion of his heart, and in his performing all those actions which are the certain proofs and effects of it.

WHEN a woman, who is forsaken by her admirers, engages in a religious course of life, she is commonly censured as a hypocrite, who mocks GOD instead of honouring him. But why so? Being thus forsaken, she conceives a dislike to the world:

world: yet her tender affections still remain, and must be fixed upon some object; and heaven is the object she chuses. She is told besides, that the love of GOD is a more noble passion than the love of creatures: this sentiment flatters her vanity; and being convinced by experience of the emptiness of the world, her pride may perhaps direct her affections towards heaven. But provided the heart be sincerely attached to virtue, it is of little importance what first gave rise to the good disposition.

VALERIA had a gallant of a distinguished rank, a circumstance which suited her ambitious temper. But he proves inconstant, and transfers his addresses to another. She cannot surely, after this, think of entertaining a lover of inferior quality! no, this would give her pride too deep a wound: her resolution is to renounce love and gallantry for ever. This change begins indeed from vexation and ill humour; but what then? it is a change from vice to virtue. Having once trod the dangerous path, she will, now she has left it, be more sensible of the fatal consequences of pursuing it; and though her first return to virtue is from constraint, she will persevere in it from inclination. Cease once from the commission of vice, and in time you will infallibly abhor it.

THE most ill-favoured countenance gives us no pain, when we have it continually before our eyes; but if we look on it after many years absence, it then appears in all its deformity. Thus vice never pleases at first sight; use only can reconcile us to the view of it. When a man enters upon a vicious course, it is with trembling steps; like one who dreading the coldness of the water in which he would bathe himself, at first only dips in his foot, his leg next follows, and advancing by degrees

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he at last boldly plunges his whole body into the stream. A man must be long inured to vice before he becomes thoroughly abandoned, and have been guilty of many less crimes before he can in any fundamental point sacrifice his honour and integrity.

SHOULD such a one afterwards be so happy as to see and repent of his folly, and determine upon a contrary course, he will proceed in it at first with difficulty; he will find the path steep and rugged, compared with that smooth and easy descent which led him before to his destruction: but notwithstanding all the pains it may cost him, let him resolutely persist; he who walks with reluctance still goes on; and what is a fatigue to one of a weak and tender habit of body, becomes an agreeable exercise when by use his constitution is grown more firm and robust. At length his eyes will be thoroughly opened to see vice in its true shape and proper colours, and then he will immediately hate it; for it is only under a mask that vice appears agreeable; while virtue, on the contrary, is most engaging when unveiled. The better we are acquainted with her, the more must we love her: if she were to appear in a visible form, we should fall down and adore her; and so would she appear, if GOD were to render himself visible to mortal eyes; for he is the only being in whom virtue resides in all its purity. And indeed I much doubt whether any real difference can be assigned between GOD and VIRTUE; a farther proof that the love of GOD and the love of virtue are the same. No one I believe will deny that we ought to love virtue; how then can it be doubted whether we ought to love GOD? But there is no occasion to multiply arguments; truths of this kind command our assent as soon as proposed. Let us now proceed to the article of GRATITUDE.

CHAP. II. OF THE GRATITUDE WHICH
WE OWE TO GOD.

WITH regard to mankind, LOVE and GRATITUDE are two distinct sentiments: we may love a person, without having received any favours from him; we may receive favours from him, without loving him; and though our obligations to him be ever so great, our not loving him is no necessary proof that we are ungrateful. But if we consider these sentiments as having GOD for their object, they cannot be separated; because he is both an amiable and a beneficent being. The former I have already demonstrated; the latter is now to be proved.

IN order to this, consider the various obligations you are under to your fellow-creatures. You are indebted to your mother for your birth, to your father for his care of you, to your instructors for having furnished your mind with useful knowledge, to your benefactors for their generous assistance, to your friends for their affection: but GOD alone sustains all these characters of MOTHER, FATHER, INSTRUCTOR, BENEFACTOR, and FRIEND; and those to whom you give these titles are, properly speaking, no more than the instruments of his bounty. For a proof of this, let us consider him under each of these relations.

SECT. I. GOD COMPARED TO A MOTHER.

SILVIA being just grown up, is addressed by a lover, whose youth, person, fortune, and polite accomplishments make an instant impression upon her heart; and though her tender years and virgin modesty render her at first timorous and irresolute,

28 GOD COMPARED TO A MOTHER.

yet at length she finds herself unable to resist so many perfections, and her inclination determines her consent. She marries, and soon becomes a MOTHER. And now what has she done hitherto for the child which she has brought forth? The whole is the work of GOD. When he laid the foundations of the heavens and the earth, he had this infant in view; and even then had settled the long train of events which were to terminate in his birth. Nay, he did more; he himself created him, when he moulded that clay out of which the first man was formed. The time is now come for the opening of this bud; the body of SILVIA is the receptacle he has chosen for it, and he has himself taken care to cherish and unfold it.

LET this child hereafter honour his MOTHER; it is his duty: for she has suffered, if not for his sake, at least by his means, all the inconveniencies of pregnancy, and the pains of delivery. But let him carry his grateful acknowledgements still higher; and not imitate those superstitious idolaters, who seeing the earth yearly covered with corn, fruits and pastures, stupidly worshipped the blind instrument of the goodness of the SOVEREIGN LORD, but forgot to bless the almighty hand to which it owes its fruitfulness.

SECT. II. GOD CONSIDERED AS A FATHER.

GOD is also the FATHER of all mankind, more truly than any man is the father of his own children.

I NEED not take any notice of the share which the father has in the birth of his son, because I do not see that any gratitude is due to him on that account. His own satisfaction was the object he had

had, in view; and if this is to be looked upon as a favour, he should also be thanked for the good meals he has made, for the wine he has drank, for the minuets he has danced, and in a word for all the pleasures he has taken. The relation of a father does not of itself give any man claim to the affection of his children; this is due to him only so far as he discharges faithfully those duties which nature has connected with that relation.

Is any gratitude due to a father from those unhappy victims whom he cruelly dooms to the melancholy confinement of a cloister, only to swell the fortune of an elder brother? Can any sentiments of filial love arise in the hearts of children towards a stern and rigorous tyrant, whose looks and words are all furious and passionate, who instructs them only by menaces, and corrects them like an executioner? What a father is FLORIMOND! he lives like a stranger in his own house; he goes in and out, drinks, games, and takes his pleasure. His children in the mean time grow up to maturity; happy indeed if they follow virtue of their own accord, if they acquire any useful accomplishments, or provide for themselves a settlement in the world! he, for his part, gives himself no trouble about them. They are indebted to him for their birth, and he has given them his name; but he has never thought of them since; he just knows them by sight, and that is all.

BUT since it is GOD that we are here comparing to a FATHER, let us at least take an instance from the most excellent and tender of parents, that the disproportion may appear less enormous. May I be allowed to propose my own father as an example.

My father was of the middle rank, but his fortune was not equal to his station: yet such was his tender care and prudent œconomy, that I have

30 GOD CONSIDERED AS AN INSTRUCTOR.

never had reason to envy the lot of those who are born in the greatest affluence. Being temperately fed, decently cloathed, instructed in the sciences by the ablest masters, and formed to virtue more by his examples than his admonitions; had I wished for another father, and could my wish have been answered, I must have been a loser by the exchange. He carefully provided for my subsistence, my education, and my improvement in virtue: these are strong motives to gratitude. He did for me all that was in his power: but it was from GOD that he received that power. Still must we ascend to that ORIGINAL SOURCE of all good. When my father was watchful for my preservation, it was GOD that preserved me; when he employed himself in instructing me, it was GOD that opened my understanding; and when he displayed to me the charms of virtue, it was GOD that inspired me with the love of it.

SECT. III. GOD CONSIDERED AS AN INSTRUCTOR.

LET us next examine, whether those masters who instruct us and direct our conduct, can with more justice be put in competition with that ETERNAL TRUTH which is the fountain of all knowledge. Though we should suppose them more knowing than they are, more certain of the maxims they teach, more free from prejudice, and less swayed by interest and passion; yet how limited is their knowledge, if it be reduced to those principles only which are evident and certain! and no other principles deserve the name of knowledge. Now these GOD has given in common to all men; every one has them in possession, and may by reflection make them present to his mind.

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GOD CONSIDERED AS A BENEFACITOR. 31

It is on this account that some sects of philosophers have imagined all our knowledge to be obtained by memory.

THE number of truths, at least of such as are really useful, is not so great as is commonly supposed; and in general, it is only indolence or prejudice that conceals them from us: or if there are any of a more abstruse kind, which are to be found only by intense study and application, the discovery of them is not therefore to be ultimately attributed either to our teachers, or to our own industry. These treasures are indeed more deeply hidden by our CREATOR; but they as truly proceed from him as others; since it is by searching into our own minds that we discover them, and our minds are his workmanship. The labourer digs the mine, the philosopher directs him in his work; but neither of them furnish the gold which it contains.

SECT. IV. GOD CONSIDERED AS A BENEFACITOR.

IF there is any one who denies the title of BENEFACITOR to the DEITY, I write not for him; nor do I think myself obliged to controvert his opinion. The light he enjoys, the air he breathes, every thing which contributes to his preservation or pleasure, the heavens, the earth, and universal nature, all conspiring to promote his happiness, bear witness against him, and sufficiently confute him. His very powers of thought, of speech and action, are the mere gift of GOD; and but for that PROVIDENCE which he blasphemes, he would never have existed, nor the earth have been burdened with such a monster of INGRATITUDE.

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32 GOD CONSIDERED AS A BENEFACTOR:

We agree indeed in general, that our existence is the gift of GOD; yet we seem to take pleasure in depreciating this gift, that we may exempt ourselves from those grateful acknowledgements that are due for it. Man is a querulous creature; in a dry season he would have it rain, when it rains he wishes for fair weather. Notwithstanding his ignorance of what is truly good for him, he is as peremptory in his wishes, and as loud in his complaints, as if he knew in every case what would most conduce to his happiness. He lives, and, while his enjoyment of life is consistent with the wisdom of the ALMIGHTY, is sustained by his bounty: but if for this life the tribute of gratitude is required of the unworthy possessor, he affects to treat it with indifference, and is sometimes pleased to complain of it as a burden: he forgets all that GOD has done in his behalf; and is more uneasy for what he wants, than thankful for what he enjoys. His principal objections against PROVIDENCE are taken from the DISORDERS which happen IN THE NATURAL WORLD, from the WANTS AND APPETITES OF THE BODY, and the IRREGULAR PASSIONS OF THE MIND.

LET us examine these objections distinctly, and endeavour to justify the ways of the ALMIGHTY.

“A CITY is destroyed by an inundation; a caravan is buried in the sands; wild beasts, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, and a thousand other dreadful evils assail and destroy us.”

WHAT is there in all these events that can acquit you of your obligation to GRATITUDE? Have you a less share in the DIVINE BOUNTY, because Lima is swallowed up? Have the flames of Ætna or Vesuvius reached you? Or if they had, death is the worst you could suffer from these or any

GOD CONSIDERED AS A BENEFACTOR. 33

any other pretended disorders in the world. But is DEATH an evil in itself? It is only the passage from this life to the other; and the determination of your lot in that future life for happiness or misery, is in your own power.

NEVER judge of GOD from events; but rather form your judgment of events from the idea you have of GOD. No disorders happen in affairs directed by men, but from want of power, integrity, or wisdom. But no perfection is wanting in GOD; and since he is the governor of the world, how is it possible that any real disorders should happen in it? Here are two seeming inconsistencies to be reconciled, the PERFECTIONS OF GOD with the apparent IMPERFECTION of his works. Now it is evident that GOD is infinitely powerful, wise, and good; but it is not evident, on the other hand, that what appears to be evil really is so; since GOD may have ends in view which are above our comprehension: determining, therefore, the uncertain from what is certain, I conclude that all is well and wisely ordered.

As to THE WANTS OF THE BODY, so far from affording any just objection against the goodness of GOD, they appear to me a strong proof of his paternal regard for us. By these we are called off from the toil and fatigue of business, which but for such powerful avocations, we might pursue with an assiduity and intenseness that would prove destructive to us. And what still more excites my admiration is, that these seeming inconveniencies give the highest relish to the pleasures of life. We then eat and drink with peculiar delight, when our appetites of hunger and thirst are most keen and urgent. The artificer rises in the morning, and begins his work; his only incentive, in general,

34 GOD CONSIDERED AS A BENEFACTOR.

ral, is the prospect of gain, which he pursues with such eagerness, that were not this desire overpowered by the stronger demands of nature, it would allow him no intermission. But hunger constrains him at least three times a day to desist from his laborious employment. He obeys the powerful call; and his fatigue having sharpened his appetite, he gratifies it with a degree of pleasure unknown to the luxury and indolence of the great. He then chearfully returns to his work; and by sweat and labour prepares himself for another repast as delicious as the former.

WHO can enough extol thy blessings, balmy SLEEP, thou powerful restorer of our exhausted strength; whose peaceful charm suspends all our cares, banishes our sorrows, and relieves our sharpest pains! Surely the nectar of the Gods had no virtues comparable to thine; nor was the boasted Nepenthe of Homer any other than a soporiferous juice. How blissful is the situation of those happy lovers, who faint and sinking under insupportable pleasure, are sustained by thy friendly arm, and feel the fierce and tumultuous transport subside in a soft and voluptuous languor, which is rather a change than a diminution of delight!

OR is the invincible propensity of one sex towards the other, to be reckoned an unhappiness? I know indeed there are some men to whom this desire is a torment. But whence does that arise? Only from their own imagination, from a ridiculous persuasion that there is a virtue in resisting their natural appetites, and that it is unworthy of a man to contribute to the propagation of his species. But is the PROVIDENCE OF GOD to be arraigned for this? Must their fantastical prejudices be placed to his account? Let them abate their arrogance,

rogance, and consider themselves as on a level with other men; and, without aspiring after a pretended and chimerical perfection, let them satisfy the demands of nature, which is the only rational way to free themselves from their importunity.

A MAN of sense, far from regarding the strength of his passion, the opposition he meets with, and the difficulties he is to overcome, as real misfortunes and causes of complaint; considers them, on the contrary, as designed to enliven his sensations and heighten the taste of pleasure. We should have but little satisfaction in the enjoyment of any object, were it not for the ardency of our desires, and the obstacles we meet with in the pursuit of it.

WILL the UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF RICHES be urged as an objection against PROVIDENCE? the exorbitant wealth of some, and the extreme poverty of others?

THIS argument is built upon a false principle; and if the foundation be taken away, the superstructure must fall of course. The objection supposes that riches are the only, or at least the chief good of human life. But if it appears, on the contrary, that of all the gifts which the divine bounty confers upon mankind, riches are the least valuable; and that the want of them, however important they may seem, may be abundantly compensated by other advantages; can we justly repine at PROVIDENCE though they should be denied to us?

To show the comparative worthlessness of these uncertain possessions, which are foreign to us in every sense, as they belong immediately neither to the body nor the mind; let us only compare them with some advantages of the animal life, such as
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perfect health, a compleat and regular form of body, a just contexture and free use of our various organs: there is not one of these advantages, which we should not even singly prefer to riches, were we put to our choice; much more should we give them the preference when united. But if we bring into the account the more precious gifts of virtue, honour, genius, understanding, and science; what despicable trifles are riches, when compared to the least of these endowments? especially if we consider farther, that these advantages both of body and mind, may be made the certain means of acquiring riches; whereas riches themselves will neither supply the defects of the body, nor correct the disorders of the mind.

IN the same manner may we answer the objection taken from THE DIFFERENCE OF RANK AND DEGREE among mankind, the exalted station of some, and the mean and abject condition of others.

LET honours be considered in the same light with riches; compare them with any natural advantages of body, or perfections of mind, and you will soon perceive of how little value they are. Let your ambitious desires rise to the highest pitch, (nothing so easy as wishing;) aspire at once to the rank of a sovereign, and imagine your wishes gratified; what would be the gain? A king, if he faithfully discharges the duties of his station, has of all men the greatest weight of care to sustain; and if he neglects them, he is of all men the most deservedly odious.

WHEN either HONOUR or WEALTH fall to the lot of the unworthy, instead of exalting, they debase their possessors in the eyes of mankind, by rendering their faults more conspicuous.

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HYPsISTUS and POLLIO are proofs of this. The latter loved gaming, feasting, wine and women; but at the same time he loved money. This passion, though it did not destroy the others, yet it concealed them; and though it did not make POLLIO a good man, it made him an hypocrite. He knew that in the world, corrupted as it is, vice must go in disguise; and though immorality may be sometimes excused, yet barefaced impudent wickedness is detested. He was, therefore, private in his vices, and circumspect in his whole discourse and behaviour. He personated the man of probity, as well as he was able, in the presence of his superiors; and took care they should discover no more of his vice and meanness than was necessary to serve their own purposes. POLLIO, by thus taking the straight road to wealth and preferment, became immensely rich; then, weary of the uneasy restraint which he had before imposed on himself, he threw aside the mask, and gave a loose to all his passions; feasting, gaming, intriguing, became his whole business and delight, and his licentious appetites were indulged with the utmost luxury and extravagance.

HYPsISTUS took a different road to preferment. His birth was not eminent, nor did his capacity seem to promise him any great success in the world. But the fair sex, who are to be sure endowed with a greater degree of sagacity than men, discovered in him a merit of a particular kind, which he improved to so good purpose, that by means of it he raised himself to the highest honours. The talent however to which he owed his advancement, not being one of those which reflect a lustre on a high station, his character appeared despicable; and he endeavoured in vain to render himself insensible of

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the meanness of it, by the arrogant and haughty airs he assumed in public.

THERE are innumerable persons of ordinary rank and fortune, who are more indebted to PROVIDENCE than HYPsISTUS and POLLIO. It is in the middle station of life that true happiness is found, and not among the rich and great. The air which is suited to the greatest part of mankind, circulates near the surface of the earth; but that which we breathe on high places makes the head giddy, and disorders the whole frame.

NATURE, that indulgent parent, notwithstanding our incessant complaints, has not distributed her favours to mankind with so much partiality as at first sight we are ready to imagine. The most intense and exquisite pleasures are common to all: those which are peculiar to the great, have little solidity in them, depend chiefly on fancy, and have many allays of pain from which the pleasures of simple nature are entirely free. All the comforts of life are derived from her; and it is from the IRREGULARITY OF OUR IMAGINATIONS and the CORRUPTION OF OUR MANNERS, that most of our misfortunes proceed.

ANOTHER objection alleged against PROVIDENCE, by the unjust and ungrateful censurers of it, is the INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS on the human mind. The condition of man, they think, is much to be lamented; because there frequently arise in his mind sudden and violent emotions, which he is not able to controul: they very freely enlarge upon the fatal effects of the passions, but seem totally to forget the infinite advantages which they produce. As well might the fire, the water, and the air be our abhorrence, because in different ways they may be the instruments of our destruction.

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tion. We ought to consider the passions as they are in themselves, and not judge of them by their imagined effects; or if the effects are to be considered, let us at least take into the account the good as well as the bad.

It is usual with moral writers to declaim with great severity against the PASSIONS, and to be very lavish of their encomiums upon REASON. I shall not scruple to assert, on the contrary, that our passions are entirely innocent, and that our reason alone is culpable.

OUR passions are excited only by the impressions which objects make upon us, and the apprehensions we thence form of them, as pleasing or disagreeable: now these depend not on our will, and cannot therefore be criminal.

WE are not ourselves the authors of our passions. They begin to exert themselves in our earliest infancy, even before we are capable of reflection. They must therefore be the gift of NATURE, or rather the gift of GOD; for in true philosophical language, GOD and NATURE are the SAME. And we cannot surely think, that our merciful CREATOR would bestow upon us such gifts as are in themselves pernicious and destructive.

NAY, I will farther add, that our passions are not only innocent in themselves, but they are good, useful and necessary. It is just and natural that a reasonable creature should desire its own HAPPINESS, and endeavour to obtain it: now two things are necessary to happiness, freedom from pain, and enjoyment of pleasure; and these are the objects of all our passions. They all tend either to remove what is inconsistent with our happiness, or to secure the possession of something by which it may be increased. Every inclination which rises

40 GOD CONSIDERED AS A BENEFACTOR.

in our minds from the fear of pain or the desire of pleasure, is innocent, and agreeable to our natural **INSTINCT**. But this instinct is involuntary and blind in its motions; nor is there any need that it should be otherwise, since it is not designed to be its own conductor. Its tendency indeed is always to the obtaining of good, and the avoiding of evil; but as it cannot of itself judge concerning good and evil, it requires to be directed to proper objects; and it is the office of **REASON** to make the right choice and distinction. It belongs to this superior power to regulate every lower impulse and inclination, to give them a just direction, and restrain them within due bounds. In this it often fails; and then our **PASSIONS** are exclaimed against for a fault, which ought to be charged only upon our **REASONS**.

LOVE, for instance, is a passion so necessary, that without it the human race would soon be extinct. Both sexes are improved and refined by their inclination to each other; an inclination which produces the sweetest union and the warmest friendship, the tenderest alliances and the most amiable society: but it produces these happy effects only, when it is under the government and direction of **REASON**; for when left to its own unguided impetuosity, it is frequently the cause of treachery, perjury, adultery, incest, murder, and every horrid mischief that a blind fury can produce. The union of the sexes is the end of love; this union is perfectly agreeable to the design of nature; it must therefore be innocent; and the affection itself is not to be suppressed. If your heart be naturally tender, endeavour not to render it insensible; but let your tenderness be fixed upon such objects as will not obstruct you in a virtuous course, or rather
love

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love only such as will assist you to pursue it. Your tender affections will not be the less gratified for making such a choice; nay, you can never enjoy true satisfaction from love that is not thus directed: there can be no friendship without virtue. The union of two lovers without virtuous dispositions, is not love; it is an odious association, by which they become partners in vice, and accomplices in each other's crimes.

AGATHO had an inclination to CEPHISA. He is a man of family, full of conceit and affectation, with a haughty mein and a tripping gait. When he is to look at an object which is not straight before him, his head, as if ill fixed on its joint, turns with difficulty half the way towards it; his languishing eye with regret performs the rest. Proud of his birth and equipage, he despises all useful accomplishments, and can excuse the acquisition of them only in those, who being placed in a lower sphere, cannot by any other means raise themselves from their obscurity. The idea of GOD is painful to him; for he likes not to think of a being superior to himself; he has an aversion to the social virtues, because they require him to show deference and respect to others; nor has he any greater love for equity, because this would fix bounds to his extravagant claims. Thus is he impious, oppressive, and rapacious; false and perfidious in his promises and engagements; incapable of tenderness, compassion, or gratitude. He is not one of those who are hurried into vice by the force of unruly passions; but the coxcomb thinks that he has merit enough already, and that it is not worth his while to be virtuous.

CEPHISA is vain and imperious; a croud of lovers are at her feet, and there she suffers them to remain.

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remain as so many trophies in honour of her charms. One only can be rewarded, but all must adore her. She commands as a sovereign, they obey like slaves; and the better to secure her despotic sway, her orders are always the most unreasonable and capricious. The most servile and abject of her train expect to carry the prize, but they are deceived; for though she demands an unlimited respect, she despises those who pay it. She has no discernment of true merit; conceit, arrogance, and presumption, are with her the marks of superior talents; she knows no other dignity than what is derived from a title; she is unable to distinguish wit from the affectation of it, and judges of love only by compliments, and flattery; she is, in a word, destitute of religion and all principles of morality, and without any settled taste or character. How nearly does she resemble AGATHO! On him she accordingly fixes her choice. Is LOVE the bond of such a union? No; it is only the persuasion they have, that neither has merit enough to render the want of it conspicuous in the other. But it is not sufficient that our passion be directed to a worthier object than either CEPHISA or AGATHO; let it be ever so well grounded and innocent in itself, it must in many instances be carefully restrained and moderated.

IF ever any object was worthy of the tenderest passion, it is surely the lovely MENOQUI. It did not require long time or observation to discover that she had charms sufficient to justify the warmest admiration. A heart equally discerning and less cautious than mine, would have been instantly vanquished. Every thing conspired against me; her beautiful features, her majestic mien, the numberless graces of her whole person, the sense and spirit

spirit which shone in her eyes, the exquisite delicacy of her conversation. I withstood, however, all these united charms. But I could not resist the force of a thousand other perfections still more engaging and valuable, which every day displayed themselves more and more, and continually increased my wonder and esteem; a heart susceptible of friendship, generous, noble, and benevolent, frank and ingenuous without the least indiscretion; her temper sprightly and chearful, but ever confined within the strictest bounds of prudence; noble and elevated sentiments without pride or ostentation; an extensive capacity and refined taste, joined with unaffected modesty; virtue without formality, and piety without superstition. Such an assemblage of charms I thought sufficient to authorize the passion they had excited: and though I can never expect any returns from her who is the object of it, she being unalterably engaged to another, yet did it not appear to me criminal, but only unfortunate; and I freely allowed it a place in my breast, on condition it should not disturb my repose. And though MENOQUI be most dear to me, yet were my passion to grow unruly, should it attempt to pass the bounds which I have prescribed to it, or break out into licentious desires, I would not expose myself to the danger of offending her by any rash discovery of sentiments so unworthy, nor wait to receive my punishment from her; I would myself be an implacable avenger of my secret guilt, and at once banish myself from her presence for ever: thus would I deprive her of the advantage of being the first to pronounce my sentence, and endeavour by a voluntary sacrifice to exert a virtue equal to her own. The love I bear her causes in me no remorse: it would indeed, were it to lead me to attempt her virtue;

but

44. GOD CONSIDERED AS A BENEFACITOR.

but it is too pure ever to produce so criminal an effect.

THUS it is with the other passions; they are all good and useful in themselves, and continue to be so while they are directed to PROPER OBJECTS, and are under DUE REGULATION. The ill consequences which are charged upon them, only happen when they are misplaced or immoderate.

HATRED is not criminal in itself; there are objects which deserve to be hated. But take care to hate only such; and never let your hatred rise to malice or revenge. Regulate in the same manner your indignation and contempt.

FEAR all real evils; without fearing them, you can hardly avoid them: but if they are unavoidable, learn to bear them with resolution. Moderate fear is prudence; excessive fear is cowardice.

ANGER is an emotion which excites the mind to violent efforts, of which, though they are sometimes necessary, it is incapable in a state of tranquillity. This passion is useful to a good father, a kind master, and an indulgent superior, who without such an incitement would pardon many faults which ought to be punished. But it is of no use to a minister of state, a governor of a province, or an inquisitor; this sort of people can do mischief enough in cold blood. ANGER, when indulged without just occasion, is a ridiculous extravagance; when it rises too high, it is madness.

THE necessities of human life first gave birth to the arts and sciences; but it is to CURIOSITY alone they owe their increase and improvement; an amiable passion, which, next to love, has most contributed to soften, to polish and civilize mankind! Happy had it been for the world, if no passions more destructive than this had ever prevailed.

Witness,

Witness, ye happy victims, sacrificed to that airy phantom GLORY, in the fields of Fontenoy, Rocoux, Lawfelt and Exiles! Your precious blood would not have been so profusely and wantonly shed, were men inspired with no other principles than useful curiosity, and the love of knowledge. And yet this passion, so fruitful of good effects, when not restrained by prudence to proper objects, becomes indiscretion; and when it exceeds the power and extent of human reason, it produces absurd systems of philosophy, and enthusiastic doctrines in religion.

FROM this enumeration it appears, that the passions are not evil in their OWN NATURE, but only become so when they are abused. However, not to cavil about words, if by PASSIONS any one chuses to mean only VICIOUS or IMMODERATE AFFECTIONS, I freely condemn them; let them be mortified and subdued as much as possible. But if we consider them in their original, as INNOCENT EMOTIONS proceeding from a natural instinct, they are the work of GOD, and should therefore be held sacred: it is a degree of impiety to endeavour to destroy them; our duty is only to regulate and guide them.

“BUT” it may be said, “is this always in our power? Is not reason itself sometimes overborn by the violence of the passions, and rendered incapable of controuling them? And may it not be justly imputed to the DEITY that we are liable to such imperfection, since he could certainly have given reason a more ABSOLUTE COMMAND?”

WITHOUT doubt: all this I readily allow. It too often happens, that reason refuses its aid when it is most necessary; and for want of being guided by its light, our passions frequently become hurtful.

46. GOD CONSIDERED AS A BENEFACTOR.

ful. But are we on this account less obliged to acknowledge THE GOODNESS OF GOD? Our passions are no farther hurtful, than our own choice makes them; and our reason is to blame, if they are suffered to gain the ascendant. But without enquiring whence it proceeds, that our passions, originally so good and useful, degenerate into imperfections, let us take the matter at the worst, and examine whether even these imperfections themselves may not be reconciled with the DIVINE GOODNESS. When we were speaking concerning the wants of the body, we observed that they were the source of all its pleasures. Why may not the passions be of the same use to the mind? They unquestionably are so with respect to a GOOD MAN, who labours to subdue in himself every vicious affection. The mathematician rejoices, when he has solved a difficult and abstruse problem: but how much greater is the pleasure which must fill the heart of a virtuous man, when, after a generous conflict with an obstinate and rebellious passion, he is at length victorious, and can say to himself, "I am now become better, I am more acceptable in the sight of GOD, and have acquired a greater resemblance of his perfections."

"But," it may be farther asked, "if man were entirely exempted from such conflicts, would not his obligation to HEAVEN be greater?"

I KNOW not that; nor is it my business to enquire into it: but this, however, I know, that his MERIT would be LESS. What! shall we be always seeking excuses for INGRATITUDE? Would you blame an artificer for making a clock which marks only the minutes, because he might have made one to mark the seconds? GOD, no doubt, could have made us more perfect than we are, and equal to those celestial spirits which are represented

to us as surrounding his throne ; but when he created us, he intended only to create MEN. Had he made you ANGELS, ungrateful unnatural hearts who repay his benefits only with murmurs and complaints, you would then, like those dæmons who are said to be plunged into the abyfs, have complained that you were not GODS.

No longer then affront your BENEFACTOR ; but confess that goodness of which he gives you such continual proofs : and if you love him not on account of his other perfections, love him at least because he is kind and beneficent.

SECT. V. GOD CONSIDERED AS OUR FRIEND.

THE whole of FRIENDSHIP consists in loving the person on whom we have placed our affection, in desiring his welfare, and endeavouring to promote it. And as the love of GOD to us, and the benefits we receive from him, have been made sufficiently evident in this and the preceding chapter, it is needless to use any further arguments to prove that he is OUR FRIEND. This proposition is a necessary consequence of the former. But though the DEITY may be justly considered under this tender and engaging character, such a view of him ought not to lessen in us that profound REVERENCE which is due to his infinite majesty. As he is more gracious and condescending than earthly princes, he is the friend of his subjects, and is willing that the friendship should be MUTUAL : but they must not on this account forget that he is their SOVEREIGN, and as such entitled to their HOMAGE and VENERATION.

CHAP.

CHAP. III. OF THE HOMAGE WHICH WE
OWE TO GOD.

THE absolute greatness of GOD is not, strictly speaking, the ground of that homage which we owe him: this is founded in the relation which subsists between him and us; he being our sovereign, and we his servants and vassals. We owe no homage to the Turkish sultan, though one of the greatest monarchs upon earth; because we are not his subjects. GOD alone is THE SOVEREIGN OF THE WHOLE WORLD; and the authority with which the kings of the earth are invested, is, at best, no more than a shadow of his universal dominion. They hold their power, originally at least, from their people; the power of GOD is derived from none but HIMSELF. He called the world into being by his word: this is the foundation of his sovereignty. Earthly princes may publish edicts for the regulation of their several states; but they are obliged to entrust the execution of them to inferior officers, to whom they delegate a power for that purpose: but GOD, by a mere act of his will, can in a moment change the whole face of nature. The power of kings reaches only to external actions; the power of GOD extends to the inclination of the heart. And in proportion as his authority over us is more absolute and extensive than that of any other sovereign, our veneration for him should be greater, and our homage more profound.

THIS homage which is due from us to GOD, is what we call WORSHIP, or RELIGION; and this is commonly distinguished into internal and external. The internal is of necessary obligation; the external is rather a matter of decency and convenience;

venience: the one is invariable and universal, the other temporary and local.

SECT. I. OF INTERNAL WORSHIP.

INTERNAL worship is seated in the MIND, and is that only by which GOD can be honoured. It is founded on a just sense of his infinite perfections, his sovereign authority over us, and our innumerable obligations to him. A heart filled with such sentiments, will naturally express them by the warmest admiration and love, and the strongest professions of gratitude and submission. This is the language of the heart, these are its hymns, its prayers, and its sacrifices; this is the worship of which it is capable, and which alone is suitable to THE PERFECTIONS OF THE DEITY. This also is the worship which the author of CHRISTIANITY intended to restore, when he abolished the Jewish ceremonies; as appears from the excellent answer he made to a Samaritan woman, who enquired concerning the proper place for performing divine worship: "The hour cometh," says he, "when the true worshippers shall worship in spirit and in truth." Such was the worship which was practised in the first ages of the world; and among those men so famed in the Jewish records, whom we call patriarchs. They had no temples nor chapels, no stated hours for devotion, no established forms of prayer, no rites nor ceremonies, no prostrations nor kneelings: the devotion of the heart depends not on TIME, PLACE, or POSTURE. The whole earth was their temple, and the vault of heaven was the roof of it. When they beheld any surprizing effect of almighty power, or had received any signal benefit or succour from the providence of
GOD;

GOD; they considered this as an immediate call either to adore his greatness, or to give thanks for his bounty. When they had leisure for retirement from the necessary cares and business of life, they employed the hours of solitude in meditating upon GOD; they conversed with him freely, and offered up their praises and thanksgivings with all the sincerest expressions of reverence and love: and having never thought of fixing bounds to the INFINITE BEING, or of confining his presence within consecrated walls, they considered him as every where present. Whether they were standing, sitting, or lying down, whether their heads were covered or uncovered, they expected to be heard, nor were they disappointed in their expectations.

THIS pure and spiritual worship did not long remain UNCORRUPTED; external forms and ceremonies were soon added to it, and from that time it began to decline.

SECT. II. OF EXTERNAL WORSHIP.

IN the first ages of the world, mankind being justly convinced that every thing which they enjoyed belonged to GOD as the creator and sovereign of the universe, devoted one part of their possessions to him as an acknowledgement of his property in the whole: hence SACRIFICES, LIBATIONS and OFFERINGS. At first these religious exercises were performed in the open air, there being then neither cities nor houses. Afterwards it was found necessary to perform them in caverns or in slight buildings raised for that purpose, on account of the inclemency of the weather; and this was the original of TEMPLES. In the beginning, every one presented HIS OWN offering and sacrifice: in process of time particular

men

men were appointed for that office: this was the first institution of PRIESTS. Such an order of men being once established, religion, or rather the apparatus of external worship, improved very fast under their influence: they imagined that it would be more perfect by being more splendid, and that they might render it more acceptable to GOD by loading it with ceremonies. They therefore invented games, dances, processions, legal impurities, and unnecessary expiations. Thus religion in all nations degenerated into mere pageantry and show; the unthinking vulgar mistook the shadow for the substance; and the spirit of it was every where lost, except among a few of the more wise and contemplative.

THE original design of external worship seems to have been pure and innocent. We are naturally desirous of communicating our sentiments; and the more so, when we are persuaded that they are just and rational. It was doubtless with this intention, that the first external and public acts of religion were performed. It was imagined, that some significant ceremonies would be useful in exciting the same sentiments which they were designed to express. But the consequence was very different: the symbols were taken for the thing itself; religion was supposed to consist entirely in the offering of sacrifices, and the burning of incense; and PIETY was weakened and destroyed, by those very means which were contrived to promote and improve it.

As the light of reason prescribed no fixed rule with regard to the ceremonial part of religion, mankind did not long agree in their notions about it. It belongs only to the pure religion of nature to be UNIFORM and INVARIABLE; every other is fluctuating and uncertain, susceptible of various

forms, and liable to CONTINUAL CHANGE. Thus each nation fixed upon a different mode of worship. And from hence another disorder arose, equally contrary to the purity of the law of nature, and to the happiness of society. The different sects which were produced by this difference in worship, looked upon each other with contempt and aversion; and those especially which affected the most rigorous exactness, were most free to reproach and condemn all others; and scrupled not to assert, that whoever refused to comply with that form of worship which they had established, was the object of GOD's displeasure, and would hereafter feel the dreadful effects of his vengeance. Thus did SUPERSTITION kindle that irreconcilable hatred, which the blood of innumerable victims has not been sufficient to quench. All efforts to restore peace and humanity in religion are vain: and though the precepts of CHRISTIANITY are of all others the most mild and benevolent in themselves, yet there is no persuading them to love the damned; nor can we expect any thing but massacres and murders from this FANATICAL spirit which devotes living men to hell.

LET us not however judge of things by the ill use which may be made of them; for what is there which men do not abuse? but, without regarding the bad consequences which may sometimes attend the practice of external worship, let us examine, I. Whether a worship of this kind is in itself USEFUL; and, II. Supposing it to be useful, whether any one particular form of it is essentially PREFERABLE to another.

I. IF piety be a virtue, it is for the good of mankind that it should universally prevail. The first of these two propositions I take for granted; and the second is a necessary consequence of it.

it. Now nothing more effectually tends to promote virtue than good examples; these have a much greater force than precepts: it must therefore be useful for every one, to have before him some engaging examples of piety. But these examples can be seen only in the outward acts of religion. I can reap no advantage from the most exalted piety of another, unless he gives me some sensible proof and expression of his inward sentiments. I do not mean, that he should observe any formal rules or stated hours for this purpose; such a conduct might proceed from constraint, or from some political views, and the proof would not be sufficiently clear and unexceptionable. All I require of him is, to give me, in any manner he thinks proper, some plain and unsuspected marks of his regard for truth, his resignation to PROVIDENCE, and his love to GOD; and to worship, praise, and honour him in public. This is all that REASON demands; and when I am witness to such expressions of piety, I feel the force of the example, and am fired with a holy emulation; which the finest lectures of morality could not have produced.

II. Is there among the various signs which have been instituted for religious purposes, any which are in themselves more pleasing to GOD than others? if there are, let them be shown. But 'till our divines can give me satisfaction in this point, I shall content myself with what reason suggests; and the following solution of this question seems to me most rational.

INTERNAL worship is simple and uniform; and as it is a duty of UNIVERSAL OBLIGATION, it must of necessity be known to all men. In this, therefore, there is no choice or distinction to be made. Love, reverence, gratitude, and submission to GOD, must be always the same, and can

admit of no variation; but there are an infinite number of arbitrary signs by which these sentiments may be expressed. All those signs which are instituted for this end are innocent; and if any distinction is to be made, those should be preferred which are naturally most clear and intelligible; but this is not of absolute necessity, because general consent is sufficient to render any signs plain and expressive. A serpent in a circular form, with his tail turning back into his mouth, was, among the Egyptians, a clear symbol of eternity, because they had agreed to express it by that figure. In some nations a circle was an emblem of the DEITY; among the Jews he was represented by a triangle. The Canaanites purified themselves by fire, the Jews by water. But of what importance is it, whether the DEITY be represented by a round or triangular figure, provided the intention be to express, that he is THE MOST PERFECT OF ALL BEINGS? Of what consequence is it, whether we express purity by water or fire, if we are convinced, that without PURITY OF HEART we can never be acceptable to GOD? What signifies it, whether we sacrifice to the DEITY an ox or an elephant, a sheep or a goat, a blackbird or a swan, whether we offer animals or only herbs, provided we acknowledge him as THE GIVER of every thing we enjoy? Or what signifies it, whether we pray with our eyes lifted up to heaven, or fixed upon the earth; whether we are standing or lying, sitting or kneeling; if the HEART be in a proper posture, and possessed with a becoming REVERENCE and HUMILITY?

THE necessity of paying some external homage to GOD, proves nothing in behalf of any PARTICULAR FORM of worship. And perhaps the DEITY is not more displeased with the different modes

modes of worship which belong to the various religions in the world ; than he is offended, that in the Romish church some religious orders perform their services at a different hour, and in a different manner from others.

If there be any kind of worship which is displeasing to GOD, it must be such a one as is founded upon principles which are CONTRARY to natural religion. He, doubtless, abhorred the abominable expiations of those blind adolators, who, to appease his wrath, offered human sacrifices, and pretended to atone for their own crimes by shedding the blood of the innocent. To neglect the public worship of GOD, is a dangerous and criminal omission ; but to make use of it only in subserviency to our VICES, is a degree of guilt that wants a name.

IT is by length of time that so many different modes of worship have been introduced ; and custom and education have perpetuated that diversity. Were we to suppose a number of men newly created, and consequently free from all impressions either from the example or the instructions of others, to assemble together from every part of the world, in order to debate concerning the homage which mankind owe to the DEITY ; that UNITY OF RELIGION which is so desirable, would soon be restored. Their judgment being not depraved by blind prejudice, but guided by pure uncorrupted reason, they would either reject all the forms of religion which now prevail ; or if there be any one which deserves to be established upon the ruins of all the rest, they would unanimously chuse that. If there were any kind of worship which GOD required of men preferable to all others, he would surely have made them acquainted with it ; or must we think that he would wait
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for the decisions of our priests and doctors, in order to give us just ideas of religion?

IF there were but one man upon the earth, he would not be obliged to any external worship; for that was not instituted out of regard to GOD, but to unite all the members of a society by the open profession of one and the same religion. This unity has been unhappily broken, by the multitude of different religions which have been introduced into the world. In this state of things, the duty of a wise man, is to attend principally to that INWARD WORSHIP, which is not susceptible of alteration or variety. And as to the established religion of his country, if it be consistent with the religion of nature, he ought to consider himself as under the strongest obligation, neither to molest others in the practice of it, nor to renounce it himself. A Turk may be excused for being a Mahometan, but it would be unpardonable in a CHRISTIAN to embrace that religion. It is worse than fanaticism, to alarm the consciences of men, about things in which THE HONOUR OF GOD is not concerned.

IT is not enough that we perform our duty to the SUPREME BEING, by inward devotion: there are also duties which we owe to our FELLOW CREATURES, of which we shall speak in the last part of this work; and a respect for the established religion of our country, is one of those duties. But, before we consider the duties we owe to others, it is proper to begin with those which we owe to OURSELVES.

MANNERS.

M A N N E R S.

P A R T II.

O F W I S D O M.

LET us now consider man in his private capacity; not as a social, but a solitary being: let us, for a while, suppose him divested of all his relations to external objects, and enquire what are his obligations to HIMSELF in this abstracted view of his existence.

WE have hitherto considered him, as subordinate to his CREATOR; and we have deduced his submission to the divine commands, from that pure and ardent affection which he owes to the great and good author of his being. We are now to consider his obligations to himself; and we shall, in like manner, deduce the punctuality with which the duties of this second class are to be discharged, from that love of SELF which is required of him by the laws of nature.

WHEN a devotee undertakes to moralize, which very often happens, if SELF-LOVE is his topic, his lecture is long. Because religion has prohibited pride, arrogance, sensuality, and effeminacy, which are also prohibited by reason, the wise and good, according to this severe censor, must forget their virtues; the deepest philosopher must rank himself with the most stupid and illiterate; and it is the duty of every man to despise and hate himself with irreconcilable enmity and contempt; and, consequently, to suppress every desire, controul every

every inclination, and mortify all his appetites, however innocent: and such is the effect of these groundless clamours, that self-love is almost universally placed among the VICES; and it is a daring attempt to appear publicly in its defence. Few, indeed, have courage to rank themselves on the side of the oppressed; but let us make one magnanimous effort to retrieve that honour, which has, perhaps, been given up without contest, and betrayed by ignorance to superstition.

LET us, however, in the first place, explain the term. If, by SELE-LOVE, arrogance, pride and vanity be meant, I abandon it to the fury of those who pursue, and rank myself in the front of its enemies. But if, by this expression, is understood that ardent affection, which PURE NATURE has inspired in the breast of every man for himself, I affirm it innocent, lawful, and even an indispensable duty.

WE are compounded of a body and a soul: the body is subject to accidents, which injure or destroy it; the soul is perceptible of ideas, which distress and afflict it; of affections which degrade, dishonour, and pollute it. For the preservation of the body, GOD has endued it with INSTINCT, which incessantly watches for its safety, guards it against every thing hurtful, and reminds it of its necessities: and, to preserve the soul from whatever might bereave it of its happiness or innocence, the light of REASON is carried before it, which guides it to TRUTH, who points out that which is truly good, and indicates the means by which it is to be attained. Nothing then, on our part, can be more conformable to the DIVINE INSTITUTION, than to be attentive to the well-being, as well of our bodies, as our souls; and to be attentive

tive to their well-being, is most effectually to love them.

“THAT we should do to others, as we would “that others should do to us,” is a precept of the LAW OF NATURE; and, as it certainly could not be the intention of the LEGISLATOR, that we should treat others with unkindness or cruelty, neither could it be intended, that we should thus treat ourselves. It is also a precept of this law, “That we should love our neighbours as ourselves:” the love of SELF, therefore, is presupposed, and enjoined by implication.

I WILL not deny that SELF-LOVE has ill effects; that it renders us blind to our own imperfections, and sometimes too indulgent to our faults: but conjugal and paternal love are not exempt from peculiar weaknesses; and must they, for this reason, be renounced? Love yourself with prudence and moderation; range, in their proper rank and order, the love of the body and of the soul, INSTINCT and REASON; and fear not, that either, under this regulation, should suggest to you ought that will offend the DEITY, or bring punishment on yourselves. Let reason COMMAND: it is the province of instinct to OBEY. Let the love of the soul have the precedency: the soul is more excellent than the body; this is but a fabric of clay, that a celestial being. Reduce the body to obedience, if it impedes or counteracts the soul; and subdue the soul itself to obedience, whenever it forgets the duty that it owes to the DIVINE AUTHOR of its existence. The body ought to be obedient to the soul, and the soul to GOD; the happiness of both depends upon this subordination, and in maintaining it, therefore, consists WISDOM: for wisdom is no other than a choice of the fittest means to render us happy. So long
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as we have body, to despise the gratification of its senses as not essential to happiness, is presumptuously to affect a false spirituality; and not to seek and prize the pleasures which are independent of sense, is to grovel a brute among brutes.

THE subordination of the soul to GOD, and the body to the soul, being once established, the great mean of happiness is to render our MANNERS conformable to the DIVINE LAW, which is the only rule; for GOD has commanded nothing which has not a direct tendency to our highest felicity: and, in order to this conformity,

I. GAIN a clear knowledge of what he commands, and what he forbids.

II. ARM yourself with courage to obey him, whatever obstacles are to be surmounted.

III. PREFER the honest to the gainful. And

IV. BRIDLE your desires.

LET us, therefore, proceed, in the order thus pointed out by our subject itself, and treat distinctly of PRUDENCE, FORTITUDE, JUSTICE and TEMPERANCE.

CHAP. I. OF PRUDENCE.

PRUDENCE is the art of chusing. He is prudent, who, among many objects, can distinguish that which deserves the preference. PRUDENCE has two offices; to inform the understanding, and regulate the will. She determines both on maxims of speculation and practice. She keeps the mind upon its guard against prejudice and precipitation. Under her influence, the degree of assent which it gives to any proposition, is always proportioned to the degree of its certainty: those, which are evidently true, are steadfastly believed; while others, whose certainty is less apparent, are ranked

ranked among probabilities: with regard to some principles, the mind remains wholly undetermined; but as to those which are of the marvellous kind, it rather inclines to doubt and disbelief, from a suspicion of some fraud or illusion.

THE laws of prudence are, however, somewhat less rigid with respect to practical doctrines; in these demonstration is not expected, before the assent is given; but there must be at least probable motives, to produce a rational determination. To desire objects which are probably inconsistent with our happiness on the whole, would be a dangerous imprudence; to desire those which are contrary to good morals, would be criminal: and whatever is criminal, cannot fail to produce misery; because there is in heaven an IMPARTIAL JUDGE, by whom every deviation from virtue is, sooner or later, adequately punished.

THAT species of prudence which regards propositions merely speculative, does not belong to my subject; this is claimed by the metaphysicians, and to them I resign it. The prudence which I am to treat of here, is that which regulates our AFFECTIONS, WORDS, and ACTIONS; and I shall divide it into three general heads.

SECT. I. OF CIRCUMSPECTION:

AFFECTION is no more voluntary than thought: it generally rises irresistably, without the concurrence of the WILL; and it is not to be eradicated by the most consummate prudence; nor is there any reason to attempt it, since that which is not voluntary, is not criminal. But affections, however innocent, are always dangerous, if they incline us to objects which are forbidden by the DIVINE LAW. It may be justly
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feared,

feared, that, by perpetually recurring, they will gain too great an influence in the soul, and at length wholly possess it; that, either seduced by flattering hopes, or over-born by clamorous importunity, it will be rendered unattentive or insensible to the admonitions of REASON.

THE affections over which it is necessary to keep a watchful eye, either spring up in the mind without the concurrence of the body, are excited by the senses, or raised by objects which are wholly external. In the first class, I place vanity and presumption, which shoot up into PRIDE; in the second, all sensual appetites, which are the seeds of INTEMPERANCE; and in the third, all desires that are fixed on objects which receive their whole value from our prejudices; such are those excited by riches and honours, and which, at length, when they have taken root, produce AVARICE and AMBITION; for all these desires, by constant reiteration, become habits, and those habits we call passions.

THE passions themselves, even when they have an illicit tendency, are not criminal without the consent of the WILL; because the reiterated desires from which they result, are blameless, when the heart, which forms them, disavows them the moment they are produced: but it is to be feared, that, by continual efforts, they will prevail against the mind, weaken it by degrees, and at length reduce it to a state of absolute subjection. By watching over your desires, therefore, exert your utmost ability to prevent the progress of irregular passions; keep a jealous eye even on those which appear to be innocent, because they will cease to be so when they become immoderate.

THERE are passions which ought to be absolutely suppressed, and others which need only be restrained.

restrained. Let us, therefore, distinguish the passions which are guilty by reason of their OBJECT, from those which are only vicious by their EXCESS; and, to proceed in order, let us begin with those, which have their origin in the soul itself, PRIDE OF VANITY.

ART. I. OF PRIDE.

PRIDE proceeds from a too advantageous idea formed of our own merit: to remedy this evil, therefore, it is necessary to estimate ourselves with exactness and impartiality: but how difficult is it to weigh with exactness, when SELF is in the balance! He whose revenue amounts to four hundred pounds a year is richer by one fourth, than he who possesses but three hundred: this calculation is easy and certain. Rousseau himself might have said, "I write better verses than La Motte;" and if this calculation was not so easy, it was at least possible. There was once an instance of a poet, who confessed the superiority of a rival, and complimented him upon it. Rotrou was this uncommon example of modesty, so little imitated since, when he saw his bays wither at the success of the great Corneille. Read his own confession in which there is no equivocation:

Yes, I will speak to please thee, and to pay

The tribute due to thy unequall'd lay.

Judge of thy merit by this verse, Corneille;

Thy rival owns it, tho' his pride rebel.

And the testimony of a poet, capable of confessing himself inferior to another, cannot be suspected, if, compared with a genius of a lower class, he judged himself to be his superior, or at least

his equal. This single instance is sufficient to prove, that it is not impossible, however uncommon, to make a just estimation of our own abilities: but, in order to this, besides exerting a great degree of sincerity, it is necessary to make the estimation by comparison; for Rotrou, modest as he was, would not have imagined himself a poet of the middle class, if he had lived ten years before Corneille: let us, therefore, take the same method to subdue our pride.

YOU think yourself, vain and arrogant REAUVERSE! a great orator, a fine speaker, a thunderbolt of eloquence: look out for your equal; there is certainly a competitor to be found, that will put your abilities to the proof. Alas! you were but too sensible of this truth, when under the specious pretence of obtaining justice for your client, you assailed, with all the petulance of jealousy and envy, an opponent whose name alone has eclipsed your merit. But let us suppose, for once, that the advantage was on your side; perhaps twenty other rivals may now wait to engage you, by the least of which you would be baffled and defeated. If the fear of a future equal does not restrain your arrogance, let us endeavour to find one in times past; for I would fain cure you. Recall a few years; bring back the time in which your profession was in the meridian of its glory; the palm did not then grow for such as you: but I will indulge your vanity to the utmost, and suppose that Demosthenes and Cicero, Patru, Le Maitre, and Le Normant, are nothing when compared to you: heaven reserved for you the art of elocution; — but you cannot write — confess it, and be humble.

IF after challenging every rival, in that particular in which he is supposed to excel, the champion comes

comes out of the lists crowned with new laurels, many methods yet remain of humbling his vanity.

It would, perhaps, be in vain to remind the proud, that, having received of heaven the talents by which they shine, they have no right to appropriate the glory to themselves: methinks I hear them answer, "That, since GOD rewards our merits, they must be our own; and, for the same reason, so are our talents, at least so far as we have improved them." Be it so, we shall not insist on this argument; there are others still which may be successfully used against pride and presumption.

ZEUXIS is an excellent painter, and, compared with all his rivals, would be adjudged their superior: one point is then determined; but there are a thousand others to be considered and compared, before Zeuxis can be rated at the exact total of his worth: if we examine further, his understanding will be found barren and uncultivated, his nature brutal, his humour capricious, his character selfish, sordid and perfidious, and his manners altogether vicious and irregular. To counterbalance ZEUXIS, whose sole merit consists in drawing a fine picture, let the wise PODALIRIUS be put into the scale; a good father, a good citizen, a tender and active friend, a fine genius but diffident and modest; the author of ingenious but anonymous productions, a friend to the polite arts, and an universal critic. And is the merit of painting alone so great, as that ZEUXIS the painter should turn the scale against PODALIRIUS?

It is a most flagrant injustice, for a man to give a sanction to his arrogance, by singling out that branch of his character from which alone he derives any worth, while he fraudulently leaves out of the comparison twenty defects which render

him inferior to the persons with whom he is put in competition, beside a hundred vices from which they are wholly free. My whole estate is some houses, for which I receive annually one hundred and fifty pounds. LYCAS has some houses too, but they produce him no more than fifty pounds. LYCAS, however, has a hundred acres of wood, five hundred acres of arable land, a corn mill, and a toll, besides a share in some mines, and the tythes of a valuable impropriation. Am I richer than LYCAS?

It is a common, but a very false and chimerical method of ascertaining a man's merit, to estimate it by popular applause; this is to prefer the trumpet to the flute, only because it is louder.

CALLIMACHUS, for example, is the reigning poet; he writes verse elegantly, and his philosophy is not contemptible: but nature, as if exhausted in the production of his head, has endowed his heart with neither honour nor probity. JENADES, on the contrary, without mounting to gather laurels on the top of Pindus, makes notwithstanding some progress towards immortality. His approaches, indeed, are slower, and by another way: instead of composing verses, a kind of production that attracts the regard of the public, and the printing of which makes the author known to a nation in a day, JENADES cures diseases; he leaves CALLIMACHUS to run after Euripides and Pindar, while he carefully traces the footsteps of Hippocrates; instead of amusing the leisure of an idle reader, he gives health to the sick. His natural inclination led him to chuse a profession, in which he might be useful to his fellow citizens; and the success of his practice abundantly gratifies the benevolence of his heart. CALLIMACHUS, who frequents the court, or who at least is admitted into the

the company of courtiers, imagines, perhaps, that he would be degraded by being put in competition with JENADES; but, on the contrary, I think it would be doing injustice to merit, not to give JENADES the preference.

URANISCOPUS, the astronomer, seeing a modern Archimedes grow old under the consideration of an abstract problem, looked upon him with pity; and, paying a compliment to his own abilities, said to himself, "Alas! perhaps this poor blundering dotard does not know what is the present elevation of Aldebaran."

THAT smoke-dried alchymist, who, mistaking the love of gold and silver for wisdom, appropriates, exclusively to himself, the character of a philosopher; proud of a title which his own vanity has conferred upon him, looks down, with a fancied superiority, on all men whose closets are not furnished with crucibles.

SHALL I descend so low, as to mention those sordid souls, who, having no other resource to flatter their vanity, value themselves on the splendor of their equipage, and the weight of their purse? I would not even acquit those, who preserving their humility in the midst of affluence, think by this temper to merit esteem. It is still making too much account of riches, to assume merit for not valuing ourselves upon them; for a man cannot sure be accounted wise, of whom it can only be said, that he is not ridiculous.

ART. II. OF CORPOREAL APPETITES.

BY corporeal appetites, I mean those desires which are excited in us by THE NECESSITIES OF THE BODY; such as the desire of meat, drink, and sleep, when we are pressed by hunger, thirst, or

or weariness. I have already observed, that these desires are innocent, that they are intimations which nature gives us for the preservation of the body; and I add here, as a necessary consequence, that, instead of being suppressed, they ought to be satisfied. To abstain from whatever right reason has forbidden, is virtue; but I see no virtue in abstinence from that which is lawful. These desires, however, must be satisfied with **TEMPERANCE**. Whatever is given to the body, more than its necessities require, tends to its destruction; the most voluptuous enjoyments, if they are excessive, lose their nature, and degenerate into punishments; the anguish of which is rendered more pungent, by the regret of having inflicted them on ourselves. It cannot be expected, that I should determine, precisely, the quantity of food or rest convenient for the body; this must be regulated by the want itself that asks a supply. To continue in a state of inaction, when our wonted strength is restored by rest, is laziness; and to eat, after hunger is appeased, gluttony. The first attention, in the choice of meat and drink, should be, to abstain from those species of both that are prejudicial to health. The unclean meats which Moses prohibited, were all less easily digested. But, as to those that are wholesome, our taste may be consulted; and nothing forbids that our palates should determine the choice.

THE same may be said of all the appetites of the body: shun **EXCESS**; it is equally fatal and criminal: but, restrained within the bounds prescribed by our wants, **HONOUR** does not require, that we should renounce **PLEASURE**. Pleasure itself may be called a want; it is a kind of repose and respite, in which a man takes breath, and gains new strength to sustain new sufferings. Sensual

ful enjoyments are neither dangerous nor enervating, except when by habit they have degenerated into WANTS: they can never corrupt him, who can forego them without regret. Heroes, I mean those who have magnanimity sufficient to be VIRTUOUS, for I never honour with this title the destroyers of mankind; heroes in virtue are not anchorites, who have renounced pleasure; but men who can abstain from it, when their OWN HONOUR, or the PUBLIC GOOD, makes abstinence a DUTY.

ART. III. OF AVARICE AND AMBITION.

THE love of riches, in common with almost all the other passions, becomes criminal only by its EXCESS: corrected by a prudent moderation, it is an innocent affection. Gold and silver being, by general consent, the key of commerce, and the instrument by which all our wants are supplied; it is no more criminal to desire it, than to desire the things themselves which are procured by these metals: but as too much food loads the stomach with superfluities destructive of health, abundant riches cause a kind of REPLETION yet more dangerous in its consequences, because it commonly brings on a depravation of manners.

INORDINATE love of riches is always a vice, but is not always AVARICE: an avaritious man is he, who, perverting the use of money intended only to procure the necessaries of life, chuses rather to deny himself those necessaries, than to diminish, or than not to encrease a hoard which he suffers to lie useless.

If an example of this vice be desired, it may be found in CHRYSOLATRIS. Consider his whole person; he is covered from head to foot with dirty rags patched together, but patched together with

with his own hands: enter his apartment, every thing there corresponds with the tattered figure of his person; his bed, his chairs, and his hangings, are curious monuments of the fashions of antiquity. Upon these, as well as upon his habit, he is careful to keep a thick covering of grease and nastiness, which at length sinks in, and becomes of one substance with the stuff. "Cleanliness," says he, "was intended only for spendthrifts." Observe him well, he is about to sit down at table: it is an inviolable custom at his house, before grace is said, to bolt the doors; next to thieves, parasites are the greatest terror to him; he fears not borrowers, for he has long known how to prevent their application: on a worm-eaten board, placed on a rickety joint-stool, appear some morsels of boiled meat made hot a second time, and drowned in broth as transparent as water, the bottom of a stale loaf of brown bread, an earthen mug, and nothing more. But who is it that knocks at the door, before he has finished his meal? It is a nephew, his heir, who makes his court to him with great assiduity, as it is supposed, to secure the inheritance of his substance. "What, nephew," cries the wretch, the moment he appears in sight, "is there no other time to importune me but at dinner? I love to eat alone; it is my humour, and I shall not change it for you. But what are you prying about for? do you come to rob me? It goes against me to say this to you; but your hands and your looks alarm me. Come, come, let me advise you, spare yourself the trouble of making me so many visits. I know you think that I am rich; it is the folly of all heirs; but take my word, I tell you, once for all, that I am not; I am

"undone;

“undone; I have nothing, I may say, nothing left.”

BUT before we quit *CHRYSOLOTRIS*, let us see how near he is to the truth. The evening closes; the hour is at hand in which he goes to pay his homage to his god, to count his money, to care for it, and hide it again in the bottom of his strong box. He has finished the tale. What does he mutter now? It is the sum total of his money,—“Thirty-one thousand two hundred and fifty pounds, two shillings, and four-pence:”—and adds, locking his chest,—“What a deal of trouble in scraping together a decent competence!”

I SHALL not here mention those wild unthinking prodigals, for whom the largest revenues are always insufficient; wretches! whom opulence impoverishes, and who precipitate their ruin in proportion to their acquisitions; their desires and their expences always exceeding their fortune, however immense: for of these I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

THERE are minds insatiable after other acquisitions than riches: these are the *AMBITIOUS*. The object of their passion is much more fantastic, but then they believe it to be more noble.

THERE are two kinds of ambition; the first excites in the person whom it possesses, a desire of rising to an elevated station, represents this desire to him as the passion of great minds, and obviates whatever scruples might stop his career. With him, all means are good that tend to accomplish his design: let him have no obstacle to surmount but the remonstrances of conscience, and his success is infallible; for these he well knows how to silence. The object which he pursues appears to be of such importance, that he firmly believes it will

72 OF AVARICE AND AMBITION.

will atone for the crimes which it produces. Whoever can be shaken by the horrors of guilt, or diverted from their purpose by remorse, are at most but half ambitious; nor is it on these that fortune lavishes dignities and honour. An honest man may possibly serve his country; but, however great his abilities, it is rare that his country serves him: he has all the zeal that enables him to serve his prince with honour; but he has not the meanness to fawn at the feet of his favourite, which is notwithstanding the most essential qualification, without which he will never obtain the rewards due to his merit.

IT is this ambition that forms INHUMAN CONQUERORS; this renders them enemies to all the neighbouring states, this urges them to break the law of nations, and violate the faith of treaties; by this they become the scourge of foreign countries, and the tyrants of their own. This also makes SERVILE MAGISTRATES, wretches who have sold themselves to the vices of the great; too weak to give them salutary counsel, yet unjust enough to pronounce implicitly the sentence dictated by arbitrary power, and to oppress the people whom they ought to protect! It is still the same vice which inflames, with the thirst of opulence and power, the breasts of ECCLESIASTICS of every denomination; which so often pollutes the mouths, devoted to celebrate the majesty of heaven, with servile adulation; transforms the fathers of the church into the sycophants of a court, and teaches them to aspire to capricious greatness, and the debasing liveries of a foreign prince.

ASTONISHING paradox, yet a truth! the most aspiring AMBITION, and the most abject MEANNESS, are generally found in the same breast. The ambitious man, eager to be great without know-
ing

ing in what true greatness consists, stoops that he may rise; and like the serpent springs upward, by pressing the earth with his belly.

ORGASTES is brutish and fierce, voluptuous, vain, and malevolent; ignorant but positive; an absolute stranger both to justice and law, but his caprice supplies his deficiency in both; he suffers the grossest affronts patiently, but avenges himself by insulting the wretched. A place becomes vacant, a place that brings an odium on its possessor, as the power which it confers can only be exercised in distressing his fellow-citizens; it is given to ORGASTES, a man born to fill it. It is now necessary to assume an imperious tone, he is ferocious and haughty; it is requisite to punish, he is severe and inflexible; he is to decide in a military manner, and what form of proceeding can be so well adapted to the whimsies of a capricious judge? You would doubtless be astonished, if with all this fitness of the employment to which he is preferred, ORGASTES should be removed from his post. Who can better answer the views of his constituents? Does he not do all the mischief which is expected of him? and does he not do it with steadiness, with a relish, without reluctance, and without remorse? Who then can merit more to be continued in his place, or to be removed only for a higher dignity.

It is a rule with those who hold the reigns of government, to reward the evil actions which are done at their command, more than the good; and this seems to be but just and reasonable: for, as honour is more valuable than life, he that tramples it under foot in the service of a great man, has done more for his master, than a hero who sheds his blood in his defence; this only risks his body, but the other sacrifices his soul.

I

Why

Why was POLYDAMUS made a knight? Because he courteously condescended to commit a murder. Perhaps his conscience, alarmed at the enormity of his crime, many times suspended his hand when it was raised for the blow; but conscience is at length subdued, and he triumphs over all compunction. Has he received too great a reward for so dear a conquest? Would you have scrupled to have accepted the same, for preserving the life of a fellow citizen? yet how much less the claim of such a service! You are already sufficiently rewarded, in the inexpressible pleasure attending the consciousness of the action; and doubtless you would be glad to have an opportunity of repeating it every day. Do not then envy the lot of POLYDAMUS; you have gained much more than he, and you have hazarded nothing in comparison of what he has lost.

THE other kind of ambition is less criminal, but more puerile and ridiculous. Its votaries do not presumptuously aspire to the rank of the great; but are content to affect their manners, and imitate them in a lower sphere, to the best of their abilities.

THE vulgar are so fully persuaded, that vanity and arrogance are essentials in the dignity of the great, that when a man, who is just risen out of obscurity, takes upon him to conceal his origin, he thinks he cannot succeed better, than in making himself known in the world by his foppery, and affectation. And, indeed, this might be an effectual method of imposing upon mankind, if he imitated his original with more exactness.

CHRYSES, touched with this frenzy, assumes the disdainful look, the forbidding air, the haughty tone, and the contemptuous smile: he receives petitions; but, without reading them, he answers,

“ I will

"I will consider of it." He has authors, priests and players at his table, whom he engages in wrangling disputes; then rallies them, and, if they are out of countenance, maliciously sneers at them: in his discourse, his walk, his gestures and attitudes, he is as much a fop as a French marquis, but with less ease; all his follies are studied, and appear to be the effect of art. Besides, he does not strike his servants; he pays his debts punctually, and audits his steward's accounts; he has computed the value of his estates himself; his expences are limited by his revenue, and he neither mortgages nor sells the inheritance which he intends shall descend to his children: so true it is, that the plebeian will always be discovered through affected nobility; for the real man of quality never descends to these minute particulars of a cit's œconomy.

SECT. II. OF CIRCUMSPECTION IN WORDS.

THE government of the tongue is a science little known, but highly necessary and of great use. A considerable proficiency is already made in this art, when the soul is brought under proper discipline, and the thoughts, desires and affections are regulated; for the tongue is no more than the interpreter of the mind. That which remains to be done is little, in comparison of what has been already effected: the work, however, is not compleated; for there are thoughts, desires and affections, which, although innocent while concealed in the breast, are yet indecent and culpable when divulged by the tongue. I may have heard the gallantries of PHOEDIMA, without violating my conscience; but, if I relate them, I become guilty. I am permitted to perceive, that ARYS

is a fulsome coxcomb ; but I cease to be innocent, if I indulge myself in rallying his follies with too much severity. POLYDORE has voluntarily trusted me with his secret ; I have not drawn it from him, either by cunning or importunity : my honour is, as yet, unblemished ; but it would be forfeited if I should betray him. I may be innocently acquainted with all the familiarities that pass between husband and wife, or between lovers that live together on the same terms : I may understand the chart of love, better than the map of the world ; but, if I should express myself on this subject in terms too clear, especially before the sex whose delicacy is soonest alarmed, I should transgress against virtue, modesty and good manners.

ART. I. OF DETRACTION.

TO derogate from the reputation of a person, either by reporting some particular crime of which he has been guilty, or by discovering his secret vices, is an action in itself indifferent. It is not only lawful, but expedient, when it is productive of any good, either to the person accused, or to those before whom the accusation is brought. It is but just, to inform a father of the extravagancies of a libertine son ; an abbot or prior, of the irregularities of a vagabond monk ; the prince, of the treasonable machinations of a seditious subject ; and the public, of the villainy which a dangerous hypocrite conceals under a specious appearance : especially after attempting in vain to reform the offender, by friendly admonition and reproof. This is not properly detraction. By detraction is generally meant, a malicious invective against an absent person, uttered merely to depreciate and villify him. This term may be properly

perly extended to defamatory libels; a species of detraction which is the more criminal, as the impression which they make upon the mind is more deep and permanent: and, in all well regulated communities, it is made a crime cognizable by the magistrate, and punished with exemplary severity. There is less detraction in polite circles now, than heretofore; because there is more gaming. Cards have saved more reputations, than could have been preserved by a legion of missionaries sent out merely to preach against detraction. But polite companies do not always play; consequently, sometimes they detract.

DETRACTION is, perhaps, the common vice of all mankind; but each individual gives it a turn peculiar to his character.

ERGASTES, the misanthrope, detracts with great freedom and plainness. As soon as a person is named in his hearing, he enumerates with the most scrupulous exactness all his faults, and is equally careful to suppress whatever might be said to his advantage; always taking the deformed side of the original of which he is pleased to exhibit a picture.

HERMIONE, the coquet, is not altogether so unmerciful: to her sprightly imagination a croud of objects is present at once, of whom her indulgent spleen makes but a slight sketch, the outlines of a picture. In this manner she will copy twenty originals in a quarter of an hour; bestowing on each but a single word, a light touch of malicious wantonness. How great a mistress in detraction is HERMIONE.

THE pious DOROTHEA is yet more reserved; she knows that it is a sin to speak evil of her neighbours, at least without an absolute necessity; and, indeed, she seldom does it: on the contrary,

she desires to speak well of all the world. If she has occasion to mention a person that is absent, she begins by a detail of their good qualities; and when she comes to the dark side of their character, she stops short: here the tenderness of her conscience is displayed; she plainly appears to suppress some strokes, which would be disadvantageous to the picture; but these can only be supplied by conjecture. HELENA happens to be the subject of her conversation. "This lady," says she, "has great beauty and wit; she was educated too in virtuous principles," but—here she stops. A person less cautious, perhaps, would have bluntly added, "But, she has profited little by it." DOROTHEA stops at her BUT. They ask an explanation; they solicit it; she is impenetrable. "No," says she, "it is nothing.—Have I not told you, that she has beauty and wit?"

ART. II. OF RAILLERY:

RAILLERY is less a breach of natural equity and the common rights of mankind, than detraction; because the person whom it attacks being present, has generally an opportunity to defend himself. But if it is less criminal, it is often more offensive: because it aims two blows at the same time, one against reputation, and the other against self-love; it at once degrades the person, and puts him out of countenance. The malicious turn which it takes, seldom fails to add to the vexation that is felt at being charged with a fault, a miscarriage, or an infirmity, the mortifying regret of not having instantly retorted the sarcasm by a severer jest. Persons would generally chuse to be traduced when absent, than rallied to their face.

RAILLERY

RAILLERY, however, is not always an outrage; consequently, not always a crime: there are innocent railleries, which a fine genius of the last age compared to a flash of lightening that dazzles without burning.

If wit was always under the direction of prudence, whoever rallies would be circumspect; for it is not fools that are here in danger of offending. But wit, and especially that which is of the sarcastic kind, is so far from being prudent and cautious, that it is generally rash and inconsiderate in proportion as it is sprightly and inventive. It gives so much pain to sacrifice a jest, that when once it is conceived, rather than the vanity of shining in company should not be gratified by giving it utterance, a FRIEND is forfeited, a BENEFACITOR disgusted, and a PATRON irrecoverably lost.

I DO not, however, absolutely forbid raillery; this would be to render conversation lifeless, and to afford vice and folly a perpetual asylum. Raillery, like salt, gives an agreeable relish when the quantity is moderate; but is pungent and distasteful when too much. Rally then, if your humour inclines you; but rally with PRUDENCE. Spare those, whose AGE or CHARACTER sets them above you: it is a detestable impudence, to rally a hoary head, a father, a master, or a magistrate. Be also tender of your INFERIORS, especially those whom you have no right to reprove. Your superiority impresses them with a timid respect, and leaves them without defence: this is to attack with an unfair advantage; it is presenting a pistol to a man naked and unarmed.

BUT with respect to those over whom you have any authority, whose manners you ought to influence and correct, raillery is often an efficacious means of bending them to the yoke of virtue and decorum.

decorum. Persons abstain from actions for which they blush, with more caution than from those which have more serious consequences. The presumption of youth often renders them insensible to fear; but self-love, stung by a keen irony, feels all the pungency of its venom; and if they cannot retort the punishment, they will prevent it by correcting the fault.

BUT it is chiefly among **EQUALS** that raillery is permitted; it is then an innocent sport of wit, an ingenious combat, in which victory, by continually changing sides, affords an agreeable amusement, if the strength of the combatants is nearly equal; for he is a coward who rallies a person, to whom nature has denied the gift of repartee.

BUT even among equals, raillery ought to be rare, genteel, and moderate.

A MAN of sense who understands raillery, will, notwithstanding, be tired of perpetual pleasantries; he will begin to be jealous, and to suspect that he is really the object of contempt, and that there is a design to render him ridiculous: this disquieting thought deprives him of his entertainment, and he continues the contest only to make good his retreat; if he is pushed, his defeat is inevitable. But let this never be done; for in combats of wit, especially among friends, we should be afraid of obtaining too complete a victory.

RAILLERY, to be delicate, must be levelled only at trivial defects; or those, at least, which pass for such: no charge must be brought, which if proved will render a man contemptible or infamous; nor must self-love be too deeply wounded. Rally **MEMNON** upon his awkward bashfulness when he is about to dance a minuet, and far from being offended he will join in the laugh; for **MEMNON** is a man of sense, and consequently
does

does not make dancing with correctness and ease a point of honour. Rally LUCINDA upon the length of time which she employs at her toilet, and her heart will secretly exult with self-adulation; conscious that the time was not lost, which she employed to heighten the charms of nature with the ornaments of art. To rally the prophane ALCANDER upon his irreligion, is to flatter him; for he glories in the character. But never rally an author on an unsuccessful publication; do not name cowardice before CASENOVUS the coward; and spare cuckoldom in the presence of the contented EUGAMETES.

BUT however trivial the subject, let it be lightly touched; for to punish minute imperfections with the utmost poignancy of satire, is a species of INJUSTICE. The laughers, indeed, will be your abettors; they enjoy the malignity of your wit, but they will fear you in secret; and though you may excite LAUGHTER, you will gain no FRIENDS.

ART. III. OF INDISCRETION.*

INDISCRETION in discourse is a fault, in which INJUSTICE and IMPRUDENCE are united: to reveal the secret of another, is to dispose of that which is not your own property, and to betray your trust; an injury which is the more criminal as it is irreparable. If you dissipate a sum committed to your keeping as a trustee, it is possible that you may one day be able to make restitution; but a secret, once revealed, can never be brought back into that friendly darkness which veiled it from the public eye.

WHETHER

* The French word INDISCRETION, has a peculiar relation to the BETRAYING A SECRET, and cannot be literally translated.

WHETHER silence has or has not been promised, the obligation to secrecy is the same, if the nature of the circumstance communicated requires it; to hear it out, is to engage not to discover it.

To recommend discretion to a confidant who is prudent and circumspect, is an unnecessary precaution; he knows how to be silent, without particular instruction: and to recommend it to a fool is also superfluous, for his promise is no security: if he had not promised, he would have thought himself under no obligation to silence; and if by accident he keeps the secret, it is because his memory has failed him, or an opportunity to reveal it has not offered: but if unfortunately he has promised to be discreet, neither memory nor opportunity can be wanting. After his promise is given, he weighs and examines it, which he neglected to do before; he begins to think he has gone too far, and wishes to recal his word. How heavy a burthen is a secret to a fool! He is in no danger of forgetting what has been formerly entrusted to his care; for is it possible that he should, without thinking of it, carry about so insupportable a weight? He imagines that every one sees the intolerable oppression of his mind, that the inmost recesses of his breast are discovered, and the secret read on his heart. To prevent the vexation of having it found out in spite of his attempts to hide it, he resolves to betray his trust; having first informed his new confidant, that what he is about to discover is of the utmost importance.

If my word may be taken, it is the safest way to keep your secret YOURSELF: but if it lies heavy upon you, and you cannot rest till it is communicated, with what reason can you complain, that another by the same means frees himself from the like perplexity?

APHROSYNE

APHROSYNE takes me aside with a mysterious air, and whispers me, "You know," says she, "the nobleman whose visits here are so frequent — well, he makes me a lady to-morrow, the marriage articles are already drawn: but I charge you don't mention it; for he is so odd a man, that I know he would immediately break off the match, if he should hear that I had spoken of it." The moment after she has left me, twenty other confidants gather round me in a crowd, to tell me what I know as well as they: APHROSYNE presently discovers that it is the common news of the day; and I am, however wrongfully, confounded with a set of blabs and tatlers. I would almost as willingly be a receiver of stolen goods, as the depository of a babler's secret.

BE, however, constantly on your guard; for although you are indeed an only confidant, you may find yourself in danger from the cunning curiosity of those, who, pretending to share the confidence of your friend, may draw from you a certain knowledge of what before they only suspected: this is a common stratagem, a snare which, though laid every day, is every day successful.

BUT though it should be true, that what is confided to you is also entrusted to others, it is no reason why you should betray the secret. You are still bound to keep it with inviolable fidelity; and even to conceal your knowledge of it from those, with whom it has been deposited by the principal: for it is possible, that your appearing to be ignorant to these very persons, may be a circumstance of great importance. But you say, "The secret has been revealed already by another:" and what inference would you draw from thence? Does the infidelity of another authorise you to be unfaithful? you have accepted a trust, and none but

but the person who reposed it can discharge you from it; he alone who has communicated the secret to you, has a right to dispense with your obligation to silence. Even a breach of friendship cannot annul this obligation; a man is not acquitted of his debts by quarrelling with his creditor. What a detestable perfidy is it, to employ those arms against a man as an enemy, which he entrusted with us as a friend! And though the tender ties of FRIENDSHIP are broken, are you therefore absolved from those of JUSTICE and HONOUR? It is to no purpose to allege, that, by betraying your secret, the ungrateful wretch whom you detest has merited your hatred; and that, therefore, to disclose his, is but to retaliate the injury. How preposterous is the revenge which you meditate! to punish treachery, you would yourself become a traitor!

THE secret of others should be lodged, if I may be allowed the expression, in some concealed recess of the memory where the mind never enters. We must, if possible, hide it even from ourselves, lest we should be tempted to apply it to some sinister purpose. To use this knowledge either to the prejudice of the person who communicated it, or to our own private advantage, would be to trade with a sum of which we are not the proprietors; a breach of trust, which the desire of revenge, in itself criminal, surely can never justify!

You know ASPONDUS possesses a lucrative post, and perhaps you imagine that he obtained it by his address and capacity; it was, nevertheless, the price of treachery. His friend PHILOCTETES solicited for this place, upon its becoming vacant; certain measures had been intimated to him, by which he would be sure to disappoint his competitors; elevated at the near approach of his good

fortune,

fortune, he communicates the secret to ASPONDUS, that he might participate in his pleasure. The next morning ASPONDUS was in possession of the post. I will use, said he to PHILOCTETES, who in spite of circumstances yet doubted of his perfidy; I will readily use all the interest which I shall gain by my new rank, to serve you: but do not take it amiss, this place was just the thing I wanted, and I have procured it for myself: would not you have done the same! No, traitor! replied PHILOCTETES, if you had made me your confidant.

BUT how much greater is the enormity, to pervert the benefits which have been heaped upon us, to the ruin of our benefactor! There are favours which ought always to be concealed; and that gratitude which makes it a duty to publish others, obliges us yet more strongly to conceal these. But those which ought to be published, are kept secret by INGRATITUDE; and those which ought to be concealed, are published by VANITY.

CORYLAS is an agreeable young fellow, formed to live well with the ladies. If you would know the particulars of his amours, you need only introduce the subject; for he makes no secret of his conquests. I will not affirm that he does not exaggerate the number; he does, however, but exaggerate, and the public acknowledges the truth of many upon incontestible evidence. Among these he has mentioned NERINA; and NERINA, in a few months, will produce a living witness of his veracity. He has boasted of favours from CLITIA; and these are so well known, that no other lover will solicit them: he has exposed AMYNIA; and the lovely victim of his falsehood now laments that weakness in the gloom of a cloister, of which her tears are a proof: he has

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gloried

gloried in the ruin of LEONORA; and the resentment of the husband, who is convinced of his dishonour, does but too well attest the triumph of the lover.

ART. IV. OF CONVERSATION ON SUBJECTS
OF GALLANTRY.*

MY design is not wholly to exclude subjects of gallantry from conversation, but to point out the manner in which they are to be treated.

ALTHOUGH a greater liberty of expression may be used in companies, which consist but of one sex; yet obscenity is always odious and detestable to persons of good sense and sound morals.

To express ourselves on subjects by which modesty may be alarmed, there are two languages wholly opposite: that of physicians, old women, and the vulgar, is gross, broad and disgusting; the other consists of chosen words, mysterious circumlocution, and enigmatical turns, which, if they do not adorn the subject, at least cover its nakedness; and this is the language spoken by polite gentlemen to ladies, which though it has the appearance of obscurity, is however sufficiently perspicuous. It is fit the ladies should be conversed with on this subject, in expressions which only glance at a meaning; the quickness of their apprehension, and delicacy of their ear, would be equally injured by more direct terms: their imagination, as a modern writers expresses it, loves to walk in the shade.

THE fair sex may be divided into two classes; maids, or, at least, single ladies who pass for such; and

* The different MANNERS of the two nations, made it necessary for the translator to deviate a little from the original, in this SECTION.

and those who are or have been married: to the latter any subject may be mentioned, if the expression is polite and chaste; but the former are supposed to be wholly ignorant of a great variety of circumstances, with which married ladies are known to be well acquainted; and it would, certainly, be a breach of good manners in every sense of the word, to converse with them in any terms on subjects which it does not become them to understand. The conversation cannot, therefore, be kept at too great distance from such subjects in their presence. It is the inviolable maxim and the characteristic of a fine gentleman, never to let an expression escape him which may give pain to a modest ear, or raise a blush in a lady's cheek: in the polite world a Cynic is a MONSTER.

BUT it may be asked, what are those licentious expressions by which female modesty is offended? what must be substituted in their stead? and when after long application and laborious study I shall have attained this knowledge, who can assure me, that the same word which produces no emotion in *ASPASIA*, will not cover *EMILIA* with a blush? To gain a perfect knowledge of a language, it is necessary to study it in the country where it is spoken; and in that country we also must speak it, if we desire to be understood. The pure and polite language which I now recommend, purged of all gross expressions, impertinent minutiae, and indecent double meanings, is spoken only in good company; there it is to be learnt, and there it is to be used: but it is necessary that I should explain what I mean by good company. Subtract, first, the brutish and unpolished, all who are destitute of morality, delicacy, and taste; then the precisian, the bigot, the pedant, and the fop; the remainder will be GOOD COMPANY, — a society of

88 OF CIRCUMSPECTION IN

worthy persons, free and good humoured, by whom virtue, decency, and good breeding are held sacred. Among these there will be a common stock of wit and gaiety, raised by a mutual contribution; a polite freedom will here be admitted, though licentiousness be excluded; and pleasure will take place, though wisdom be not banished.

SECT. III. OF CIRCUMSPECTION IN ACTIONS, OR DECORUM.

THE reader is not to expect, that I should here trace out a general plan of conduct; for it is not my design to comprize, under this head, a compleat system of morality. I shall here, as under the foregoing SECTION, presuppose, that the desires and affections are already brought under a due regulation, and confined to their proper bounds: my subject, therefore, does not lead me to deter from vice, but only to expose certain breaches of DECORUM, which, although not the effects of a vicious principle, do yet deserve reprehension.

IF GOD alone was witness to our actions, our heart being irreproachable, our conduct also would be blameless; for of this GOD judges by the intention. Mankind, on the contrary, who see only externals, judge of the intention by the conduct; and it is by the testimony of their senses that they examine and estimate each other. It is, therefore, equally our INTEREST and DUTY, not to excite any suspicion by which our reputation would suffer: it is our interest; because, as our well-being greatly depends upon the assistance of others, it is of great importance to gain their ESTEEM; their benevolence and good offices being always in proportion to their opinion of our merit.

rit. It is our duty; because we contribute to the VIRTUE OF SOCIETY, by a conduct which renders them virtuous by inclination, and gives a relish to their duty. It is not sufficient, therefore, that virtue lies hidden in the heart; it must be rendered visible, it must diffuse a lustre round all our actions, which may dissipate suspicion and set our intention in the fairest light.

EUSEBIUS fears, honours, and serves the ALMIGHTY; EUSEBIUS, notwithstanding, is branded with impiety: he imprudently ridicules the worship which custom has established among his fellow-citizens; he offers no incense to the God of his country, and for this reason is reputed an atheist. EVERGETUS is compassionate, liberal, and active; but he has a reserved manner, an austere look, and speaks little. The wretched, whom misfortune has made timid, are kept at a distance by these forbidding appearances; but those, who dare to approach, never return without consolation and relief. Thus EVERGETUS, because his benevolent mind is concealed under a discourteous behaviour, is ranked among the brutish and inhuman. ADELAIDE is a woman of virtue, faithful to her husband, and punctual in the discharge of every duty; but the excessive gaiety of her dress, the freedom of her conversation, and her injudicious choice of company, are universally decried; the secret recesses of her heart are not searched to denominate her character, the point is already decided and ADELAIDE is reputed a wanton.

THE great art of decorum consists in two points; I. Perform no action that is not stamped with the characteristics of rectitude and virtue. II. Do not perform even those actions which the law of nature permits or requires, otherwise than in the manner and under the limitations prescribed.

FROM the first of these points arises GOOD EXAMPLE; and from the second PUBLIC DECENCY.

ART. I. OF GOOD EXAMPLES.

TO love our species, is to wish them those things which we judge necessary to their happiness, and to communicate them to the utmost of our abilities. And nothing being more essential to happiness than VIRTUE, the first and most important duty of society is to display it in all its beauty, that it may be seen by ALL, and by whomsoever it is seen may be BELOVED. Example is best adapted to produce this effect, and is often the only method in our power. Every man cannot compose books, preach sermons, or make laws; for every man has not equal abilities, leisure, or authority: besides, these are but pictures which as they are inanimate seldom touch the heart, and exhibit but imperfect and mutilated representations of virtue. The pen and the tongue itself, like the pencil, paint but the surface of objects; and of this surface they exhibit no more than can be discovered at one view and in one attitude; nor can they animate the piece with motion. Example is a LIVING PICTURE, which represents virtue in action, and communicates the impulse that moves it to the heart of every spectator. And every one has it in his power to give an example of virtue; since to this nothing more is necessary than to act like a virtuous man.

THUS admirable is the DIVINE WISDOM, which of all possible means of promoting rectitude of manners, has rendered that practicable to all men, the effect of which is most certain. Some indeed can contribute more than others, but all may contribute

bute in a degree. Every star is radiant, but the orbits of all are not equally extended : so it is with examples of virtue ; every one shines in its peculiar circle, and illuminates and vivifies whatever is within the reach of its influence : but a prince, if he is virtuous, diffuses more extensive light and life than a private citizen, who although he shines is seen but by a few. Not that a virtuous man on a throne is a star of a greater magnitude, or more brilliant light ; his rays are more extensive only, because they are beamed from a more elevated station.

ART. II. OF PUBLIC DECENCY.

TO violate public decency, is to be defective in a branch of decorum to which we are under the strictest obligation.

YOU are the husband of AGATHIA, and in virtue of this relation have a right to familiarities with her which she does not contest ; but the altar at which this right was conferred, is not the place in which it is to be enjoyed ; and the witnesses of your solemn engagement are not to be witnesses of your conjugal embraces. **THISBE** ardently wishes to be in the arms of **PYRAMUS**, and this wish is innocent ; but she must not throw herself on his bosom. Let her sigh in secret for the happy moment, which is to unite her to the man she loves ; when it arrives, let her without scruple admit his innocent caresses, her conduct will be irreproachable ; but let her not anticipate them by too wanton an impatience.

RESERVE and bashfulness in the fair sex, are real perfections ; nor is modesty a virtue of human invention.

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MAN being the noblest work of nature, she has been eminently careful of his preservation; and in order to perpetuate his species, she has excited him to the means by pleasures so animated and yet so tender, that they have even seduced those austere philosophers, who ridiculously boast a superiority to every sensual enjoyment: and the blush which arises from a consciousness of this exquisite delight, is one of those attractive charms which heightens enjoyment with new pleasure, by only half disclosing sensations which should always be half concealed. Nor let us imagine this end unworthy the majesty of the CREATOR, or that he is degraded by supplying us with the means of pleasure. Look around you, and contemplate nature in her utmost extent and most secret recesses; descend to the beds of rivers and the bottom of the deep, and search the bowels of the earth: among the works of the ALMIGHTY not one in a thousand will appear absolutely necessary to our EXISTENCE; all the rest are subservient to our PLEASURE.

BUT let not modesty and chastity be confounded. Modesty is, if you will have it so, a kind of virtue. I will venture however to affirm, that it is no more than a branch of decorum founded on the expediency of maintaining public decency; because there are cases in which the rigour of modesty may be abated; but our obligation to chastity is constant and universal, which is the distinguishing characteristic of VIRTUE. Sincerity for example is a virtue, because it is of indispensable obligation. Modesty and chastity are so essentially DIFFERENT, that a woman who would not suffer you to see even her arm uncovered, may at the same time burn with an adulterous flame: and of this the Eastern ladies are flagrant instances, who in general

general have not less incontinence than modesty. Darkneſs and privacy ſuſpend the obligation to modeſty, but the obligation to chaſtity remains.

As a general rule, a thick veil ſhould be drawn over all thoſe actions which natural inſtinct prompts us to conceal from the PUBLIC EYE. I ſhall not particularize any; becauſe I myſelf ſhould then offend againſt that public decency which is my ſubject, and which ought not to be leſs reſpected in our writings than in our conduct.

CHAP. II. OF FORTITUDE.

FORTITUDE is that ſtrength or dignity of mind, which elevates us above vulgar fears; and enables us, when circumſtances make it neceſſary, to encounter and bear up againſt danger, pain, and adverſity. I ſay, when it becomes neceſſary; becauſe to ruſh into them, when they may be avoided with honour, is rather folly than greatneſs of mind. When, therefore, is it neceſſary to ſuffer? Doubtleſs, when the evil is inevitable, or when it is productive of a greater good. To endure an inevitable evil with conſtancy, is PATIENCE; voluntarily to expoſe ourſelves to an evil as the means of a greater good, is COURAGE.

SECT. I. OF PATIENCE.

THE evils by which life is embittered, may be reduced to four claſſes: I. NATURAL EVILS; thoſe to which we are by nature ſubjected as men, and as perſhable animals. II. Thoſe from which we might be exempted by a virtuous and prudent conduct, but which are the inſeparable conſequences of imprudence or vice, which we ſhall call PUNISH-

PUNISHMENTS. III. Those by which the fortitude of the good is exercised ; such as the PERSECUTIONS raised against them by the wicked. To these may be added, IV. The OPPOSITION against which we must perpetually struggle, arising from the diversity of sentiments, manners, and characters, of the persons among whom we live. Under all these evils patience is not only necessary, but useful : it is necessary, because the laws of nature have made it a duty ; and to murmur against natural events, is to affront PROVIDENCE : it is useful, because it renders our sufferings lighter, shorter, and less dangerous. If an epileptic person be left to himself, you will see him with terror employ his hands against himself, become his own murderer, and welter in his blood. His epilepsy was an evil ; but the wounds he has given himself, have greatly encreased it : of the epilepsy he might have been cured, or at least he might have lived under it ; but his wounds are mortal.

ART. I. OF NATURAL EVILS.

IHAVE already said, that natural evils are those which the CREATOR has inseparably connected with human life ; and these are not so numerous, as they have been generally imagined. The infelicities of infancy, the pain of child-bearing, the loss of those who are dear to us, the infirmities of old age, and death, will I believe be found to include all the natural evils : the rest are either imaginary, or the bitter fruit of the corruption of mankind, diseases themselves not excepted ; because they are generally the productions of man, and have seldom any other causes than his imprudence, idleness, or intemperance.

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AMONG all the natural evils, two only, in my judgment, are of moment; the death of those whom we love, and of ourselves: these are the only two which require any firmness of mind to sustain them. A very common share of fortitude, or, perhaps, that which does not deserve the name of fortitude, will suffice for the rest.

It is now more than thirty years, since I forgot the evils of infancy: but whatever they were, they do not belong to my subject; because, no argument for patience can be adapted to that age. Besides, whether an infant in a cradle be patient or not, is, I believe, a matter of indifference in morality, which has no relation to those who, as yet, are endued with no more than a blind instinct. Saint Austin was not the only one who beat his nurse; but, perhaps, he is the only one, who very seriously reproached himself with it as a crime: the conscience of that pious father was certainly very tender.

How acute the pangs of child-bearing are, I cannot know; but I judge they are not intolerable, from the intrepidity of those widows who venture on a second marriage, and by their being patiently endured by brutes.

NOR do the aged appear to have much more reason to complain: because, in proportion as their infirmities increase in number and degree, their sensibility also becomes more languid; and because, to them, the mere pleasure of living compensates the pains of life. An old man's greatest infelicity is the near prospect of death, to which a young man submits with a much better grace.

BUT the loss of a friend, a son, a father, or a wife, who was the object of our tenderest affection, are strokes of adversity that wound us deeply, and

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are most sensibly felt; and all our strength of mind is scarce sufficient to sustain the shock.

A WOUND which is curable in a sound body, may be mortal in one that is shattered by diseases, or labouring under a cachexy: so a wound in the soul, however healthful and vigorous, may cause the acutest pain; but the goodness of its constitution, a virtuous habit (for VIRTUE IS THE HEALTH OF THE SOUL) will at least prevent her from sinking under it, and at length perfect the cure; so that of a deep wound, there shall be no remains but a superficial scar.

IN violent pain, either of body or mind, we should equally avoid IMPIETY and SELF-DEPRESSION. Let us apply this maxim to a particular case.

DEATH has snatched from your arms an amiable wife, who was adorned with every natural and acquired excellence; and in whom the seven qualifications, which the great Henry, who was certainly a good judge of female perfection, desired to find in woman, were united; — beauty, discretion, sweetness of temper, a sprightly wit, fertility, wealth, and noble extraction. But is this a reason, why you should accuse your fate of cruelty; that is, PROVIDENCE of injustice? Does this authorize you to renounce your life, abandon your employment, and neglect your duty; to indulge the transports of grief to distraction, or sink into a stupid insensibility? your impatience is a superadded evil, which can neither remove nor alleviate that which before oppressed you; and what is yet worse, it is a careless and guilty revolt against the supreme authority of the UNIVERSAL MONARCH. Your wife was born to die, and you received her under the condition of mortality. Her death (an event which you ought to have foreseen, and which indeed you did foresee) is now past; and what is there

there in all this, that can justify your complaint? GOD lent her to you but for a term, of which he did not acquaint you with the limits; this term is expired, and what injustice has he done you in taking her back? But you did not expect to lose her so soon. — And why so; since he never assured you, that you should possess her so long? Is GOD to be reproached, because you flattered yourself with groundless expectations? Enjoyment becomes too habitual; and we are apt to build a claim of future, upon the possession of present happiness. It was at least as probable, that your wife would die before you, as that she should be the survivor; and yet you think it strange, that she has left you behind her. But if death had taken you first, is it certain that you would have found no pretence to complain? would not you have affected a participation in the pain, which she would be supposed to feel at your loss? The wife, however, must either die before the husband, or the husband before the wife. Perhaps, indeed, you desired, that both might expire at the same instant; but does the desire of an event give you a right to demand it? These reflections, I perceive, have had some effect upon your mind; you resolve to insult the ALMIGHTY, by impious murmurings no more: but this is not enough. You have, indeed, made some advances towards VIRTUE, but you must approach also to REASON; you reverence the hand that afflicts you, but you still sink under the affliction. The tears which stand in your eyes, either increase the magnitude, or change the figure of the objects around you. You imagine yourself the most unfortunate of mankind; there is no situation which you do not think preferable to your own; and yet, the loss which you have suffered, does not put you into

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a state of positive misery ; it is no more than a mere privation of pleasure : and, perhaps, to be separated by death from a wife whom we love, is a less evil, than to be obliged to live with one whom we hate : this punishment at least is longer, and is inflicted to the last hour with equal rigour : grief, on the contrary, however violent, becomes every day less and less. It is by neglecting to observe this circumstance, that we deceive ourselves. We imagine, that this piercing sense of sorrow shall continue to the end of life ; and it is deemed a defect in delicacy of sentiment, to dare to think of being ever less touched at the remembrance of our loss : we imagine, that we shall for ever sigh under insupportable despair ; and, to render our grief yet more intense, we add the future to the present. Before you possessed the object which you now regret, was you conscious to the want of something so essential to your happiness ? had you the same painful desire of an absent good, as that which now sets you on the rack ? you acknowledge the contrary. Leave your affliction to time, time will infallibly remove it ; and you will at length find yourself exactly in the same circumstances, as you were before you possessed what you have now lost. After a long interval, to have lost, and not to have possessed, is almost the same thing. Your sorrow will be changed into a tender remembrance, or it may be wholly obliterated by a new engagement. My supposition offends you ; but ten years hence it will appear more probable, and less injurious.

BUT who is that other object which excites my pity ? It is not a husband weeping over the grave of a wife, but the ancient ZOZIMUS who is now dying. His ghastly and distorted countenance, his livid complexion, and his fixed and languid eyes,

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already confirm the hopes of his impatient heir. He is given over by his physician; for what can be effected on a machine that is worn out by long use, on a body whose vital powers are exhausted? The physician is however succeeded by the priest, who stands at the patient's bedside, and endeavours at least to save his soul. "Alas! is it then impossible," says ZOZIMUS in a mournful and faltering voice, "is it impossible that I should recover! — POLYCHRONUS is five years older than I, and yet he is just recovered from the same disease. — Yes, I too shall recover; — I feel new strength, and my constitution is still sound." It is, however, gently intimated to him by his attendants, that he is nearer to his end than he imagines. This he resents and disbelieves; they repeat it in stronger terms: his disorder increases; and, at length, he himself begins to be less confident of his recovery. His terror throws him into confusion and agony; he shrieks at the prospect before him; he weeps, he despairs, he calls his crucifix to his assistance, his patron saint, and his guardian angel; but they are deaf to his invocation. What can he do in this dreadful extremity? he wrangles with death, and struggles against him with all his strength; if he must die, let it at least be confessed, that it was against his will. Alas, poor ZOZIMUS! And what have you been doing, for almost a century that you have crawled about upon the earth? You came hither but to learn to die, and have only contracted a stronger attachment to life! What would you gain if that century could return? what, but some years of misery and regret, which perhaps would be yet more pungent at the expiration of your reprieve. Death is a debt which must be paid; and life was given you only upon that condition. Instead of

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repining at the approach of the mortal hour, give thanks to GOD, that, although on the breaking of a fibre, of a thread more than a hundred times finer than the smallest hair, you would have dropped into the grave; yet your life has been preserved till this day.

A ZEALOUS Christian would rather forfeit his head, than suffer himself to be circumcised; and a religious Jew, at Rome, would chuse rather to be burnt, than baptized: because, both the Jew and the Christian firmly believe, that this inflexibility is essential to a good conscience. One of them, however, is in an error; and neither of them has demonstrative evidence in his favour. But you whom GOD has been pleased to visit with a mortal disease, are certain of his will; it is a demonstrative truth, that it is his will you should be sick, since sick you are, and he is omnipotent. You would anathematize whoever should embrace the opinions of Confucius or Mahomet; and yet are guilty of a greater crime, by murmuring at the fever which is commissioned to destroy you. What then would be your conduct, if you had nothing to hope after death? You expect to be happy in another life; and yet you repine at the stroke, which opens to you the door of immortality. 'But it is not, you say, so much the loss of life that alarms you, as the uncertainty of what shall succeed: who knows whether he is the object of the divine favour or displeasure? such dreadful tales are told of the other world, as may well make the boldest tremble.' Fear not, however, to trust your future fate to GOD. He has perhaps been represented to you, as a severe and unjust master, who demands what he has not lent, and expects to reap where he has not sown. He is, indeed, too frequently painted in these odious colours:

lours: but can you imagine there is any resemblance of the original, in these blasphemous portraits — the work of melancholy and superstition! — when they differ so greatly from that fair copy of DIVINE BENIGNITY and LOVE, which is traced by the hand of GOD himself in all his works! GOD is a tender father, and good to all his children: to those who pay him a filial obedience, bountiful to profusion; and even to the rebellious, placable and indulgent.

ART. II. OF PUNISHMENTS.

THERE are other evils, which may also be termed natural; because, in consequence of the established order of nature, they are the necessary effects of CORRUPT MORALS: as infamy of fraud, poverty of prodigality, and debility and disease of intemperance.

OENOPHILUS, in his fortieth year, has all the infirmities of old age; his body totters, his hands tremble, his head shakes, and his voice falters: an hidden fire in his bowels dries up the vital juices, and consumes his strength; but it is a fire of his own kindling, which he has also continued and increased by the immoderate use of wine and strong liquors. LEMARCUS is tormented by frequent and excruciating paroxysms of the gout; for which he is indebted to the skill and dexterity of his cook, the luxury of his table, and perhaps to some other excesses which equally enervate the body.

How wretched is the condition of ASOTUS! a little garret with bare walls is his whole apartment; and of this, a flock bed covered with rags takes up two thirds. Cold, nakedness, and shame compel him to lie in this bed, till the day is far

spent. At night a lamp suited to the place, a true sepulchre lamp, rather adds horror than diffuses light. By the feeble glimmering of this languid flame, he eats a dry crust of brown bread, his whole repast! yet, poor as it is, he is not sure that he shall be able to renew it to-morrow. What are now become of his countless treasures, his immense revenues which appeared sufficient to maintain a whole province? It may as well be asked, what becomes of water in a sieve, or of wax in a furnace. Luxury, gaming, women, usurers, and his steward, are the bottomless gulphs which have swallowed up his opulence. But is there not one among all his friends, who knows him in his adversity, and stretches out the hand of bounty for his relief? Is there not one among all his friends? alas! had he ever a friend? if he had, he would have him still: for, whatever may have been said, adversity never banished a friend; it only disperses those who unjustly assume the name: and if adversity is productive of any good, which surely cannot be denied, this is one of its principal advantages; for the loss of a false friend, is a real gain: and if ASOTUS has any cause of complaint, it is only of never having had a friend that was sincere.

THE character of PHILOCERDES is blasted by violence and extortion; that of APHYSTAS by treachery and fraud; and PHRYNE's by immodesty. Every vice is the natural cause of some kind of punishment. The tyrant, whose frown intimidates nations, trembles every moment for himself. A father who permits licentiousness in his family, will find his folly severely punished, by the disgrace which the vices of his children will bring upon him. A mother's inclination to gallantry and intrigue will contaminate the blood of her

her daughters, and their scandalous adventures will cover her with infamy. A subtil hypocrite in vain conceals from others, those vices which would render him infamous; his own knowledge of them is sufficient to ensure an adequate punishment; consciousness of guilt, and involuntary remorse, shall give him up to the worm that never dies, and fill his bosom with perpetual anguish. Or if the divine justice suffers the few wretches, whose habitual guilt has rendered conscience insensible, to enjoy a flattering reprieve while they live; it is because death only consigns them to a more dreadful punishment: for sooner or later, an IMPARTIAL RETRIBUTION must take place.

GOD, doubtless, chastises in the character of a parent: it is therefore probable, that he never chastises but to reform. I will venture to affirm, that even the punishments to be inflicted in a future state, are no more than means of reformation, if they are not eternal; and that they are eternal, is so far from being the voice of reason, that reason strongly intimates the contrary. I cannot believe, that ALMIGHTY GOODNESS, like a vindictive mortal, punishes even his guilty creatures, for the barbarous pleasure of contemplating their misery. If he punishes them, it is to alienate them from vice by an experimental knowledge of the miseries which it never fails to produce. Nor can I form any conception of a just and good being, who punishes merely to revenge; much less, who takes vengeance for ever. Revenge would not have been forbidden to man, if GOD had permitted it to himself; because man is his IMAGE. But whatever be the motive or end of future punishments, it is certain, that those which are inflicted in this life are no more than parental corrections,
intended

intended only to recal us to paths of virtue: and this is sufficient for my present purpose.

If you were slumbering in a lethargy, from which you could only be recovered by being rendered sensible of pain; you could not, surely, blame the surgeon, whose lancet restored sensation, and awakened you from the sleep of death. And such exactly is the benevolent severity, which is exercised by the ALMIGHTY in chastising our vices and follies. The pains which our vices bring upon us, are much less than those which they remove: but to render them perfectly efficacious, it is not only necessary that GOD should punish as a FATHER; but that these salutary corrections should also be received by us, with the dutiful submission and docility of CHILDREN.

ART. III. OF PERSECUTIONS.

THE friends of virtue are not jealous rivals, who mutually endeavour to destroy each other; on the contrary, nothing gives them a more sensible pleasure than to see their number increase. It is from the enemies of virtue only, that injuries are to be feared; and as these injuries are inevitable evils, they ought to be expected with temper, and sustained with constancy. If we form our ideas of happiness from popular opinion, it is so far from being necessarily connected with virtue, that they are scarce ever united. Wealth, titles, elevated stations, and temporal dominion, are not her inheritance. She is an orphan, abandoned, unknown, destitute of friends, without a portion. Her beauty, from time to time, makes a few conquests; but the love that is kindled by her person, is commonly extinguished by her indigence. And there is yet another

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reason why her lovers are few; the avenues to her dwelling are fenced up with briars and thorns, and guarded by evil genii who keep off those that approach it, some by threatnings, others by promises, some by open force, and some by stratagem and cunning. There is however one circumstance, which ought to encourage the lovers of virtue, and teach them perseverance; they are secure of conquest, if their passion is sincere. To love virtue, is to possess her; she escapes from those alone, who betray her by inconstancy or weakness: and by those who love her, she can never be betrayed. Nor are there any who become unfaithful to virtue, but through a fond attachment to some fallacious good which she either with-holds or takes away; such as indolence, ease, the pomp of life, and the favour of the great. But to prefer to virtue, or even to put in competition with her, any temporal advantage,—the mitre, the tiara, or the regal diadem itself,—is more than not to love her, it is not to know her. To put air, and smoke, and tinsel, in competition with virtue! what an injury! what an insult!—but to give these the preference! what an horrid profanation!

THE vicious, who, as the majority, are the governing part of the world, have never dared publicly to stigmatize virtue; nor do they ever oppose her under that name. To justify their persecutions, they give her odious appellations, pretend not to know her, and canonize vice disguised in her ornaments and apparel. They call integrity and fair dealing, puerile simplicity; the forgiveness of injuries, cowardice; prudent circumspection, pedantic gravity; the contempt of gold, folly; and generosity, weakness. Ambition, on the contrary, is in their language transformed into noble.

noble emulation; cunning and fraud, are industry and address; bigotted hypocrisy takes the name of piety, knavish chicanery that of refined policy; false pretences, subtle evasions, and dissimulation, are master-pieces of prudence; transports of passion, are vivacity; pride, dignity of sentiment; thirst of revenge, an indispensable point of honour; and ferocity, courage. The encomiums of these wretches are insults; endeavour, therefore, to render yourself unworthy of them. Their favours are poisoned; be careful not to merit them, for they cannot be obtained but at the expence of virtue. When we are deliberating on an enterprize, which we may either attempt or relinquish as shall appear most eligible; it is not only allowable but necessary, to weigh all the disadvantageous circumstances which may attend the execution: but we must not suppose there are any such circumstances, when the work before us is a duty. A soldier is commanded to mount the breach; it is not his business to examine the risque he runs, but to march forward without deliberation, although his death appears to be inevitable: for the word of command is not conditional. In the same manner let us march under the standard of virtue, without reflecting on the danger to which we may be exposed; which if it is an evil ought to be considered as inevitable, because it cannot be shunned but by breach of faith; and to be weary of suffering for virtue, is to make great approaches to vice.

Is your reputation sullied by invidious calumnies? Rejoice, that your character cannot suffer but by false imputations. You are arraigned in a court of judicature, and are unjustly condemned; passion has influenced both your prosecutor and your judge, and you cannot forbear repining that you suffer although innocent. But would it have been

been better, that you should have suffered being guilty? Would the greatest misfortune that can befall a virtuous man, be to you a consolation? And would your sufferings be alleviated by the addition of remorse? The opulence of a villain, the elevated station to which he is raised, and the honours that are paid to him, excite your jealousy, and fill your bosom with repinings and regret. What! say you, are riches, dignity, and power, reserved for such wretches as this! Cease these groundless murmurs. If the possessions which you regret were real benefits, they would be taken from the wicked and transferred to you. What would you say of a successful hero, of a *VEN-DOME*, or a *MAURICE*, who, after having delivered his country, should complain that his services were ill requited, because a few sugar-plumbs were distributed to some children in his presence, of which they had not offered him a share? Ridiculous as this would appear, your complaints are not better founded. Has *THE LORD OF ALL* no reward to confer upon you, but perishable riches, and empty precarious honour!

ART. IV. OF CONTRADICTION.

NATURE has not varied the countenances of mankind, more than their tastes and characters; and as it would be unreasonable to expect, that the countenances of others should resemble our own, it is equally absurd to require a universal conformity of temper to our own as the standard. Persons think and act differently, as they live in different periods of time, and different parts of the world; and as they differ also in age, sex, predominant passions, and education; without enquiring whether they think and act well, or ill.

ill. It is not to be conceived, how few persons there are in the world who study themselves, and endeavour their own improvement; all our own faults are forgiven, but the failings of others are censured with the most rigorous justice. Every man desires to be the reformer of mankind, and yet no man includes himself in the reformation.

FIRST, render your own temper yielding and gentle, you will then meet with less opposition from the tempers of others. ROSINA confesses that her temper is warm; and the public, less tender in the choice of expressions, calls her warmth of temper, rage, fury and frenzy. She has never once reflected, that the universe was not made merely to contribute to her pleasure: whatever she desires, she imagines to be her due; and whatever disappoints this extravagant expectation, she treats as outrage and insult. A child cries, ROSINA loses all patience, "What squalling brat is this! away with it this moment." A servant breaks a glass, "What a stupid clumsy wretch! be gone out of my sight, — pay him his wages." — She is accidentally alone, and solitude becomes irksome; and immediately her absent friends are upbraided: "Where is now the ungrateful Doris? What is become of the negligent Agatha? Where is the false Euphorbus amusing himself? What is the perfidious Sylvander doing? what cold friends! in what a forlorn situation do they leave me! But I renounce them, and will see them no more." Capricious, fickle ROSINA! What she desired yesterday, is to-day her aversion; her only constant wish is, that all the changes of her will may be divined and gratified. This is attempted, but in vain; to guess at her desires, is almost always to be mistaken: and if by chance they are known,

to gratify them is a fruitless attempt; something is always wrong, the service is delayed too long, it is precipitated with too much haste, or it is not performed with a good grace. Caress her, you are too free; treat her with reserve, and you neglect or disdain her; visit her but seldom, she complains of you with all the bitterness of resentment; if your visits are frequent, you fatigue her; and when you disoblige her, you are immediately made sensible of her displeasure, by a torrent of invectives, reproaches, and exclamations. Leave her to grow cool by degrees: to attempt to appease, is to increase her passion. When her rage has subsided, you will risque less by remonstrance, but you will not gain more. Her answer will be, "You must allow that I was right in the main: why do not people take more care? I confess, I am a little hasty; but this is not a great fault, — you must take me as I am."

If all mankind were equally virtuous, they would still differ in many particulars. The principles of virtue and moral sentiment would be alike in all; but they would, notwithstanding, differ from each other, in those things which are indifferent with respect to moral good and evil; nor would they be under any obligation to the contrary. GOD has given us his law for the rule of our conduct; and has not proposed us as patterns to each other. One person may be equal in virtue to another, without a perfect resemblance of his character. Let us then suppose a society consisting wholly of virtuous persons, we should still find something to exercise our patience and forbearance. The acute and penetrating genius would find it difficult to bear with a slow and heavy understanding; the chearful and facetious would but ill agree with the thoughtful and melancholy. Let

one be sedate, another sprightly, one a great talker, another inclined to taciturnity — what subjects of animosity to impatient tempers! But I have supposed them all to be men of virtue, and consequently that they deserve respect, and are intitled to some allowances. Let us first seek this essential qualification in those, with whom we would be connected; this is sufficiently valuable, uncommon, and excellent, to efface, or at least to cover, some trivial failings. Let us excuse every thing in a man whom we know to be indued with probity and honour: you should treat his infirmities with tenderness and indulgence; for you will lose an invaluable treasure, if you forfeit his friendship. Nothing bears a nearer resemblance to DEITY, than A JUST AND VIRTUOUS MAN; and to insult his image, is to affront the ALMIGHTY.

TIMON is cold and reserved; the smiles of mirth never unfold the wrinkles of his contracted brow. Assemblies, where jollity and pleasure are permitted, are deserts to him; whither he carries a gloomy countenance, and a mournful and disordered air. When, in point of good breeding, he thinks himself obliged to be there; the company is too sensible of his presence, and would be glad to have dispensed with his attendance. But to balance these defects, TIMON has integrity of heart, a good understanding, and a generous mind. To need his assistance, is in his opinion to claim it as a due. He is grave and serious, but neither suspicious nor censorious; he abstains even from innocent pleasures, but he does not condemn them; so far from slander, he is never heard to blame the absent; he speaks little, but what he speaks is truth; his lips were never prophaned by falsehood or equivocation; treat with him in confidence, there is no need of either witnesses or bonds

OF CONTRADICTION. III

to insure the execution of his engagements — where can you find a better security than TIMON himself?

THOSE who most frequently give occasion to fallies of passion, are children, servants, and the vulgar. Not that these persons are a meaner species than the rest of mankind, or that their hearts are more corrupt; but as they have never learned to assume a specious appearance by what the world calls good manners, their failings are more visible, and consequently more offensive.

DAMARIS, in common with most mothers, has wanton, idle, and heedless children. She exhausts her spirits in cautions and reprimands: they either do not hear her speak, or they forget that she has spoken the moment she closes her mouth. Her patience is at length worn out; she storms, she threatens, she strikes them, and repeats her blows. Maternal tenderness, suspended for a while, gives way to rage. But are you, or your children, DAMARIS, most worthy of blame? They are carried away by levity, you are transported by anger. Is prudence rather to be expected from their age, than moderation from yours? They ought at least to obey me, you say; and, I say, you ought to obey reason, which forbids these ineffectual acts of violence. To punish in a transport of passion, is less to chastise than to revenge.

WHAT dæmon is it that has possessed APHRONIA! I hear her continually scolding at her servants. Are they all confederated to provoke her? No — they are innocent victims to her capricious fury. Let APHRONIA but abate a little of her thundering petulance, and all their faults will vanish. They appear guilty to her, only because she is out of humour. Her impatient temper

magnifies every displeasing object, and transforms the slightest failing into the most atrocious crime. Our servants are men: it follows, by necessary consequence, that they are not without faults; and that they are men, should also be a reason for our treating them with humanity and indulgence.

You despise the vulgar; and you do right, if your contempt falls only upon their rusticity, ignorance, and meanness of sentiment. If we form our opinion of them from this disadvantageous view, we shall pronounce them a groveling multitude who are continually in motion, without knowledge and without design; a body destitute of sight, which walks, indeed, but knows not whither, or which is guided only by the allurements of sordid gain: wholly ignorant of their true interest; enemies, both to wisdom and moderation; turbulent and seditious; brutishly fierce, when courted; timid and servile, when oppressed; vain, inconstant, and superstitious; fond of novelty, and slaves to prejudice; arrogating to themselves a right to judge those who instruct and govern them, and always judging wrong. But from this ignoble class select some docile subjects, who are as yet of an age susceptible of instruction; and, perhaps, like rough diamonds in the hands of an able artificer, they may astonish you by an unexpected and dazzling splendor. Wisdom and virtue, the effects of education, will distinguish them from the crowd, from which riches and honours alone would not have distinguished them. The majority of the great, are only a part of the rabble.

SCORN, as much as you please, the populace in general; but, in every individual of that complicated body, recognize men like yourself; love them

them under this denomination, and bear with their faults: but especially behave with tenderness to those among them, who are depressed by misfortunes; your haughtiness and severity will render the sense of their calamity more piercing and acute: as we excuse caprice and fretfulness in the sick, we should also overlook all the extravagancies of the WRETCHED, which are the effects of their misery.

You yourself, certainly, are not impeccable; treat others, therefore, as you would that they should treat you. But supposing you were perfect, PERFECTION itself would not invest you with a right to insult those who are still struggling with human frailties; on the contrary, it would only strengthen their claim to your pity. What tho' Adonis were the most beautiful of mankind, would he not have been inexcusable if he had reviled Therpsites?

SECT. II. OF COURAGE.

COURAGE is that magnanimity, by which the mind is enabled to achieve such virtuous actions, as, by reason of the obstacles which are to be surmounted, are impracticable to the pusillanimous. These obstacles are of two kinds; those which have their origin within the breast, and those which arise from externals. Courage, therefore, is also of two kinds: that by which we are enabled to subdue ourselves, I call GREATNESS OF SOUL; and that which is exerted to remove such obstacles as are opposed to virtue from without, I distinguish by the name of HEROISM.

ART. I. OF GREATNESS OF SOUL.

BY greatness of soul, I mean that dignity of sentiment which enables us to discern what is truly beautiful, and prompts us to pursue it with ardour and perseverance. But where is TRUE BEAUTY to be found? and from whence does it arise? Doubtless, from the virtues and attainments of the mind. All else is only tinsel, parade, and show; and the source of virtue is the contempt of transient enjoyments, as that of mental accomplishment is emulation. The human heart is by NATURE virtuous and noble; banish from it the low affections, which it has contracted by yielding to the allurements of sense, and it will immediately reassume its original purity and dignity.

I. GREATNESS of soul does not consist in a neglect of our own interest; but in the placing our affections on objects, which are really and permanently good. The virtuous do not desire happiness, with less ardour than the vicious: but they know the means, by which happiness is to be attained, better; and they pursue them with less reluctance, because they are not restrained by remorse. They know, that virtue alone can render them happy, and that externals can only contribute to their felicity, as they are connected with virtue. If a good man, without sullyng the purity of his manners, can enjoy a life of ease and tranquillity, free from intellectual and corporeal pain, and sweetned by innocent pleasures; he will certainly prefer it to a life of disappointment, inquietude, and misfortune, imbittered by affliction, ignominy and sorrow. But if a virtuous action, which would ruin his fortune or endanger his life, and an action by which wealth may be

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acquired at the expence of virtue, be proposed to him as the objects of his choice; however great the pecuniary advantage on the side of vice, his election is already made, nor does he suffer a moment's hesitation. Virtue is, in his opinion, of infinitely greater value, than his ease, his pleasure, or his life.

SOPHRONIUS and PULCHERIA seem to have been born for each other; the conformity of their taste, their genius and character, might have joined them by an indissoluble union: but PULCHERIA had already disposed of her person. SOPHRONIUS, however, still loved her; and her presence would have encreased his passion, and consequently his weakness. An effectual method to secure his virtue, was however in his power; it was, indeed, severe and mortifying, but there was no other; he must see PULCHERIA no more; this was his resolution, and his virtue was preserved. Love is an enemy, which cannot be conquered but by flight.

AN innocent person is accused before EACUS. The prosecutors are powerful, and dictate the sentence which they expect the judge should pronounce. Upon his decision, depends his ruin or preferment: but to an upright magistrate, what is fortune when put in competition with justice!

CALISTHENES is, by an uncle, put into possession of a valuable estate as trustee, which he hoped to have inherited as heir; and charged to make it over to a person whom the uncle affirmed to be his son, though the relation was of that kind which is not recognized by the law. CALISTHENES promised to fulfil this trust; but this promise was verbal and secret, made obligatory by no writing, and secured by no witness. And now, disappointed of a fortune which he had long regard-
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ed as his own, and depressed by poverty which the prospect of wealth rendered more dreadful ;—
 “ Why,” say you, “ might he not appropriate this
 “ estate to himself ; or, at least, reserve a part ?
 “ if this had been done, who could have known
 “ it ?”—GOD, doubtless, from whom nothing is
 hidden ; and CALISTHENES, who must have been
 conscious to his guilt.—What, avoid indigence by
 rushing into perfidy ! this, surely, is not deliverance,
 but ruin.

BOUND to a stake, by those zealots who destroy
 mankind under colour of promoting religion, your
 life is still in your own hands ; the barbarians
 will consent to unbind you, if you will consent
 to lie, or at least to dissemble your real senti-
 ments. What preposterous mercy ? that which
 they require you to inflict on yourself, is a greater
 evil than that which you would otherwise suffer
 from them.

II. THE activity of our minds, the structure of
 our bodies, the vigour and mobility of their or-
 gans, and, above all, our continually returning
 necessities, demonstrate, that the hand which
 formed us, formed us for a busy and active life ;
 and the end for which the CREATOR designed
 us, is, undoubtedly, the best to which we can pos-
 sibly attain. That the necessity of LABOUR ought
 to be regarded as a punishment, is a mean and
 sordid opinion invented by the effeminate and la-
 zy : on the contrary, if GOD had prohibited la-
 bour, such prohibition might justly have been
 deemed a token of his displeasure ; for inaction is
 a kind of lethargy, equally pernicious to the mind
 and body.

OF this RATHIMUS is a striking example :
 whatever employs, displeases ; and whatever exer-
 cises, wearies him : it is even a fatigue to him to
 exist ;

exist; annihilation would be his supreme felicity; and imagining, that GOD can bestow no higher reward upon those whom he loves, this is the paradise which RATHIMUS expects; and even while he continues oppressed with the load of being, he anticipates the pleasure of shaking it off, by suspending it in sleep every day 'till noon. Dreadful is the moment in which he awakes; he therefore keeps it off as long as he can. Forced, at length, to commit an act of violence on himself and quit his bed, his sullen look and contracted brow are lasting intimations that he has risen against his will. He begins to dress himself, and having made some trifling progress, interrupted by twenty intervals of rest, he at length drops his arms, unable to go through the fatigue of compleating the work. How does he begin his day? "Give me," says he, "something to eat." Not that he is either hungry, or a glutton; but because an idle person can fill up some vacant hours by eating, without interrupting his indolence. RATHIMUS, during the twelve hours in which he is out of his bed, has often recourse to the same expedient. The intervals between these capricious meals, are filled up by some trifling amusements; which are varied almost every moment, because all are equally insipid.

A LAZY person is of all others the most incapable of pleasure; a wretch, who slumbering in a perpetual lethargy, cannot be stimulated to action or roused from his insensibility. He is his own burden, and would fain fly from himself, but is not able: that eternal inappetency which he drags about with him, assumes a thousand different forms for his own punishment and that of others: now it is lassitude—he feels himself dull, heavy, and not able to move so much as a finger:
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it is now indisposition—he finds himself oppressed by a disorder which he cannot define: at other times it is a melancholy, of which he knows not the cause; and his temper is always uneven, captious and splenetic. If his word may be taken, no man was ever so ill treated: he lives neglected, suffers unpitied, and, should he die, would be unlamented by the whole circle of his acquaintance, who are so destitute of compassion as to wish he was already in the grave. This, indeed, would be to wish him well; for the gloomy habit of his mind, his indolence, and want of exercise, will shortly realize all his imaginary disorders, and he will be to-morrow, if he is not to-day, pale, dejected, languid, emaciated, and totally debilitated in body and mind. And is life a benefit to those, who preserve it on such conditions as these? Supineness and effeminacy have ruined more constitutions, than excessive labour; and moderate exercise, far from being destructive to health, establishes and strengthens it.

As we are members of a society, the assistance of which is necessary to our well-being, to merit this assistance, we ought in our turn to serve that society with alacrity and zeal: to discharge our duty with languor and indifference, is not to acquit ourselves of the obligation; and nothing can be well done that is done with reluctance. There are a thousand different employments, all which concur in promoting the common interest. Let us chuse one among those which we have abilities to execute; let our taste and capacity be consulted, and our decision be in favour of that employment, which appears upon the whole to be most eligible. But the choice once made, let it be a point of honour to excel in that profession, to which we have given the preference.

EMULATION seems to be allied both to ENVY and AMBITION; and yet, in her character, she resembles neither. The merit of others, far from being the object of her regret, becomes a motive to aspire after perfection with the greater ardour and assiduity. Emulation is excited by a sense of honour, and a relish of our duty; not by the thirst of ambition, or the pangs of envy. PHLISTENES hates all who acquire wealth, fame, or distinction; every advantage which he sees others possess, he thinks misplaced; it is to him only that they are due, but the world is ignorant of his merit: PHLISTENES is consumed by ENVY. PHILOTIMUS, dazzled by the splendor of dignities and honours, makes these the only objects of his wishes, and the end of all his actions; far more solicitous to obtain, than to render himself worthy of them. The honours which he sought with so much ardour and anxiety, become insipid the moment they are enjoyed; or, rather, they are never enjoyed at all; for he is continually forming distant views, and the object of his desires is still that which he has not attained: PHILOTIMUS is a prey to ambition.

BUT a noble emulation is, apparently, the only active principle which animates EUDOXUS. That of a pleader, is the profession which he has chosen; a profession, which surely would never have been chosen by ambition. In the country where EUDOXUS resides, eloquence is but little regarded: and if to eloquence were added the most penetrating genius, the most exact judgment, the profoundest skill in morality, the most perfect knowledge of the manners, laws, and customs of nations, in a word, every possible accomplishment; all would be unavailing, if money were omitted. In this country every thing is venal; whatever
might

might encourage the improvement of the mind, is there sold to the highest bidder. The right of disposing of the property, and even the lives of the people, of facing death at the head of a regiment, of managing the public revenues, and the private estates of individuals, of presiding on a tribunal, of forming and executing judicial determinations; even empty titles, names, and escutcheons, and I know not what frivolous distinctions which they call nobility, all is sold. This detestable venality, which is in vain attempted to be justified, leaving merit destitute of the least hope of reward, emulation must necessarily be, in this place, very rare; but then, in this place, it must shine with all its lustre. EUDOXUS, in applying himself to the eloquence of the bar, cannot be suspected of aspiring to the first employments in the state; since he is assured, that not being able to buy them, they are wholly out of his reach: the sole object of his wishes is, to excel in the art to which he has confined all his studies; the art of drawing truth out of that chaos of darkness and confusion, in which it has been involved by chicane and quibble; of exhibiting it to the judges in the clearest and strongest light, and compelling them, by the force of irresistible evidence, to give sentence in favour of the party who has justice on his side. If a rival succeeds in this noble attempt, EUDOXUS is not disgusted. What is it to EUDOXUS who does the good, so the good be but done? It was CALIDEMUS who snatched an innocent person from the brink of ruin, and it was EUPHRADES that delivered an orphan from oppression; no matter—since they succeeded: EUDOXUS could have done no more, and their success is his. If mankind had no other views in the exercise of their abilities, than HONOUR and the PUBLIC GOOD, the human breast

breast would be inaccessible to the sordid train of jealousy and envy.

ART. II. OF HEROISM.

HEROISM includes greatness of mind. There are no heroes, who have a base and servile disposition: and yet heroism differs from mere greatness of mind; as it implies the exercise of glittering and popular virtues, which excite astonishment and admiration. It must indeed be confessed, that the conquest of vicious inclinations cannot be effected, but by generous efforts which offer a kind of violence to constitutional propensities; and to obtain this conquest, is greatness of mind. It is not, however, that which is distinguished by the name of heroism: a hero, in the general acceptation of the word, is a man constant in difficulties, fearless in danger, and daring in battle.

I. CONSTANCY and obstinacy have a general likeness to each other: but, in the following portraits, they will easily be distinguished.

THYMOCRITUS has embraced a certain opinion; and the opinion of THYMOCRITUS must also be that of all, who are so unhappy as to live in a state of dependance upon him. To tell him that this opinion is erroneous, is insolence and presumption; but to prove it, is an outrage not to be forgiven. He has made a capricious regulation, which he imagines to be a master-piece of prudence and policy; he is informed, by humble remonstrances, that the execution of it is impracticable; but information and remonstrance are ineffectual: THYMOCRITUS is an utter stranger to thought and reflexion; volition is the only act of his mind. To moderate, or to suppress his ordonnance, would

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have been to act the wisest part, but not the most despotic. ‘Is an intendant of a province, a magistrate of my rank, to receive law from the rabble?’ ‘My ordonnance is a novelty’—‘is it so? let them obey it, and in ten years this objection will be obviated.’ ‘It is censured,’ ‘and the absurdity of it publicly demonstrated,—’ ‘what have I to do with the criticisms of wretches, who were born to obey me?’ ‘I bring my authority into question, by commanding impossibilities’——‘but it is easy to give it sanction, by punishing those who complain. Shall I go back, after having advanced so far? My order is issued: just, or not, it shall be obeyed.’ ‘If I persist, the country will rise against me’——‘let it rise; I know how to reduce rebels to their duty.’ This is the portrait of OBSTINACY; we shall now exhibit that of CONSTANCY.

CHOREGUS once served his country, as a statesman and a general. The public good was the only object which he kept constantly in view; and he regarded nothing with indifference, that had a tendency to promote it. When he had once formed any design which might advance the common interest, the execution of it was certain, if he had no obstacles to surmount but the cavilings of perverted reason, and the machinations of sedition. The inconveniencies of a project might induce him to drop it, but he was not to be diverted from his purpose by difficulties. Although he was the favourite of his prince, yet, far from stooping to gratify his vanity by servile adulation, he dared to set truth before him without a veil, and to confront him with it wheresoever he turned. This glorious and unshaken integrity frequently exposed him to the danger of losing his post; but the public interest was always, in his opinion, to be

he preferred before his own: he deemed it greater honour to serve his prince, than to continue in his favour; and was less solicitous to avoid disgrace, than not to deserve it. "I have already," said he, "ventured my life in battle, for my master's honour and my own; and should I fear to risk my fortune?" Happy the monarch, on whom indulgent heaven shall bestow a minister like this! My reader doubtless regards him, only as an imaginary being; nor will I venture to affirm his real existence. Alexanders and Cæsars, however rare, are yet less so than disinterested ministers of state, who have no other end in view than the good of their country, and the glory of their prince.

OBSTINACY is a blind attachment to something either trifling or criminal; and is commonly the effect either of stupidity or vice, and sometimes of both: it is the characteristic of wretches, who imagine that their honour would be sullied, if they should turn back, when they are credibly informed that they have missed their way. **CONSTANCY**, on the contrary, is the unshaken resolution of a man of sense, who persists in a design which he knows to be just and useful, notwithstanding the opposition he meets with, and the labour he sustains. Constancy is inspired by honour, virtue, and public spirit. I add public spirit; because whoever perseveres in any enterprize, with a view only to private advantage, is a mercenary wretch, whose constancy is rather the effect of meanness than heroism. For honour, and for virtue, too much cannot be done: but too much is done for fortune, when we sacrifice to her our health, our ease, our mistress, or our friend.

II. INTREPIDITY is a kind of constancy, which is tried by the presence of danger, pain, and affliction; and this more particularly characterises

the hero. Let us, however, distinguish it from a brutal FEROSITY, which produces nearly the same effects, but never proceeds from the same principle.

PENISANDER fears nothing: gulphs, precipices, fire, sword, and thunder itself, are ineffectual barriers against his daring attempts. Doubtless he thinks himself intrepid, and assumes the hero; yet he is no better than a villain blinded by brutal rage: he rather shakes off the thoughts of danger, than despises it; and, if he should venture to reflect, would sink under the apprehension of it like a coward. A villain can only face dangers of which he is not sufficiently apprized, or which he hopes to escape. Let us not deceive ourselves; every man that is destitute of virtue, is at heart a coward; and such he must always appear, except when he is under the immediate influence of rage, or some other violent passion. In CRATERUS, we have an example of INTREPIDITY. Before he enters on any undertaking, he examines first whether it is practicable; and then whether it is worthy a man of honour? If it is, he is not terrified at the prospect of danger; he sees it approach with steadiness and serenity, and prepares against it with equanimity and composure. If he miscarries, it is not for want of courage, but of power; and whatever the event, having fought to the last, he must come off with honour.

THERE is frequently no apparent difference between the intrepid and the fierce, but the MOTIVE from which they act. The savage, for some trifling acquisition, some chimerical honour—mere shadows and names, which would be too dearly purchased by the mere desire of possessing them!—sacrifices his enjoyments, his peace of mind, and life itself. The hero, on the contrary,
knows

knows the value of his existence, the charms of pleasure, and the sweets of repose; he will renounce them, notwithstanding, to struggle with difficulties, smart under affliction, and submit even to death, if justice and his duty command him; but he will renounce them on no other consideration. His virtue is dearer to him than life, pleasure, or repose; but than these, virtue ONLY is a more valuable possession.

III. But let us now seek for heroism, on those bloody theatres on which it is placed by the vulgar; in camps, in armies, and under the walls of besieged towns: for the many think no man a hero, but a soldier. Let us see then if these sons of triumph, when weighed in the balance of reason and equity, are worthy of the pompous titles that have been lavished upon them.

VALOUR, doubtless, is a virtue of the first rank; since, of all others, it requires the greatest SELF-DENIAL.

POLEMISTES, reclining on the lap of plenty, and surrounded by all the laughing pleasures that wanton in her train, hears the shrill sound of the martial trumpet: immediately he starts up, and flies to battle. Plays, balls, festivity, and love, pleasures of every kind, to him ye were only trifling pastimes! ye amused his leisure, but could not engage his heart. It is only since he has shaken you off, that his manner of life has suited with his genius—But is that POLEMISTES! Dust, sweat, blood, wounds, hunger, thirst, and fatigue, have so changed him, that I no longer know him but by the vigour of his arm and the greatness of his exploits. All opposition vanishes at his approach. The king of terrors has invested him with his own authority, and armed him for slaughter and desolation with his own weapons: the firmest batta-

lions of the enemy are ineffectual barriers against his fury ; they fall before him like grass before the scythe. If honour, a sense of duty, or the love of justice, have armed POLEMISTES, I confess, that he is a HERO ; but if this deluge of blood swells only to gratify his avarice, or his ambition, he is a MONSTER. I know that even these monsters, if under the influence and direction of others, may be serviceable to their country ; she has frequently need of their arm, but the principle that moves it is a circumstance of no moment. " It is certain," says a modern writer, " that a military spirit is the defence of the state ; it should be cultivated and cherished, but with the same caution that we keep a mastiff to guard the house, whom we chain up, letting him loose but seldom, lest he should worry his master."

THE malice and injustice of mankind have rendered war necessary ; but it is notwithstanding an evil, which all the good that it produces cannot compensate. War is herself the daughter of ferocity, and violence, cruelty, and murder, are her offspring : by her, every tender tie is broken ; nations are depopulated, cities are reduced to ashes, and the most fruitful country to a desert : nor is this the worst ; by her the manners of mankind are depraved, genius extinguished, and brutality, ignorance, and barbarism, established upon the ruins of social virtue, literature, and science : then inhumanity glitters with the trophies of valour, and the thirst of hostile blood is the wretched substitute of virtue. Greece had never so many heroes as in the infancy of her states, when she was peopled only by robbers and assassins ; as knowledge increased, their numbers diminished. PHILOSOPHY examines a hero with a cautious scrutiny, before

before his right to that glorious appellation is acknowledged. It has been denied to Alexander, and to the Swede; nor is it allowed to any potentate, whose claim is supported only by conquest and triumph: the great HENRY himself would have been unworthy of it, if content with being the conqueror, he had never aspired to be the defender and father of his country. But the vulgar will be the vulgar in all ages and nations; and as they have no idea of true greatness, it must frequently happen, that he who in their estimation is a hero, when reduced to his just value, is no better than the pest and the reproach of mankind.

THERIODES, whose temper is savage, and whose manners are brutal, who is destitute of taste, abilities and virtue, had yet the good fortune to do justice to himself; he engaged in a military life, the only station in which he could have succeeded: and in proportion as he is unfit for every other profession, he is qualified for that, if nothing more is necessary to execute it well, than to be outrageous, fierce, inhuman, and blood-thirsty. No rebellious tenderness is to be subdued, before he can be excited to a massacre; he has an innate relish for carnage, and no longer regards men as sharing the same nature with himself, when he is paid for killing them: the fear of one day sharing the same fate, does not restrain his fury; he looks no farther than the present moment, nor does he amuse himself with debating, whether there is any difference between living and having lived: he is an armed automaton, a military machine placed on the field of battle; its springs are wound up by the sound of the drum and the trumpet; the thunder of the artillery puts it in motion; it then strikes furiously to the right and left, and all
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that it has of life and action is confined to its arms. This, however, in the opinion of the multitude, is a MAN, is endowed with courage, is a HERO, especially if he holds a considerable post; for the title of hero, in the language of the vulgar, includes the idea of an elevated station: nor is it given even to a soldier, if he is no more than a corporal or a sergeant; he must at least be a field-marshal, a prince, or commander in chief. But not to dispute about words, let us leave warriors of the first rank in possession of heroism, since custom immemorial has adjudged it exclusively to military valour; let us however, at least, call that valour which is truly such. To sacrifice life without fear or hesitation, passes for the most sublime and glorious effort of BRAVERY: and yet to sacrifice it on a trivial occasion, is mere RASHNESS; and to sacrifice it in a bad cause, is the most consummate WICKEDNESS. The contempt of life is not meritorious in itself; on the contrary, self-preservation is enjoined by the law of nature; and the only case in which we are permitted to dispense with this law, is when some act of virtue becomes our duty, which cannot be executed without the hazard or the forfeiture of life. To die in the defence of our country, our honour, or our integrity, is glorious; but it is infamous to fall a victim to our passions, to insatiable ambition, fordid avarice, or vindictive fury. It is not true, that an action is glorious in proportion as it is difficult, if at the same time it is neither useful nor virtuous. Difficulty adds no value to it, but as a testimony of the inviolable attachment of the agent to his duty.

LET it not be feared, that by declaiming against false valour, I shall abate the warlike disposition of our troops. The officer is excited by the
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alluring hope of pecuniary reward, which has a much greater influence on his mind than my maxims of dry morality. The private centinel is also sheltered from their baleful influence, by his habitual ferocity; and besides, our heroic Pandours will scarce read my work. But what do I say? Let them read it. The military interest will be advanced, and their valour will increase in proportion as it becomes VIRTUOUS; all the dispositions of the mind, when regulated by right reason, acquire new strength and stability. Let the danger be known before it is approached, and, secured against surprize, intrepidity shall become more firm. Let life be preserved for that important moment, in which it shall be most necessary to hazard or to lose it: life is, at least, too valuable to be wantonly thrown away; and besides, by this conduct you will be able to render your country more signal service. But the most effectual means of acquiring a greater degree of intrepidity, is to be A GOOD MAN. Your conscience then giving you a pleasing assurance of another and a better life, you will be ready to forego this, if need be, with greater alacrity and chearfulness. "In battle, says Xenophon, those who most fear the Gods, are those who least fear men." To surmount the fear of death, it is necessary that a person should be conscious to the utmost PURITY OF MANNERS; or that he should be a villain, whose mind is rendered insensible by HABITUAL GUILT: chuse which you will.

WHICH will you chuse, ye FURIOUS DUELISTS, who glory in deciding your private quarrels with the sword? You trouble not yourselves about the tremendous effects of the divine justice: you, who fear not that death should surprize you in the very act of your offence, have you the sole
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property of that life which you are about to sacrifice? Have you bestowed it on yourselves, that you assume a right to dispose of it again? Is the blood which ought not to flow but in the service of the public, and which notwithstanding you are about to spill in a private broil, **YOUR OWN?** Faithless depositaries! who betray your trust, and convert to your own use, or rather to your ruin, that which **GOD** and **YOUR COUNTRY** have a right to require at your hands. But whither do I wander? To propose arguments deduced from natural equity, to these frantic wretches, is to speak in an unknown tongue; they cannot see justice but at the point of their swords. Let us approach nearer, and come within the reach of their apprehension; let us, if possible, undeceive them with respect to a false point of honour that has infatuated them: if we succeed; how many murders shall we prevent! for it must be confessed, that they are not so often transported by enmity, as by a desire to pass for men of courage. Their thirst of revenge will be immediately allayed; if they can be convinced, that to avenge themselves is **AN ACT OF COWARDICE**; which may be easily effected, if they do not wilfully shut their eyes against the clearest evidence.

COWARDICE is an inexcusable weakness, which renders us deficient in the discharge of some duty: and the desire of avenging ourselves bears these two characteristics; I. It causes us to violate one of the most important duties of life, by exciting us to the **MURDER** of one of our fellow-creatures, whom we are commanded by the law of nature to love as ourselves. What amazing difference between loving our brother, and plunging a poniard in his bosom! II. I dare affirm that desire of revenge is a weakness; for what other name

name can be given to the violent emotions of a rebellious heart, which sacrifices its tranquillity to the resentment of an insult that in itself is far from being insupportable. Is the giving way to impatience, courage? True courage is an ability to suffer well; and consists in forgiving, and not in revenging injuries: the transports of rage must be subdued before we can forgive; but to revenge requires no conquest. Your enemy has attempted your life, and the life of that enemy is now in your hands; give it him, and fulfil a precept of natural equity. By this generous conduct, you will either extinguish his hatred, or heap all the guilt of it upon his own head, instead of sharing it with him by seeking to revenge it. His attempt to commit a murder, has not conferred upon you a right to destroy any of your species.

BUT what if the injury of which you complain, be no more than a contemptuous sneer, a biting jest, an excess of raillery, a stroke of a cane, or a box on the ear? Would you, for so trifling an offence, take upon you either to spill the blood of the offender, or expiate the affront which he has offered you by your own. "Oh! it is not so much the affront itself, say you, that provokes me, it is the dishonour which it brings upon me; a blow of a cane! a box on the ear! what indelible disgrace!" Wretched prejudice! at once the object of contempt and pity. Is it impossible to banish it from the minds of my countrymen? What! can the outrage of insolence or phrensy, degrade and disgrace you? Can the fault of another deprive you of your honour? Can it then rob you of your virtue? Or is there any species of HONOUR, of which VIRTUE is not the PARENT? Astonishing and deplorable absurdity! and yet a thousand prejudices, equally monstrous, are

are derived from father to son, the folly of which is seen and confessed, and yet we have not courage publicly to renounce them. "I acknowledge," says PHILAETHES, "the justice of your maxims, and my heart speaks the same language with yours: but I shall be irrecoverably ruined if I regulate my life by your plan, and the dictates of my own conscience; for I shall then be no longer able to appear with honour, and honour is dearer to me than life." Alas! shall we never have done with this mistaken honour? Can honour be contradictory to RIGHT REASON? You discover by her sacred light, that revenge is weakness, and the gratification of it cowardice; and yet you persist in the purpose of avenging yourself to maintain your honour! Dare to defy popular error; and if you fear that the world should doubt your courage, signalize it in some lawful and useful exploit. If example has any weight with you, judge of the turpitude of these single combats by that of all polite nations. If the country which pretends to be polite above all others be excepted, where has this phrensy, this source of vain glory, an advocate? The Greeks and Romans, who were by turns the conquerors and the legislators of the world, certainly well knew what was valour: but did they make murder a sport, and wantonly destroy each other? they hung up the sword, the bow, and the shield, as instruments wholly useless in time of peace. Would you have a nearer and a later example? It is found in those magnanimous islanders, our perpetual rivals in courage, justness of sentiment, genius, learning, and the polite arts. Notwithstanding that savage rusticity we are pleased to impute to them, they are not to be reproached with that enormity for which I am now reproving you.

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While priests alone declaim against it from the pulpit, you hear the moralizer indeed, but disregard the morality. You have known them censure as criminal, so many actions which in your opinion, and perhaps in reality, were innocent; that you suspect them, and not without reason, when they condemn duelling: but will you not believe me, who enjoin nothing but what is known to be commanded by GOD himself, and forbid nothing that he has not forbidden? Neither effeminacy nor cowardice has dictated these precepts, but that MILDNESS and HUMANITY in which I glory. Our self-conceited coxcombs, indeed, will not relish my morality; but can they be thought capable of a relish for any thing, in which there is just reasoning and good sense.

CHAP. III. OF JUSTICE.

JUSTICE, in the general acceptation of the word, is that virtue, by which we render to GOD, our neighbour, and ourselves, that which is their due. It comprehends all our duties: and to be thus JUST, and to be VIRTUOUS, is the same thing.

BUT we shall here consider justice only as a principle of equity, which causes a rectitude of conduct, and excites us to render our species what in particular is due to it from every individual. Although justice, according to this definition, may appear to belong to the social virtues, of which we shall treat in the third part of this work, yet I think it is most properly placed here. The social virtues arise from the different ties by which mankind are united to each other; such as love, subordination, gratitude, and benevolence. Justice, on the contrary, has no need of these ties,
 O which,

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which, far from rendering it more active, frequently embarrass, impede, and corrupt it. It is not by friendship, compassion, or bounty, that we become just: but we are just, because we are created in the image of GOD, one of whose perfections is JUSTICE; and whose will it is, that in this also we should resemble him.

THE Civilians distinguish justice into two kinds, and we shall adopt their distinction. One they call COMMUTATIVE; and this establishes fair dealing in the mutual commerce between man and man: the other DISTRIBUTIVE; and by this their differences are decided, according to the rules of equity: the former is the justice of private individuals, the latter of princes and magistrates.

SECT. I. OF COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE.

RECTITUDE, which is the basis of commutative justice, may be divided into SINCERITY in our discourse, and INTEGRITY in our dealings. The effect of sincerity is mutual confidence, so necessary among the members of the same community; and this mutual confidence is sustained and preserved by the integrity of our conduct.

ART. I. OF SINCERITY.

IF our souls were pure spirits disengaged from corporeal ties, our sentiments would be intuitively known to each other; every thought would be visible, and would be communicated without the assistance of language; nor would it then be necessary to make sincerity a PRECEPT. It is to supply, as much as is necessary, the want of this intellectual intercourse to which the body is an
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insuperable obstacle, that nature has enabled us to produce articulate sounds. The tongue is an interpreter, by which souls converse with souls; and it is certainly guilty, if it performs this office deceitfully; as a linguist would be guilty of the most aggravated fraud who should betray his trust. Far from us be those refinements of falshood, equivocal expressions, subterfuges, and mental reservations, which rather multiply lies than prevent them. Whoever designedly leads another to believe that to be true, which he knows to be false; or to believe that to be false, which he knows to be true, is a liar, let the mode of expression be what it will. ABRAHAM lied, when by a stratagem of mistaken prudence, he caused his wife to pass for his sister at the court of Abimelech and Pharaoh. If it be allowed that she was of kin to him, his sincerity was still violated: to say that she was his sister, was to cause them to believe, that she was not his wife; which indeed was what ABRAHAM intended. It is said, that he feared one or other of these princes would have taken away his life, to have had the sole enjoyment of SARAH's beauty. But had this father of the faithful so little faith, so little confidence in his GOD, as to think him unable to secure his life, if he did not co-operate with him in the good work by contributing a LIE? And what kind of lie did he contribute? A lie which would have delivered up his wife to the first that should have desired to have her. What the Spanish husbands think of this subtle expedient of ABRAHAM, I know not; but I believe it would find a greater number of advocates in France than Spain.

THE law of nature, which requires the most scrupulous regard to truth in all our discourse, has not excepted the case, in which LIFE ITSELF

would fall a sacrifice to sincerity. To lie, is to offend against VIRTUE; and it is, therefore, to injure honour. But it is generally acknowledged, that honour is to be preferred to life: the same must, therefore, be affirmed of sincerity. Nor let this opinion be deemed extravagant; though I should be the first person in the world who adopted it, I would not for that reason give it up: it is however more generally received, than it is thought to be. It is the practice of almost every court of judicature, to make the person accused swear, before he is interrogated, that his answers shall be true, even when the crime with which he is charged is CAPITAL. They do him therefore the honour to suppose, that though he be guilty of the fact, he will notwithstanding act so far like an honest man, as to depose against himself though at the expence of life, and though his death will be violent and ignominious. But could this be supposed, if it was believed that sincerity was dispensed with by the law of nature in this case? It is true, that the affirmation of the accused is attended with the solemnity of an oath; but this is a circumstance of which I have not the most favourable opinion. To what purpose is his oath subservient? A villain will not find it more difficult to swear falsely, than to lie; and an honest man, after the most dreadful imprecation, will not have a more scrupulous regard to truth, than if he answered to a simple interrogation: there is NO MEDIUM between truth and falsehood. The exaction of an oath is a useless insult on mankind; it is to suppose them capable of a lie, and yet superstitious enough to make a DIFFERENCE between lying and perjury: there are some, however, of whom this must be confessed to be true. EPIORCUS is sued for the payment of a sum
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of money; but no written obligation can be produced against him; the demand is founded only on a verbal contract. He appears before the court: at first he equivocates; he is pressed—he frames a plausible story, relates particular circumstances to give it the greater resemblance to truth; and closes it by positively denying the debt. Let us congratulate EPIORCUS, out of court, upon the facility with which he has gained the cause: as he was not compelled to swear, he has only affirmed a falsehood in the presence of his judges and the crowd that surrounded them. “I am well off,” says he to his friends, as he departs; “if they had put me to my oath, I should have lost my cause; for I would not have been guilty of perjury.” Let us not, however, draw any conclusion from this instance in favour of the established custom of sometimes requiring an oath from the parties in judicial proceedings: for who can engage for EPIORCUS, that he would rather have retracted his falsehood, than have confirmed it by an oath? But suppose that had been the case, which is not probably, this would be but a single instance from which no consequence can be drawn; and is far from being of sufficient weight, to prevent its being established as a general truth, THAT WHOEVER WILL LIE WITHOUT SCRUPLE, WILL ALSO SWEAR TO A LIE. The most effectual method to prevent perjury, is never to administer an oath: nor would I, except in cases of absolute necessity, even interrogate a person whom I suspected to be capable of lying, and interested to conceal the truth; for this would be giving him an opportunity to do it.

THE morals of the greater part of mankind with respect to sincerity, are not very rigid: they make no difficulty of betraying truth to interest;

and will lie without scruple, to exculpate themselves, or to excuse others: these they call **FRIENDLY LIES**; they are told for the sake of peace and quietness, to oblige some friend, or to prevent some accident. Wretched pretexts! which this single sentence reduces at once to empty sound; **IT IS NEVER ALLOWABLE TO DO EVIL THAT GOOD MAY COME OF IT.** A good intention may justify an indifferent action, but can never render an evil one lawful. Small account is also made of jocular lies, feigned stories, and fictitious news; "These are waggeries that hurt no-body." What a ridiculous apology! is an action therefore innocent, because it does not include two crimes?

CALUMNY, however, is abandoned to my resentment: this is a detestable species of falshood, which every one would condemn and abhor, if it were only thro' fear of one day becoming its object. But those who condemn it are not always innocent themselves: they have, perhaps, related facts unfaithfully; they have added, diminished, or altered, without design, and merely through the habit of embellishing or exaggerating their narrations. There is one infallible method, and but one, to secure ourselves from being guilty of calumny, and that is, **NEVER** to detract.

LET fancy transport you to some imaginary world, in which words are always the faithful interpreters of thought; where the friend who offers you his service, feels his bosom glow with the benevolence he expresses; where a generous confidence shall not render you the dupe of falsehood; where truth shall dictate every declaration, every narrative, and every promise; where, consequently, life shall be unimbittered by suspicion and distrust, and sheltered from fraud, treachery,
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circumvention, perfidy, calumny, and false accusation. How delightful the intercourse of the beings who people this HAPPY WORLD! You wish, certainly, that the world which you inhabit enjoyed an equal felicity, and you wish well: but do not stop here; contribute your part to attain so desirable an end, and begin the good work by being YOURSELF just, sincere, and inflexibly true.

ART. II. OF INTEGRITY OR FAIR-DEALING.

IT is not necessary to define what is meant by integrity or fair-dealing. Those who practise it least, well know what it is; and would be glad that every other person was endowed with this virtue, that they might cheat them with the greater ease; for they are not knaves for nothing: they never cheat or over-reach you, but they have some private advantage in view. Why did those impostors, the priests of dumb and lifeless idols, forge so many mysteries, oracles, and prodigies? why did they multiply sacrifices, invent lustral waters, holy cakes, and consecrated bread? — By these inventions, they increased their revenues. Whatever doctrine contributed to fill their coffers, that they preached as the most sacred and inviolable. Why have lawyers drowned right reason and equity in a deluge of quibble, formality, and refined chicanery? Doubtless, to improve, to their own advantage, the differences which arose among their fellow-citizens, and to enrich themselves by their quarrels. Why does the demure ASTORGUS walk with his eyes fixed on the ground, his head bowed down with an affected humility, buried under a large and rusty hat, and cloathed with apparel that indicates an excess of severity? Why that soft tone, those affectionate expressions? Why

Why that pretended zeal for the interest of heaven, those hypocritical lamentations for the blindness of sinners? It is to raise contributions on the too credulous female devotees who are the dupes of his grimace.

To put an end to a tedious law-suit which has been fruitful in turns and incidents, you compound with the litigious ERISTES, even to your disadvantage: unavailing sacrifice! under the specious pretence of listening to an accommodation, ERISTES has snatched this opportunity to gain ground against you. You have voluntarily given up part of what is your due, to secure the rest; you shall, notwithstanding, be despoiled of all: with the assistance of a knavish scrivener, he has foisted equivocal terms into the deed, of which he well knows how to take advantage; and, thus, without knowing it, you have signed your own destruction.

I GO into that part of the city which is inhabited by drapers; and I see such strange and ridiculous customs, that I almost doubt whether I am not transported into some distant country by enchantment. The tradesmen which I have seen in other places, have, for the vending of their commodities, a room on the ground-floor which they call a shop; so have the shop-keepers here, but it is empty, and without any other furniture than the wife and daughters of the dealer, who, as they appear gorgeously dressed sit in an indolent posture and are always idle, seem to answer no other purpose than that of a sign. I go in with a design to make a purchase: they introduce me into a distant hall, inaccessible to perfect day-light, where the rays of the sun never enter but obliquely and through a narrow crevice. They show me some cloth, which they uncover and unroll: deceitful complaisance,

complaisance, which serves only to impose upon me! the false light which they have artfully contrived, hides the blemishes and defects of the commodity: first remove these high shutters which exclude the light, and if you intend that I should see, do not let me see by halves. There is in all professions, some customary fraud with which the tradesman never reproaches himself, because it is universally practised: and thus a person will, without scruple, suffer a blind to be put up at the window of his warehouse, who, perhaps, would faithfully discharge the office of trustee to his nephew.

A CAPTAIN of a company inserts the names of many in his muster-roll, who perform no duty; and scruples not to receive their pay, though he would be ashamed of any other kind of robbery. A soldier will pilfer from his host, and thinks whatever he can carry off from his quarters undiscovered good prize, who, under any other habit, might be safely intrusted with uncounted treasure. A monk, who in other respects is an honest man, displays to the public, as objects of veneration, boxes of reliques, bones, Agnus Dei's, and scapularies, which in his heart he estimates at no more than their just value: but as this is a practice common to all of his cloth, he would think himself a false brother, if he should not acquiesce in the pious fraud. The lawyers sell their advice and assistance at a very dear rate: the most disinterested among them, indeed, expect to be paid only for what they do; but is this no more than is necessary to be done? It is become a custom to charge their clients with a heap of impertinent writings, three fourths of which are of no other use than to encrease the fees for draughts and copies: the lawyers, however, have no scruples of con-

conscience on this subject. Have we not a right, say they, to live on the follies of mankind? It is granted; live on them and welcome, but do not devour the men by whose follies you are supported.

I SHALL say nothing concerning open plunder and rapine. To take away the property of another by violence, is almost universally known to be an inexcusable crime; for, except the conquerors of nations, there are but few who are strangers to this important truth: nor would I be thought to assume the office of a reformer of highway-men or house-breakers; for gibbets and wheels are the only arguments by which they can be convinced: these alone can restrain them from acts of violence; and, indeed, to these alone the greatest part of mankind are indebted for their honesty.

THAT species of theft which is most practised, and of which men are least ashamed, is the contracting debts which they never pay. It is a trite maxim, that an honest man may be in debt: it is notwithstanding true, that theft consists, not only in taking away, but in with-holding the property of others. Let us, however, distinguish between the different kinds of debts; for some are INNOCENT, and some are CRIMINAL. The innocent debts are those contracted through necessity, and which necessity also prevents from being paid. There are, besides, debts of a middle kind; which are innocent with respect to the present time, the debtor being unable to discharge them; but criminal with respect to the time in which they were contracted, because they were contracted by unjustly appropriating the money of others. Other debts are criminal with respect to the present time, though innocent with respect to the past; and

and of this sort are those which are suffered to remain unpaid, notwithstanding an ability to discharge them, for whatever cause they were contracted.

NICANDER having been ruined by fire, was re-established in trade by a sum which his friends advanced him upon credit. His affairs began to wear a promising aspect, when a series of new misfortunes, law-suits, sickness, ship-wrecks and bankruptcies, plunged him into yet deeper distress: far from being able to discharge his old debts, he is necessitated to contract new, and thinks himself happy if he can find any that are willing to become his creditors. Pity NICANDER, but do not blame him: for though his ruin should bring on that of all the friends who so generously assisted him, he is still innocent, if this extensive calamity is not the effect of knavery or negligence, and if he has exerted his utmost abilities to retrieve his losses.

HE who risks only the impoverishing himself, or at least the becoming less wealthy, by neglecting his interest, may neglect it if he will: but for a man who is in debt to assume an air of magnanimity, by affecting a contempt of riches, is a crime; he is accountable to his creditors for all that he might have gained honestly, by his own industry and labour: and if these circumstances be duly considered, there will not be so many debtors found innocent as is generally imagined.

LYSIPPUS, who had formerly a post in the service of the government, and was by virtue of his office trustee of the fortunes of many private persons, consumed by his luxury not only those fortunes but his own. He confesses his iniquity at the foot of the altar with sighs and groans, and hopes to expiate his guilt by fasting and prayer. LYSIPPUS.

SIPPUS, say the multitude, is become a penitent; he has quitted the world, and is perpetually on his knees. How preposterous a penitence! Pray a little less, LYSIPPUS: the best method of atoning for your faults, is to make restitution to the injured: improve your talents, return to the world, and apply yourself to business; spare no labour either of body or mind, nor suffer any prospect of ease to allure you, till your creditors are satisfied. Go then and prostrate yourself at the THRONE OF GRACE; for then only you can hope to be heard.

INDIGENCE itself does not acquit a person of the obligation to pay his debts, if they were contracted, or continued, by imprudence, indolence, or prodigality. A debtor possesses nothing as his own, but that which would remain after the payment of his debts; and whatever he expends more than this, is unjustly taken from his creditors. The mere necessaries of life, indeed, are allowed him by the laws of humanity, but nothing more; and even these, upon condition that he endeavours, with sincerity and diligence, to pay what he owes.

How admirable is the tranquillity of MISOCHRESTES! with what ease does he disengage himself from a number of creditors, who importune him with a clamorous impatience! He has avoided them a thousand times, by causing his servants to deny him: by what stratagem will he avoid them to-day? They have crowded into his hall before he is up: he resolves not to stir from his chamber: they are obstinately determined to wait till they see him. They are told by his order, that he is indisposed, and can speak to no-body; but they are not mollified by the news of his indisposition: if the door is not opened, they declare they will

will enter his room by force: upon this he sends word that he will surrender, and immediately comes to a parley. ‘How now, gentlemen,’ says he, ‘cannot a man be sick in his own house?’ ‘Give me leave to tell you, that your behaviour is very extraordinary. What have you to say, Mr. Rhedon? You made me a chaise about three years ago; and have not I paid you ten pounds on account? You have great reason to complain, truly! Go, go, don’t be afraid of your money: nobody loses any thing by me. There is an honest man now that has served me with bread these six years; he knows how to behave himself to a person of my rank: he has had great patience, and he shall lose nothing by it.—Mr. Rhedon, your servant—excuse me now—I must speak to these gentlemen—you’ll call again.—My good friend, Artopolus, I have a great respect for you, you serve me extremely well: how do you manage to make such good bread as you send me?—it is excellent—no bread can be better.—Let me see what I owe you—a hundred and ninety-five pounds, ten shillings, and twopence three farthings.—I owe you this sum—I shall not scrutinize your account—I take it for granted that it is right—a hundred and ninety-five pounds, and upwards—never fear, we shall be able to answer your demand—and I do assure you, Mr. Artopolus, that the first money I receive shall be yours: I will save you the trouble of coming for it—it is but reasonable that I should; it is you that keep me alive.—Ah! yonder is my wine-merchant. My friend, I have long wanted an opportunity to take you to task; you know very well, Mr. Vintner, that the wine you send me is poison: what the devil do you put into it! I cannot drink three bottles

‘ of it without losing my senses ; and yet, I sup-
 ‘ pose, you want money ! Go, go about your bu-
 ‘ siness ; those who expect to be paid never serve
 ‘ their customers as you serve me : you shall have
 ‘ no money till every body else is paid, if it were
 ‘ only to teach you to sell good commodities. As
 ‘ to you Mr. Guillaumet, I am really ashamed
 ‘ that I have made you wait so long for your mo-
 ‘ ney : I know all the complaints you might justly
 ‘ make against me ; you have clothed me and my
 ‘ whole family these five years, and I have not yet
 ‘ paid you a penny. I promised you at the close
 ‘ of the last year, and disappointed you. Is not
 ‘ this what you would say ? You know me well
 ‘ enough Mr. Guillaumet : do you think I could
 ‘ be so cruel, as to suffer you to be distressed for the
 ‘ money that is due to you, when you have dis-
 ‘ burshed such considerable sums for my use, if my
 ‘ tenants paid me my rents ? I should then be def-
 ‘ titute of honesty, as well as compassion : but
 ‘ they must pay me by-and-by ; and then Mr.
 ‘ Guillaumet, I will pay you—your servant : give
 ‘ me leave now to say a word or two to that gen-
 ‘ tlewoman. Good-morrow t’ye, Mrs. Pernelle
 ‘ —it is about those thirty pieces of holland which
 ‘ I had of you, is it not ?—I cannot pay you for
 ‘ them so soon—you see how many people I have
 ‘ promised already. But you can afford to wait.
 ‘ Ah ! Mrs. Pernelle, you are warm, as they say.
 ‘ —Indeed, you mistake, Sir, my circumstances
 ‘ are very strait.”—“ Oh ! it is so much the worse,
 ‘ my good friend ; when people cannot afford to
 ‘ give credit, they should not undertake to sell.
 ‘ As to the rest of you, gentlemen,” says MISO-
 ‘ CHRESTES, addressing himself to those creditors
 ‘ who had not yet had audience, “ I believe I do
 ‘ not owe you any great matters : you see I am
 ‘ en-

“endeavouring to regulate my affairs; and if I can do no better at present, I will at least look over and settle your accounts.” MISOCHRESTES, as he pronounces the last words, rushes by them, and vanishes like a flash of lightning; leaving his creditors in such astonishment at his effrontry, that he was at a great distance, before they had recollected themselves sufficiently to return an answer.

SECT. II. OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.

IF all men were honest, there would be no need of distributive justice; for it is only a kind of intrenchment, thrown up to prevent the in-roads of violence and rapine. The greater part of mankind have confounded the **USEFUL** with the **PLEASANT**. Whatever gratifies their appetites or their passions, they immediately pronounce to be useful; and this indeed would be true, if these appetites and passions were always under the government of **REASON**, and regulated by the laws of **EQUITY**: but if this is not the case, that which gratifies the appetites and passions may at the same time be unjust; and yet, “That whatever is **UNJUST**, must, on the whole, be **DISADVANTAGEOUS**,” is a maxim which I shall endeavour to establish by the following arguments.

NOTHING is advantageous or useful, but that which has a tendency to render us **HAPPY**: the highest advantage, or absolute utility, is compleat happiness; and to this happiness whatever is advantageous or useful, is relative as to an **ULTIMATE END**; and nothing that is not thus relative to happiness, can properly be said to be advantageous or useful. But whatever is unjust, is so far from tending to promote that it destroys our happiness;

pinefs; for WHATEVER IS UNJUST, IS CONTRARY TO THE DIVINE WILL: but it is not poffible that we fhould become happy, by refifting that will; becaufe, of this will our happinefs is the immediate object. GOD is not a tyrant proud of uncontrollable power, who impofes capricious laws only as tests of our obedience, and to make us feel the weight of his yoke; all his precepts are leffons which teach us how to be happy. But it is the will of GOD, that we fhould be JUST. From whence it follows, that no true happinefs can be acquired by thofe who are unjust. An action, therefore, which is contrary to juftice, being contrary to the will of GOD, muft be inconsistent with our TRUE INTEREST; and confequently, far from being ufeful or expedient, it muft inevitably produce ruin and mifery.

BUT the fenfual and brutal part of mankind, who regard only the prefent moment, who fee no objects but thofe which fall under the cognizance of the corporeal eye, and eftimate the merit of every action by the gain which it produces; thefe wretches have always confidered juftice and utility as INDEPENDENT of each other. They put utility in the balance againft honefty every day, and never fail to incline the beam in favour of the former, if the fupposed advantage is thought to be confiderable; and they always judge, that its importance is in proportion to the ardour of their defires: they have, therefore, no regard to juftice but as they reckon to gain by it, or at leaft not to lofe; and are always ready to deferit it, when it expofes them to any danger, or threatens them with any lofs.

FROM this difpofition of mind proceed that avidity of wealth, and that habitual fraud which
per-

petually imbroil civil society: from this fatal source, arises that deluge of iniquity which has overflowed the world: from this preference of interest to honesty, proceed every unjust litigation, and every act of violence. To prevent therefore the dreadful confusion, which this mistaken notion of interest introduced among mankind, it became necessary to have recourse to the innate principles of justice; to suspend the balance and display the sword, for the determination of differences, and the punishment of guilt. As it was also necessary, that the legislator should not only be endowed with sagacity and prudence, but invested with sufficient authority to enforce the execution of his laws; this important trust was conferred upon persons, who were already distinguished by an acknowledged pre-eminence above the rest of mankind: and thus DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE became the appendage of SOVEREIGNTY. But, to prevent the execution of justice from degenerating into the wanton exercise of arbitrary power, certain general rules were established with suitable solemnity, to adjust and determine the more ordinary differences which arose among numbers of the same society; and to repress the insolence of those who dared to violate the public peace, by possessing them with the dread either of corporeal punishments or infamy. If any extraordinary case occurred which had not been foreseen, it was decided by that natural equity from which the general rules or maxims had been derived. PRINCES then administered justice in person and without delay. But at length, being embarrassed and oppressed by the multiplicity of business, which increased with their dominions, or diverted from their attention to civil government by the command of armies; they put the execution of

distributive justice into the hands of SUBORDINATE JUDGES; and, for this purpose, invested them with a part of their judicial authority. These delegates of the sovereign power were called MAGISTRATES; and these are the persons by whom justice is, at this time, administered. Let us enquire how they execute their office, and how it ought to be executed.

JUSTICE ought to be administered SPEEDILY, IMPARTIALLY, and WITHOUT EXPENCE to the parties. It is not denied in this country, more than in others, that justice ought to be administered without expence to the parties: it is a maxim that has always subsisted; but at present it is unhappily reduced to a mere speculative truth. With respect to this subject, in common with many others, expedients have been found to elude the austerity of practical virtue. The first step was to prohibit the people from enjoying their undoubted birth-right, by forbidding them to plead each man HIS OWN CAUSE: if this regulation proceeded from just motives, I confess I have no penetration sufficient to discover them; but I can easily distinguish the inconveniencies which it has produced. What need have I of a mercenary substitute, whom I am obliged to pay for defending my interest, when I can be a better advocate for myself? It is answered, he states my cause to the judges with greater accuracy and perspicuity, and with less heat and passion: but if I am able to make my lawyer perfectly comprehend my case, surely I am able fully to explain it to the judge. And how can I be certain, that this substitute has perfectly comprehended me; that he sees the particular circumstance upon which the decision of my cause will turn; and that he has taken the pains to read all the papers that I have put into his hands: who can en-

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gage for him, that he will apply himself to my affairs with a faithful assiduity; that he will represent them to the judge in the strongest and most advantageous light; that he will forget no part of the evidence, and that he will urge it with all its force: how can I know, that he will not suffer himself to be bought into the interest of my adversary, and assist in his triumph by making a weak defence for me? All these species of treachery are sometimes committed; there is none, therefore, which I have not reason to fear. But permit me to defend my own property, and it is no longer possible that I should suffer by any.

BUT let it be taken for granted, that I have found an advocate upon whose integrity and abilities I may securely depend; of what advantage to me are these imagined qualifications? One defect obliterates them all; his price is too high for my purse. Despoiled of all my substance by injurious power, justice in vain offers me her assistance to recover it, if the gate, by which alone I can have access to her, is not to be opened but by a golden key. Suppose me, however, to have bought this entrance into the outward court; I am stopped by new obstacles at every step: the palace of THEMIS is a destructive custom-house, where a hundred greedy ministers of exaction succeed each other, to devour the substance of the unhappy client. The judge himself, at their head, authorizes the pillage, and stands ready to receive his share of the booty. He is, however, somewhat delicate as to the manner in which it is to be accepted; he would blush to pollute his hand, by the acceptance of a gratuity; but the barbarian insists, that his part of the spoil be paid him as his due; and he not only sets justice to sale, but will sell it to those only who pay him before-hand.

IT is in vain to object, that these exorbitant expences are no more than a just punishment on the litigious and the knavish client, upon whom the whole burden will ultimately fall. For I reply, first, that I do not perceive the equity of these pecuniary punishments, the profits of which accrue to those who inflict them; and I cannot but suspect all interested justice to be of the false kind. Why should my judge be so much a gainer by *HARPASTUS*'s having unjustly commenced a suit against me? It is I, only, who ought to receive a recompence, and not the judge who has suffered no injury; and who ought impartially to acquit or condemn, without drawing any advantage from the process. I assert farther, that it is not true, that one of the parties must necessarily have been guilty of unfair dealing: the subject of debate may be doubtful in itself; and, in this case, he who loses the cause, ought rather to be pitied than punished. But let it be supposed, that the party upon whom the expences of the suit fall, ought to pay them as a mulct for having endeavoured to obtain that to which he had no right; his adversary notwithstanding, pays dearly for his victory: he must have satisfied a thousand secret extortions, which he can never recover; and he must defray even the known expences of the suit, if the party who ought to bear them is unfortunately insolvent. There is yet another case, in which the costs may fall upon the party who ought not to pay them. I mean when a cause is determined contrary to equity, either by the ignorance or corruption of the judges. And of this there are many instances: for those haughty arbiters of our fortunes are not endowed by heaven, either with an unerring conscience or understanding.

LET us suppose the judges to be *DISINTEREST-*

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ED, they will, indeed, examine with more success, and decide with more sagacity; but this is not sufficient, they must also be expeditious. To defer an act of justice which may be determined immediately, is to be unjust; time is precious to those, whose fortunes are at stake. It is the common phrensy of persons in place, to make men solicit for that as a favour, which they owe as a debt by virtue of their office: it is expected that I should purchase, by a servile supplication, what I have a right to demand as my due: but rather sell me justice at the most exorbitant price, and let me have it NOW; whatever it costs me, I shall gain by the bargain. The president CENOCEPHALUS imagines, that to be followed by a crowd of suitors to the foot of the bench, is a circumstance of state that displays the dignity of his office. The trouble and anxiety which he discovers in their countenances, flatters his vanity, and gives him the most sensible delight; and he whispers to himself with a secret exultation, "It is upon my will, that the fate of this multitude depends." He takes care not to dispatch their business too soon, because this would render his court less numerous.

I CANNOT conceive, how the first person that solicited a judge could venture on so desperate an attempt; nor by what means judges have accustomed themselves, patiently to suffer so bold an insult. For what is it to solicit a judge? It is to address him, though in other terms, yet to this effect: 'I do not doubt, but that you would neglect my affair, if I did not press you to interest yourself in it. I know that you love ease and pleasure, that you prefer them to the diligent and faithful execution of your office; but let me intreat you to do your duty on this occasion, for my sake; examine the state of my case yourself,

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“ self, and do not rest satisfied with only perusing
 “ the extract of a secretary : and when you are per-
 “ fectly acquainted with the merits of my cause,
 “ decide as justice and equity shall direct you. The
 “ lovely HORTENSIA comes to solicit your interest
 “ against me ; but turn away your eyes from the
 “ dangerous splendor of her beauty : she will come,
 “ recommended by several noblemen of the first rank ;
 “ but remember that these recommendations do not
 “ add the least degree of equity to her cause : they
 “ will endeavour to pervert your judgment by pro-
 “ mises, and perhaps by bribes ; but act uprightly
 “ and maintain your integrity. In one word, do
 “ me the favour to behave like an honest man.”
 But how much more injurious would be the solici-
 tation of a person, who was endeavouring to ob-
 tain what was not his right ! To solicit his judge
 in order to gain an unjust cause, is to tell him
 to his face, that you take him either for a knave or
 a fool.

IN my opinion, to thank a judge after gaining
 a cause, is also to insult him ; it seems to render
 him suspected of having, in some degree, softened
 the severity of rigorous justice in your favour. If
 he has not done this, for what do you return him
 thanks ? If he has regulated his decree by the rules
 or strict equity, he has no more claim to your
 thanks, than a tenant who pays you a quarter’s
 rent when it is become due ; neither of them have
 done any thing that they could have neglected to
 do, without prevarication and injustice. Esteem,
 as highly as you please, an upright judge ; he me-
 rits esteem, but he deserves no thanks. He may,
 on the contrary, notwithstanding the most un-
 tainted integrity, deserve reproach, if he has suffer-
 ed the parties to languish in a long and anxious ex-
 pectation of a decree, which he might have pro-
 nounced

nounced immediately. A magistrate is accountable for every moment of his time, so long as there are any causes remaining on his hands undecided. Is it not enough that a suitor has suffered the tedious delay of all the petty officers of the court? must the sovereign dispensers of justice, themselves, prolong his misery by endless procrastination?

AFTER many years of attendance, anxiety, and solicitation, at length a decree is obtained: but to obtain a decree, is to obtain nothing; for the adverse party, to prevent its taking effect, proceeds by successive appeals from one court to another. And let no man think himself certain of recovering that for which he sues, because his right to it is incontestable: the rites of THEMIS subject her clients to so many trifling formalities, upon which their fortune depends, that it is difficult to arrive at her tribunal without making a false step; and in her awful temple, SUBSTANCE is the daily victim of FORM; and the most indubitable right is solemnly proscribed, for the omission of a word, letter, or the most trivial circumstance.

BUT if all these rocks and quicksands are happily passed, the bark may be lost in the very port, by the injustice or incapacity of the judge. Of all professions, that of a magistrate is, in my opinion, of the greatest importance to the public; and yet I know not any other, for which less evidence of ability is required: every one who has taken his degrees, and is able to defray the expences of his admission, is deemed fit to become a judge.

I do not know whether the young ADRASTUS is a good judge: he does not take upon him to decide, he only declares his opinion, and even in this, perhaps, he does too much. But I know his morals, his pleasures, and amusements: he is sportful,

sportful, sprightly, amorous, volatile, and indolent. He conceived an aversion to books in his infancy, which has continued ever since; especially law-cases, reports, and precedents. He is somewhat less prejudiced against pamphlets; he has turned over Acajou, Grigri, the Sopha, and the Etrennes de la S. Jean. He loves good cheer, and above all long suppers: he is fond of gaming, dancing, arms, and horses: no amusements but those which are sedentary, come amiss to him. You perceive I had my reasons for acquainting you at first, that ADRASTUS was a magistrate; since, if you had judged of him only by this picture, you would doubtless have taken him for a young officer, or a page of the back stairs.

CLOSE to ADRASTUS sits the gouty MENALIPPUS; an ancient judge, whose knack at determining causes by rote, acquired by sixty years practice, serves to supply his want of capacity. He knows what a young barrister would say at first sight: he therefore indulges himself in a profound sleep while the cause is pleading, and yet gives his opinion of the merits of it when it is over. His age and infirmities secure him from being perverted by the solicitations of the FAIR; and, on this side, his integrity is invulnerable. If any charms have the power to seduce him, they must be the charms of GOLD: but then the sum must be equivalent to the service; his virtue disdains the temptation of an ordinary bribe. There is no reason to fear his being influenced to neglect his duty, by tenderness or compassion; or that the remorse, the anguish, and despair of the criminal, should melt his zeal for justice into pity. When a convict is to be sentenced to capital punishment, assure yourself that he will not lose the opportunity of doing it; this is an act of that authority

thority of which he is jealous. His heart has been so long hardened against prayers and tears, he has been so long an intrepid spectator of torture and executions, that he would rather send twenty innocent persons to the gallows, than suffer one guilty to escape. If there were on the bench twenty such judges as *ADRASTUS* and *MENALIPPUS*, can it be imagined that innocence would be a sufficient security against condemnation? and yet our courts of justice are not always supplied with better magistrates than these. For one judge who is worthy of the seat which he fills, there are thirty who deserve no other employment than that of cryer of the court.

It is a common custom, to decide causes by the plurality of voices; a method which, in my opinion, reflects too great an honour on our magistrates: for it is founded on a supposition, that the greater part of them are sufficiently endowed with integrity and penetration. On the contrary, I am of opinion, that it would be better to regulate the decision by the judgment of the minority; for is it not more reasonable to suppose, that in twenty-five brothers of the bench, the five only should be properly qualified for their office, than the twenty? — sagacity is not the accomplishment of the many. Notwithstanding the paradoxical appearance of my position, it was long ago advanced by the Jewish legislator. He warns the Israelites, not to form their judgment by that of the majority in judicial proceedings.* I should prefer the suffrage of a single judge whose opinion is the effect of thought, to that of fifty who determine by mere instinct.

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* Non in judicio plurimorum acquiesces sententiæ.
EXODUS, xxiii. 2.

THE most delicate, and consequently the most dangerous temptation to a magistrate, is that which arises in his own breast; I mean an ill-placed generosity, a desire to oblige his friends which cannot be gratified but at the expence of justice. The man who is proof against the largest promises, and the most alluring offers, is frequently seduced by the pressing solicitations of a friend. He imagines that the motives which urge him to a breach of duty, extenuate his guilt. He would be self-condemned, if he suffered himself to be perverted by the sordid allurements of gain, or by any views of private interest: but tenderness, friendship, love, gratitude, are sentiments so noble! — and noble they certainly are, in the highest degree, when they operate IN AID OF VIRTUE; but when they are employed against her, they are not only mean, but criminal. Not only custom, but duty, forbids a magistrate to act in his public capacity with respect to a cause, in which a person nearly allied to him by affinity or by blood is a party: but society is connected by many other ties which have an equal influence upon our actions, and against which we should, therefore, be equally upon our guard. You could not pronounce sentence against your friend, but with the greatest regret; do not, then, become his judge.

GOD, and SOVEREIGN PRINCES as his vicerents, are the only beings in the universe who have the power of mitigating deserved punishment, and of favouring those whom they love in the exercise of judicial authority; and neither GOD nor sovereigns can do either, to the injury of the opposite party. But an inferior magistrate has no right to favour either party, whether the other be injured by it or not; he has no authority but that which he derives from the law, of which he is no more

more than the depositary and instrument: if he deviates from the law, from whatever motive, he exceeds his power and forfeits his integrity.

BUT if the law is not explicit with respect to the subject of dispute between the parties, may not the judge give such an explication of it as will favour his friend? No, certainly, the most tender friendship must stand for nothing in this explication: consequences drawn from the law are a part of it, and should be deemed equally sacred and inviolable.

CHAP. IV. OF TEMPERANCE.

TEMPERANCE, in the most extensive sense, is a prudent moderation, which restrains our appetites, passions, and desires, within due bounds. But it will here be considered in a more confined sense, as a virtue which bridles our **CORPOREAL APPETITES**; and by preserving them in a medium equally distant from two opposite extremes, renders them not only innocent, but useful and laudable. Among the vices which are repressed by temperance, incontinency, and excess in eating and drinking, are the chief: all the others flow from these, as streams from a common fountain; and, consequently, temperance may be properly divided into **CHASTITY** and **SOBRIETY**.

SECT. I. OF CHASTITY.

CONTINENCE ought not to be confounded with chastity, as is too frequently done; the indiscriminate use of terms never fails to introduce a confusion of ideas: as persons may be chaste without obliging themselves to continence, they may also oblige themselves to continence

without being chaste. Chastity may be violated even in thought; but by thought alone there can be no breach of continence. All mankind, without exception of circumstance, age, sex, or quality, are under an indispensable obligation to be chaste; but none are obliged to be continent.

CONTINENCE consists in an abstinence from the pleasures of love; chastity, in confining these pleasures within the bounds prescribed by the law of nature. Continence, although voluntary, has no merit in itself; and becomes meritorious, only in proportion as it accidentally contributes to the practice of some virtue, or the execution of some generous purpose: for, except in one of these cases, it more frequently deserves censure than commendation. Whoever is formed with abilities to propagate his species, not only has a right, but is obliged to it as a duty: such is the voice of NATURE; and her voice merits more attention and deference, than all human institutions which seem to contradict it. I know of no reasons which oblige to perpetual continence; at most there can but be some of the prudential kind which render it necessary for a time.

EVERY one has a right, by the law of nature, to dispose of whatever is his own property. It is not however an act of injustice, to restrain a minor, a prodigal, or a lunatic, from the exercise of this right, which they would otherwise infallibly abuse: and thus, although the commerce of the sexes is permitted to all mankind, there may be certain circumstances in which it may be expedient to restrain particular persons for a time, in order to procure a greater good. It is lawful, for instance, that children, who are of too tender an age to form a right judgment on so important a subject, should be restrained from contracting an
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indissoluble union without the consent of their parents or guardians. On the contrary, it would be a most flagrant inhumanity, to abandon them to the thoughtless temerity common to the inexperience of youth, when they are about to determine by marriage, whether life shall be happy or miserable. Those to whose charge they are by nature committed, may, without encroachment on their rights, prevent them from engaging, or from carrying an engagement already made into execution, if they think it imprudent and disadvantageous. To a young person in these circumstances continence is certainly a DUTY, till a marriage shall be duly contracted. It must however be noted, that parents, on their part, ought to provide for the settlement of their children, and not capriciously refuse them in marriage when a suitable match is proposed.

THE story of PROXENES and CLORIS is already so well known, that it can be no scandal to relate it. CLORIS, who was under the guardianship of an avaricious father, had long and patiently expected him to put her into possession of her mother's fortune; when the agreeable CHARITON, by his assiduity and affection, made a conquest of her heart: his fortune and his rank were such, that PROXENES might, without blushing, have accepted him for a son-in-law. The proposition was made, and he rejected it: he did not declare the motives of his refusal, but they were easily to be conjectured; his invincible reluctance to part with the money was the cause of his unreasonable conduct. He desired CHARITON to desist from his addresses; and this prohibition, as usual, increased the passion of the two lovers, who by mutual consent took the method which they imagined would be most effectual to extort the

consent of the father: they were however mistaken; this pleasing expedient, of which so many daughters have experienced the efficacy, did not succeed upon PROXENES: although his daughter's disgrace would necessarily be reflected upon himself, yet he broke out into transports of rage; and not confining himself to invective and reproach, he delivered her up, with his own hands, to the infamy and horror of those mournful retreats which are consecrated to repentance and tears. To which of the three actors of this scandalous scene, shall we impute the fault? Doubtless, to all. A father destitute both of pity and justice, a lover who seduced the mistress whom he professed to love, a daughter who contemned the parental authority, are all guilty characters.

BUT does this law of nature then, you will say, the excellence of which is so much boasted, require all that vain apparatus of disgusting ceremony, which is now made essential to the union of two lovers? I answer in the negative. Nothing more is required by the law of nature, than the FREE CONSENT of the parties: the moment this has taken place, the marriage is registered in heaven, if there is no other reason to the contrary than the want of ceremony. But the noble simplicity of this excellent law has not forbidden human legislators, to regulate the solemnity of marriage by positive institutions; and even positive institutions are venerable and obligatory, when they are not repugnant to the law of nature, and intended only as comments and explanations. They are indeed obligatory, only as by-laws of a particular community; but to all the members of that community, these laws are binding.

It is of great importance to the order of society, that marriage should be an engagement for life;

life; and this, indeed, seems to be a precept of the law of nature: the perpetual obligation which it imposes upon husband and wife, reciprocally to love each other, is an indication that this union was intended to continue till it should be dissolved by death; for how can we quit a spouse whom we love? The necessary dependance of children, both on father and mother, for their protection and assistance, must be wanting, if marriage was no more than a temporary engagement. It is from conjugal affection, blended with self-love, that the parental tenderness proceeds: so that the positive laws which have appointed the solemnities of marriage, only enforce the law of nature with respect to its perpetuity; by adding a new sanction to the tie, they render the dissolution of it more difficult. A private and stolen engagement may easily be broken; but when it is entered into in the presence of creditable witnesses, confirmed by the parental authority, authenticated by the law of the state, and consecrated by that of religion, what a complicated validity and strength does it acquire!

I WOULD not, however, be understood to censure those nations among whom divorces are permitted, and accuse them of infringing the law of nature by this permission. A law is not violated, when its rigour is softened by a prudent moderation: justice sometimes degenerates into injustice, merely by its becoming too rigid: dispensations and exceptions, when they are not too frequent, rather confirm than invalidate a law. On the contrary, to extend it to cases in which it would be impracticable, would be to endeavour its abrogation; and it not only may, but does so happen, that opposition of temper renders a mutual affection and harmony between man and wife impossible: in these cases, nations, which are the most

remarkable for the strictness of their laws, have allowed a kind of disunion, which has been called the separation of the body: the bond of marriage, say they, is not broken; this separation only deprives the married couple of all the delights arising from the conjugal union; and this, indeed, is the very inconveniency with which it has been reproached. Wherefore, because PAMPHILUS is hasty, brutal, and impetuous, should the sorrowful SOPHONISBA, separated from this worthless husband, endure the pain which he alone ought to suffer? Because he is unworthy of her, is she worthy of no other? To compel her to languish in a state of austere celibacy, a thousand times more unhappy than the most forlorn widowhood, is to compel her to wish the death of the author of that misery from which a divorce would have delivered her. The members of the human body are intended to remain united to each other, so long as the body continues to live; and yet that union, although naturally indissoluble, does not prevent their separation when any of them mortifies or becomes gangrenous: so, without reducing marriage to a mere temporary essay, ill-matched couples may, in desperate cases, be disengaged from the fatal tie which unites them and misery together.

THIS absolute indissolubility of marriage, which in some parts of the world is made a point of conscience, only insures its continuance: but so far from engaging the married couple in the exercise of their reciprocal duties, it contributes, perhaps more than any other cause, to the breach of them. Dissatisfied with each other, and perceiving their misfortune to be irreparable, they think of nothing but how it may be palliated; and to alleviate their sufferings, they solace themselves, one in the arms of

of a mistress, the other in those of a gallant. It is, undoubtedly to the same cause, that the criminal correspondence, called *KEEPING*, ought to be imputed: for men tremble at the thoughts of tying an indissoluble knot.

HERMOGENES and *JUNIA*, both at their own disposal, have cohabited as man and wife during ten years, without being united by any other bonds than those of a mutual and constant affection. The possibility of a parting alarms them, and keeps them constantly upon their guard; he fears to displease *JUNIA*, and she to offend *HERMOGENES*. From this mutual apprehension, tempered by the assurance of mutual love, arises that reciprocal deference, condescension, and assiduity to please, which are constant fuel to the tender fire that has been so long kindled in their breasts. They are only the more strongly united, by the possibility of a separation: no action that we perform voluntarily gives us pain; but pleasure itself is distasteful when it becomes a duty. ‘But if this be what is called *KEEPING*, under what pretence is it stigmatized as a crime? This is a lasting union of two faithful lovers, who have but one heart, one will, and one soul; and does the instinct of pure nature require any thing more? What is there in the galling yoke of marriage preferable to this?—its *INDISSOLUBILITY*? Is not a union founded on mutual tenderness, more pure, more holy, and more honourable, than that which is secured only by severe necessity?’ I will readily acknowledge, that *HERMOGENES* and *JUNIA* are united by a bond that nature approves, especially if it be supposed that they have no intention to break it. The marriages of our forefathers, which it does not become us to censure, were contracted with no other solemnity.

lemnity. The two lovers consented to take each other as husband and wife; they acted as such, and from that time the mutual relation was established. But in our times the legislature of almost all nations has, for political purposes, rendered these marriages infamous, not only to the parents but to the children; and if our love is mingled with esteem, can we possibly propose to the lovely object of this passion, a union which will DISHONOUR her? And if we love ourselves in our posterity, can we think, without shuddering, of giving such children to our country as she will DESPISE and DISOWN? Wretched outcasts of society, whom injurious prejudice renders accountable for the crime charged upon their father! But how much more criminal are those voluptuous inconstants, the only object of whose love is PLEASURE! who like brutes, when they have gratified a sordid appetite, despise and abandon the lovely mourner who contributed to their delight, and the unhappy though innocent offspring of the transient embrace: nature herself, all indulgent as she is, condemns this guilty flame. Her ultimate end in every union which she forms, is the procreation of children; which, on the contrary, is the dread of those who look no higher than the mere casual enjoyment.

BUT this shameful licentiousness, however culpable, is but a venial fault in comparison of ADULTERY, which includes a more complicated and dreadful degree of guilt than all other breaches of chastity. I repeat the MOST DREADFUL; for incest itself, with which alone it can be put in competition, is far inferior in point of turpitude. To violate the chastity of a sister, a mother, or a daughter; or to yield to the guilty solicitations of a brother, a father, or a son, are the only actions which

which are truly incestuous: nature knows no other; and familiarities between more distant relations are incestuous only in name. But I do not put incest, thus defined, in competition with adultery; for besides that the instances of it are very rare, the idea of it is so disgusting, that I shall wave the subject: I shall here mention only that species of incest which is of human invention, and by which marriage is confined within narrower limits, for the sake of alliances or kindred; nor can there sure be any proportion, between the fictitious crimes which have their origin only in arbitrary prohibitions, and the direct violation of the pure instincts of nature which is implied in adultery. To the excess of incontinence and sensuality, which it has in common with other offences against chastity, must be added injustice, perjury, and perfidiousness.

ADULTERY is either simple or complex: it is simple, when one of the parties by whom it is committed, is not under the ties of marriage; it is complex, when they are both bound by that solemn engagement; for then, besides the crime of which each of them is guilty as principal, they incur the additional guilt of being accomplices in the offence of each other.

IF PALLADES and THAIS were free from all prior engagements, yet the mutual familiarities in which they indulge themselves, are not innocent; because these are not permitted, but to those who have entered the marriage state. But THAIS, being the wife of EURYALUS, is yet more criminal; because, to UNCHASTITY she adds PERJURY and INJUSTICE: perjury, in violating the fidelity which he vowed to her husband; injustice, by bringing him, or rendering herself liable to bring him, intruded heirs; who, notwithstanding their illegitimacy,

illegitimacy, will succeed to a participation of his estate, to the prejudice of his own offspring or the collateral branches of his family: and in all the circumstances which aggravate the fault of THAIS, PALLADES has an equal share; and although he is not bound by the nuptial tie, he is, equally with her, guilty of adultery, injustice, and perjury: for every man is supposed to commit the crime, in which he concurs. But let us suppose THAIS to be single, and PALLADES married, they are both equally culpable; the guilt of PALLADES on one side, is now equal to that of THAIS when she was supposed to be unfaithful to the bed of EURYALUS; for conjugal fidelity is EQUALLY INCUMBENT on husband and wife: and if the wife who violates it, may bring her husband illegitimate heirs; the husband may withhold legitimate issue from the wife: THAIS on the other side, being an accomplice with PALLADES, contracts an equal share in his guilt—and both of them would be yet more guilty, if their adultery had been complex. Of two faults which are equal in other respects, that is the most heinous by which another is injured; and if both are injurious to another, that is the most enormous which injures in the greatest degree, or affects the greatest number: and according to this maxim, the complex adultery is more criminal than the simple, and simple adultery is more criminal than any other unlawful familiarity between the sexes.

THE last, but not the least complaint that I have against adultery, is, that it destroys the peace both of husband and wife; and if their hearts have been united by love, adultery, by extinguishing that love, divides them for ever. He only who has loved, can conceive the pangs of this dreadful separation. I will venture to affirm, for

I know it by a happy experience, that life has no enjoyment equal, at least in the estimation of tender minds, to that of loving and being beloved. Fortune, honours, riches, and diversions all are names and shadows, in comparison of this inestimable felicity; and of this inestimable felicity we are deprived by adultery. For want of listening to the internal voice of NATURE, which inveighs against adultery, it is generally believed to be but an excusable gallantry, upon the credit of wretches, who having wholly extinguished all sense of honour and virtue by habitual debauchery, instead of blushing at this horrid enormity, glory in the commission of it. But pirates and banditti glory also in their violence and rapine; and a grenadier becomes a ravisher without remorse, in a town taken by storm: are we then to determine the turpitude of a particular crime, by the OPINION of the CRIMINAL!

SECT. II. OF SOBRIETY.

TO give the young Lacedemonians a relish for sobriety, slaves were exposed before them, who had been made drunk on purpose; and this spectacle, which exhibited a faithful and striking picture of the infamous brutality which is the effect of drunkenness, made a deep and lasting impression upon their minds. We are not reduced to the necessity of having recourse to this whimsical expedient; we have no need to make our servants drunk, to give lessons of temperance to our children; many of our fellow-citizens, of all ranks, very willingly take upon themselves to perform the office of the slaves of Sparta: and some perhaps who have preached against intemperance in the morning, will generously illustrate their

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doctrine at night, by exhibiting, in person, an instance of the absurdity and brutality which are the effects of the vice against which they have declaimed. If nothing more were necessary to inculcate temperance than the practice of the contrary vice, we should not want preceptors.

WE have indeed lost one instructor, a certain lord, more famous for his drunkenness than his nobility, which was but of modern date. Wine, that treacherous liquor in which he had placed the supreme delight of his life, proved his poison; "but being dead he yet speaketh," and is a perpetual preacher of sobriety: his memory alone will teach those who know how he lived, how despicably low even the great may fall, whom nothing stimulates to emulation but the ridiculous praise of being able to drink well, or more properly to drink much. But there still remains a sufficient number of apostles who are under the direction of the same spirit, to prevent our regretting the loss of one among a thousand. We have still before our eyes the judge EUPOTIMUS, that organized cask who knows nothing more than to drink, to sleep, and to try causes. Behold him totter to the bench; hear him snore when he has taken his seat; follow him, when in the middle of a cause the particulars of which he thinks tediously impertinent, he quits the court to wait in the neighbouring drinking-room till the counsel shall have done pleading; observe him in his passage from the tavern to his house, when, in the middle of the night, he is carried home dead drunk, without motion, sense, or pulse; bruised, livid, and bloody, by the falls which he has received. Is any thing else necessary to excite an abhorrence of intemperance and a contempt of the intemperate? Behold the illustrious **DIOGENETES**
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a prelate distinguished both by his rank and his birth, enervated, debilitated, and having little more left of life than the name, who is scarce able, so great is his weakness, to trace in the air, with two of his fingers, those sacred hieroglyphics which devout persons call benedictions! His legs which bend under him, his arms that dangle a useless weight at his sides, will sufficiently instruct you in the dreadful effects of excessive drinking. Would you insinuate, that the excess of the table alone has not reduced him to this deplorable condition? I grant it; his example, therefore, includes yet another lesson.

BUT because I have insisted so much on the injury which our health receives from intemperance, let me not be accused of considering the law which prescribes sobriety, as a mere prudential maxim, and wholly indifferent with respect to morality. No prescription of the law of nature can, in this respect, be indifferent; and I am proceeding to prove, that to be temperate, is an express precept of this law. Nature has determined the quantity of aliments which we ought to take, by the degree of heat and the capacity of the stomach; and the quality of them, not only by the agreeable or disagreeable sensation which they excite in the palate, but by the good or ill effects which they produce with respect to our health.

HEALTH is that constitution of the body, in which the breath of life that animates it, acts with greatest energy. To impair health, is to diminish life: a man is less and less alive, in proportion as his health declines; and when it is totally destroyed, he dies. The same law which restrain us from putting an end to our own lives, forbids us, also, voluntarily to destroy our health. Let whoever will call it, in this respect, a prudential maxim;

im; what does it signify how it is denominated, if it be confessed to be **INDISPENSABLE**. From these principles it follows, that voluntarily to destroy health, in whatever manner, is to infringe the law of nature, which enjoins its preservation. Sobriety, therefore, like all other virtues, is the mean between two opposite extremes: to destroy the constitution by excessive abstinence, is not a less culpable excess, than to shorten life by intemperate eating and drinking. Is he who takes a slow poison, less a self-murderer, than a more resolute wretch who stabs himself? As this criminal is condemned without hesitation, why should the other be acquitted?

If it be disputed, whether **SUICIDE** be contrary to the law of nature, I believe it will not be difficult to prove it. This law, as I have before observed, does not require us to treat other persons better than we treat ourselves: and it is generally agreed, that we are forbidden to take away the life of others, at least by our own private authority; much less, therefore, are we allowed to take away our own. ‘*Bait,*’ say you, ‘if life is rather a burden than a benefit, since the instinct of nature itself has our happiness for its object, why may we not in this case cut it short?’ Why? because life, belonging to **GOD** from whom you derived your being, you have no right to dispose of it without his permission. Besides, we are not sufficient judges of our own interest, especially when blinded by some violent passion, to determine with certainty, even in the circumstances of the greatest distress, whether life is rather a burden than a benefit. It is on the contrary certain, even in those circumstances, that it is worth preserving, if not with respect to the present time, yet with respect to the time to come:

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for we continue to live, doubtless, only because it is the will of GOD that we should not yet die; and GOD wills nothing with respect to us, which has not a direct tendency to our happiness; this being the ULTIMATE END of our creation: to become our own murderers, therefore, is to counterwork his purpose, and not only to neglect, but to renounce the felicity which he intended us. But even supposing that life was really become a burden, we should no more have a right to lay it down, than we have to take away the life of another when it becomes an obstacle to our advantage: our own life is no more at our disposal, than that of others.

THAT an action is great and generous, in proportion as it requires a more severe degree of self-denial, and is performed in opposition to stronger instincts and passions, is a maxim that, altho' generally received, is yet always false, if not understood with proper restrictions; and from this maxim, many persons eminent in history have inferred, that to destroy themselves was to merit the applause of posterity; and indeed they have not been destitute of admirers in succeeding ages. But to plunge the poignard in the breast of a parent, must certainly cause great struggles in the parricide; nor could the pleadings of nature be silenced, but by the strongest and most painful efforts. But can these struggles and these efforts, convert so horrid an enormity into a meritorious action? To struggle with natural propensities, is not a virtue, except such propensities are vicious: to meet death with intrepidity, is courage; but to inflict it on ourselves, is cowardice. No man becomes the author of his own death, but to deliver himself from some calamity which he deems unsupportable. Men kill

themselves, because their fortitude is not equal to their sufferings: the violence of the remedy by which a man endeavours to put an end to his calamities, if it does not include the preservation of his life, rather proves the excess of his impatience than the greatness of his courage. Fortify yourself with these prudent maxims founded on right reason and humanity, and the most dreadful misfortunes will never induce you to lay violent hands on yourself. Let the PERSIAN USBEK in vain attempt an apology for suicide, to his friend IBBEN; regard his captious sophistry only as frivolous palliatives of the blindest fury: and convinced that to deprive yourself of life is a CRIME, consider the preservation of it is a DUTY. And nothing contributes more to the preservation of life, than sobriety.

SOBRIETY is of two kinds: one consists in the moderate use of meat and drink, which we have already considered; the other in disinterestedness, and the good use of riches: this is with respect to the soul, what the other is with respect to the body; the result of the former is HEALTH, and of the latter VIRTUE.

AMONG all the different classes of the rich, the least culpable are those, who, during a long succession from father to son, have always lived in ease and plenty, and scarce know that there are wretches in the world who want the necessaries of life. They are, indeed, generally insensible to the miseries of others, and, excepting this, they would be irreproachable; for it is no crime to be rich.

THOSE upon whom riches produce the worst effects, are the CROESUS's of yesterday, who carry the sum-total of their possessions written on their foreheads: the disdain of their eye, and the

the arrogance of their behaviour, seem to increase every day in proportion as their coffers fill. That which ought to comfort the man of merit who is exposed to their insults, is the reflexion, that these prodigious heaps of wealth which were so suddenly amassed, are as suddenly melted away.

To accumulate immense riches, and to dissipate them, is seldom the work of more than two generations: the father hoards, and the son squanders; the father grows rich, the son becomes necessitous. Such is the ordinary course of things; and this it is that facilitates commerce: without this, the wealth of individuals would never circulate and enrich the community.

YESTERDAY you saw PHYLARGYRIS rise on the wheel of fortune, with incredible swiftness; and you see his son SCORPISON descend with equal rapidity to-day. PHYLARGYRIS was born without wealth, but with an ardent desire to acquire it: he did not amuse himself with science, a sterile soil! which, to those who cultivate it with the greatest assiduity, produces only flattering honours and empty praise: he was neither geometrician, poet, grammarian, nor astronomer; but he was, successively, commissioner of the customs, cashier, director, and undertaker for supplies. There still remained one step between him and his utmost wishes; but this step was at length successfully taken: twenty thousand pounds well applied, procured the honour of a place among the opulent Forty, and he became receiver in chief. Perhaps you imagine, that he then wished for nothing more; on the contrary his desire increased with his wealth, and his wealth increased almost in proportion to his desire: for when he died, ten principalities might have been formed out of his estate. The year of mourning was scarce

scarce expired, when SCORPISON, although he was sole heir to these vast possessions, was less wealthy by one half than his father; the keeping a mistress, gaming, the re-payment of loans with exorbitant interest, building and demolishing, a passion for pictures, medals, and cockle-shells, and, above all, his inattention to his domestic affairs, so greatly diminished his patrimony in so short a time. But he has made considerable progress since; for he has now not only dissipated the remainder, but has brought himself deeply into debt.

BUT persons frequently think themselves good œconomists, when they barely keep on this side prodigality: they never dream of retrenching superfluous expences, provided they do not exceed their income; they have never thought it a duty to relieve the distresses of the unfortunate, nor do so much as know that it can be a pleasure.

I KNOW not by what fatality it happens, that the more persons are distinguished by the bounty of fortune, the less they are inclined to relieve those to whom this bounty is denied: the poor derive more assistance from persons who are almost equally indigent, than from those who abound in wealth. Men seem to pity those evils only, which they themselves suffer in some degree: I say, in some degree; because a person who is overwhelmed with calamity, exhausts his sensibility on himself; and the excess of misfortune renders us as incapable of commiseration as the excess of prosperity.

ANOTHER singularity which appears equally astonishing, is, that few persons are more insensible to the misery of others, than those whose profession it is to preach charity to the rest of mankind: perhaps they think themselves excused from
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assisting the unfortunate, in consideration of the care they take to exhort others to do it; and imagine they have done enough, by interceding only for the wretched.

It is commonly said, that persons make a noble use of their fortune, who keep a splendid table, have vast apartments, rich furniture, and costly jewels, a numerous retinue and sumptuous equipages; or, in other words, live as luxuriously as they can, without mortgaging their estates, or breaking in upon their principal. But I must take the liberty to correct this abuse of language. That which I call making a noble use of an affluent fortune, is to use it like an honest, or rather like a beneficent man. Does the generous and pious DEMOPHILUS then use his fortune otherwise than nobly, because, having renounced mean and sensual gratifications, all trifling amusements and vain superfluities, he showers his bounties, with a liberal hand, upon the indigent and unhappy? If wisdom can derive any advantage from WEALTH, it is only by procuring the sublime satisfaction of COMMUNICATING HAPPINESS.

MANNERS.

M A N N E R S.

P A R T III.

O F S O C I A L L O V E.

IN the first part of this work, we have asserted, that the LOVE OF GOD will produce a cheerful obedience to his laws: in the second, that LOVE TO OURSELVES, when guided by reason and wisdom, will ensure our own happiness: and may we not now say, that if we love our FELLOW-CREATURES, we shall never be wanting in the performance of our duty to them? "LOVE," saith St. PAUL to his new profelytes, "is the fulfilling of the law." Love alone can secure a faithful observance of all our duties; it is the root from which all our engagements spring, and the bond within which they are all comprehended. Without this, all intercourse between man and man would degenerate into artifice and dissimulation; society would retain only the shadow of virtue, a delusive appearance of friendship, humanity, and generosity; which would produce more dreadful effects than avowed hatred and open abuse. We have already described the characters and effects of that love which MAN owes first to his GOD, and then to HIMSELF: let us now delineate the characters and effects of that love, which MAN owes to MAN.

EVERY kind of union among the human species, in proportion as it is more or less limited, is cemented by stronger or weaker degrees of affection.

fection. We give the name of LOVE to that passion which unites two lovers, or the wedded pair; and also to that which attaches the child to the parent, and the parent to the child. FRIENDSHIP is that affection which proceeds from choice; not derived from the difference of sex, nor yet dependant on the ties of blood. And we give the name of HUMANITY to that affection, which as men we feel for all our own species. Some degree of difference between these several affections, is allowed. LOVE, in its own nature, is more lively and ardent than FRIENDSHIP; and we may lawfully do more for an approved friend, than we are obliged to do for the rest of MANKIND. But these three kinds of affection differ only in degree: they are, indeed, subordinate to each other, but they have this property in common, that they incite us to do good to those whom they render dear to us, and to procure them all the happiness in our power.

CHAP. I. OF LOVE.

THOUGH the term LOVE is applied in general to all affections which arise from NATURE, and which incline the heart almost involuntarily towards the object beloved; such as the tenderness of lovers, that of the husband and wife, the filial and much more the parental affection: yet custom has determined it more particularly to signify, that strong sympathy which persons of different sexes feel for each other. And of this we shall speak in the first place, as being that which has the most absolute empire over the heart. The other three shall also be the subject of distinct sections.

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SECT. I. OF LOVE, PROPERLY SO CALLED.

CALISTA was young and beautiful, blest with an uncommon share of solid sense enlivened by the most sprightly wit. AGATHOCLES exceeded her very little in point of age; he was well-made, brave, and prudent. He had the good fortune to be introduced at CALISTA's where his looks, wandering indifferently over a brilliant circle, soon distinguished and fixed upon her. But endeavouring to recover himself from the short extasy which this first glance produced, he immediately reproached himself as being guilty of rudeness and disregard to the rest of the company; and this fault he endeavoured to repair, by looking round on other objects. Vain attempt! they are attracted by an irresistible charm, and again turned towards CALISTA. He blushed as well as she, whilst a sweet emotion, hitherto unselt, played about his heart, and disconcerted all his looks. They both became, at the same time, more timid and more curious. With pleasure he gazed at CALISTA, and yet could not do it without trembling: whilst she, secretly pleased with this flattering preference, looked at him by stealth. They were both afraid, but especially CALISTA, of being caught by the other in the fact; and yet both were so almost every moment. The hour of separation came, and they thought it came too soon. They made painful reflections on the rapidity of time. Imagination, however, did not suffer a total separation to take place: for the image of CALISTA was deeply engraven on the mind of AGATHOCLES, and the lineaments of his person were as strongly impressed on that of CALISTA. They both appeared less chearful the rest of the

the day; a lively and interesting sentiment, whatever it was, employed their minds, which no amusement could banish.

It was two days before they saw each other again: and tho', during this interval, their whole time had been filled up, either by business or recreations; they both felt a languid anxiety which rendered every thing insipid, a void in their minds which we want words to define, and of which they knew not then the cause; but discovered it the very instant of their meeting: for the perfect contentment, the soothing delight, which they tasted in the presence of each other, would not suffer them to be longer ignorant of the cause of their melancholy. AGATHOCLES now collected himself, and assumed the courage to address CALISTA; he accosted her with the most polite and obliging expressions, and for the first time enjoyed the happiness of a particular conversation with her. He had hitherto seen only her exterior charms: he now discovered the beauty of her mind, the integrity of her heart, the dignity of her sentiments, and the delicacy of her wit; but what still more delighted him, was the pleasing hope, that she did not think him unworthy of her esteem. From this time his visits became very frequent; in every one of which he discovered some new perfection. This is the characteristic of real merit; it is a gainer by being laid open to the inspection of a judicious eye. A man of understanding will soon be disgusted with the wanton, the foolish, and the giddy: but if he has conceived a passion for a woman worthy of himself, time, so far from weakening his attachment, can only serve to encrease and strengthen it.

THE fixed inclination of AGATHOCLES made him now sensible, that what he felt for CALISTA

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was love; and that of the most tender and passionate kind. This he knew; but CALISTA was still unacquainted with it, or at least had never learnt it from his lips. Love is timorous and diffident: a bold and daring suitor is not the lover of the lady whom he addresses; the only object of his love is PLEASURE. At last he took the resolution to lay open his heart to CALISTA, but not in the studied language of a romantic passion. "Lovely CALISTA," said he ingenuously, "it is not merely esteem that engages me to you; but the most passionate and tender affection. I feel that I cannot live without you. Can you, without reluctance, resolve to make me happy? I have hitherto loved without offending you; this is a tribute that your merit demands: but may I flatter myself with the hope, that you will make me some small return?" A coquette would have affected to be displeased; but CALISTA not only heard her lover without interruption, but answered him without severity and permitted him to hope. Nor did she put his constancy to a tedious trial. The happiness for which he sighed, was deferred no longer than was proper to make the necessary preparations. The marriage-settlements were easily adjusted, for in these sordid interest had no share; this solemn contract chiefly consisted in a mutual exchange of hearts, and this was already performed.

WHAT will be the lot of this newly wedded pair? I will venture to foretel, that it will be the happiest that mortals can enjoy on earth. No pleasure is comparable to that which affects the heart; nor can any other, as I have already observed, affect it with such exquisite delight, as the pleasure of loving and being beloved. To this tender union of souls we can never apply the

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words of Democritus, that "the pleasure of love is only a short epilepsy." He, without doubt, had merely that sensual gratification in his thoughts, which is so different from love, that the enjoyment may be without the passion, and the passion without the enjoyment. Their love will be constant. This I dare prophesy, and I know the cause: their passion is not founded on the dazzling charms of beauty; they are both the friends of virtue; they love each other on this account; their love, therefore, will last as long as their virtue, and the continuance of that is secured by their union: for nothing can secure our perseverance in the paths of wisdom so effectually, as having incessantly a loving and beloved example walking before us. Their felicity can never be disturbed, unless by those disasters and misfortunes from which their mutual tenderness cannot shelter them. But supposing that these shall fall to their share, they would then only partake of the common lot of mankind. Those who have never tasted the tender delights of love, are EQUALLY exposed to disappointment; and the lover is at least a gainer, with respect to those pleasures which are of great account in the estimation of the value of life. Add to this, that love will greatly DIMINISH the sense of their misfortunes. It has the peculiar virtue of rendering the sufferings of two well-paired hearts less acute, and their delights more exquisite. It would seem as if, by communicating their distresses, each one felt but half their weight: while, on the contrary, their satisfactions are doubled by the participation. As a Squadron of soldiers is more difficultly defeated, in proportion to its closeness; so the happy pair resists the attacks of trouble and adversity, with so much the more strength and success as they are more firmly united.

YE sensual lovers, whose pleasures are merely corporeal, the representation of these chaste delights is to you an incomprehensible enigma, a ridiculous paradox? LOVE, whose standard you profess to follow, is to you unknown. You are in his eyes the PROFANE, who do not deserve to be initiated into his mysteries. What have you performed in his service? by what exploits have you merited his favour? You have ridiculously affected frivolous gestures, and theatrical attitudes; you have minutely conformed to every rising mode, you have practised in your glass the complaisant and insinuating smile, the lively glance, the soft and passionate look; you have exhausted the delicacy of your taste, and the strength of your imagination, in the frivolous employment of adoring your persons with all the pride and extravagance of dress. Elated with these noble advantages, you strut in every assembly with an air of triumph. The greatest beauty, you imagine, must upon the first attack resign her arms, and surrender at discretion. You practise every method, either to seduce or surprize; and spare neither flattery, nor lies, nor gifts, nor promises, nor pretences, nor dissimulation. It is true, some have served as trophies to your odious vanity. One has been prepared for her fall, by a looseness of manners, or a warmth of constitution. Another has been dazzled with the lustre of gold and jewels. The innocent AGNES fell into the snare, through simplicity; the young HEBE, by an indiscrete curiosity.—But confess that you blush at your conquests. None of them could ever render you happy. This is plain, from your repeated inconstancy and infidelity, from your perfidy and perjuries, from your disgusts
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and disappointments. Your love is turned into hatred; you blaspheme what you once adored; there is no woman upon earth who can shelter herself from your outrageous declamations; you vilify and defame that lovely sex, which was formed for the felicity of ours. But how is it possible that you should conceive an esteem for it, while you form a judgment of all from the WORST patterns?

No solid happiness can be reasonably expected from this passion, except you love with delicacy a person worthy of your tenderest affection; without this condition you will infallibly be unhappy, either by the inconstancy of the person beloved or by your own: and then you will find by experience, that what you thought to be love, was not really so; for love is always CONSTANT: yours was nothing more than a conformity of taste for pleasure.

LOVE being the sympathetic bond of two minds, it is in the qualities of the MIND that we must search for the FOUNDATION of this sympathy. And here, the first and principal, and by which indeed we are to judge of all others, is THE LOVE OF VIRTUE: for there can be no present more fatal to a man of honour, than a heart that is a stranger to virtuous sentiments; since this he cannot accept without risking his own innocence. In a union so strict as that of lovers, sentiments and habits are communicated imperceptibly; and, as we are too well informed by experience, the bad are more easily caught than the good. The disorders of the mind are much more contagious than those of the body; its spots defect and defile all those, who are so imprudent as to touch, or approach too near.

ADD to the danger of incurring this fatal consequence,

sequence, the interest even of your love itself; for what are the perfections that can fix the heart of a woman, who is insensible to the charms of virtue? Will you adopt her crimes? will you become an accomplice? You will then sacrifice your honour, but not promote the interest of your love: for the fair seducer, herself, will lose her esteem for you; and it is infallibly certain, that what we despise we can never love. If you behave towards her with inflexible virtue, you then become an object of fear. If you submit to base condescensions, she will abuse them, and at the same time be insensible of the obligation; and this will, one time or other, be the foundation of some bitter reproaches, when she will not fail to reflect back her own guilt upon you; and as you have favoured her crimes, you will then be charged with being the author of them. What medium can you take between these two extremes? Spare yourself these dangerous embarrassments, cultivate a love of virtue in your own mind, and despise her that wants this great accomplishment.

WITH what views does BELISA caress the young LINDOR? surely with no other than that of becoming the MINERVA of this lovely TELEMACHUS. She could but ill perform the part of CIRCE. He is a youth scarce freed from the terrors of the rod, nor has he yet shook of the dust of the college. BELISA, on the contrary, is of full age; she has seen the beginning of the present century, and ought now to have laid aside the trifling vain amusements of gallantry and intrigue. Full five and forty years experience, and some mortifying anecdotes not yet effaced from her memory, ought for ever to keep her on her guard against the follies and indiscretions of the juvenile part of our sex. She is the friend of LIN-

DOR's mother, and takes him under her care as a pupil. Slanderers however say, that she herself has a very warm concern for the success of her lessons. Nothing is more common, say they, than for a young man to lose his innocence in the arms of these superannuated ladies. The timidity natural to youth would be his security, if these dangerous seducers did not undertake to break down this fortress by licentious discourse, and to finish the conquest by indecent fooleries. But let us, ourselves, examine the behaviour of the mistress and her disciple, and try if our own observation will justify these suspicions. Why are they always in close and private conference, secured by the unseemly protection of locks and bolts? Is there no other seat for BELISA, than a couch? does no other attitude become her, than a reclined posture; no other dress, than the loosely negligent and alluring? Does mere friendship animate the countenance with such a glowing ardor? does its eye sparkle with so much fire? is its zeal expressed in kisses, given with all the fervor of desire, and repeated almost without intermission? But let us draw a veil over the rest of this scene: I design to inspire my readers with the strictest morals, and yet I have alarmed their modesty.

ENCALPUS is not wholly unlike BELISA; for he seeks to attain the same end, tho' by very different means. His long cloak, his venerable character, the wrinkles multiplied on his brow, and an air of piety and devotion, inspire every one with an unbounded confidence. The young and beautiful go to him, to blush at their own weakness; to reveal to him their secret inclinations; and to tell him, how greatly the empire of appetite prevails over that of reason; to lament the ascendancy

dency of their irregular desires, and to learn how they may be subdued. HELOISA has told him her unconquerable propensity to tenderness, and the indiscretions into which this weakness has betrayed her. Before he prescribes the remedy, he must search into the nature of her disease. He questions, he examines, he expatiates on the distemper; and lest he should omit any material circumstance, he raises a number of obscene ideas, adapted much more to defile her imagination than to fix and confirm her wavering chastity. And, indeed, the more of truth and sincerity there is in her replies, the better this impostor will be enabled to seduce and triumph over her. He knows already the weakness of the place, and will be sure to make his attack where it is least capable of resistance. The young ALMANZOR, though of a bold and enterprizing genius, has in vain strove to overturn that modesty, which, though wavering, has hitherto been impregnable; but this traitorous guide is better qualified to accomplish his views. He has shewn her the dreadful precipice, and her very fears will help to precipitate her fall. And thus, what a young lover, tenderly beloved, could never obtain by all his endearments; this venerable spiritual director will accomplish by his sacrilegious artifices.

Do you give the name of love to the guilty fondness of BELISA, and the criminal desires of ENCALPUS? Can love teach a man to rob the dear object of his passion of her most valuable treasure, her innocence! to sully her soul with a crime the most ignominious of all others? Does love teach you to plunge the poinard into the unguarded bosom? or do you give the poisonous draught, thro' excess of tenderness?

THE intentions of ERASTUS are very honourable;

ble; he has a passionate fondness for ISABELLA, which is easily discovered in the advantageous picture he gives of her; yet there appears one feature wanting to finish the portrait: he says nothing of the character and disposition of her mind. These are not what affect him. Her beauty, her graceful air, her lively gaiety, have irresistible charms; these are enough for him; and he imagines, that there can be no greater happiness than the possession of so lovely a person. While under the beams of her eyes, he is transported with ecstasy; but, when she is absent, languishes and pines in restless uneasiness. Is not this love? ERASTUS thinks it is; and believes that he is more passionately in love, than any other man upon earth. But I see from whence this error springs; he mistakes for love, what is only the desire of enjoyment.

If you are sincerely desirous of discovering by which of these you are led, consult the eyes of the fair one who holds you in her chains. If her presence intimidates you and holds you in a respectful submission, you then know what it is to love. This passion banishes from the mind every sensual idea, every excursion of the imagination, by which the delicacy of the object beloved might be offended, were it possible for her to know it. Love is chaste, even in our dreams. But on the contrary, if the perfections which you admire, make a greater impression on the senses than they do upon the mind; in that case it is not love, but a corporeal appetite.

THIS generous passion, when it is perfectly sincere, will never excite us to the commission of any fault which may wound either our conscience or our honour; for whoever is capable of love is VIRTUOUS: and, on the other hand, I dare affirm,

firm, that whoever is virtuous is also capable of LOVE; for all the virtues have a close connexion with each other, and the TENDERNESS OF THE HEART is one of them. As an incapacity for propagating the species would be a fault in the structure of the body, so to be incapable of love is equally a defect in the mind.

I AM in no pain for the morals of the lover, since the tender passion has a natural tendency to improve and exalt every virtue: it renders the heart less fierce, the temper more pliable, humane, and generous. The lover is accustomed to bend his will to that of the dear object of his affection; and, by this means, he has the happiness of contracting the habit of commanding, controlling, and even suppressing his desires; and of conforming his taste and inclinations to places, times, and circumstances. But it is quite otherwise, when a person is hurried away by those impulses of a wanton appetite, which these gross feeders confound with love.

SECT. II. OF CONJUGAL LOVE.

THE marks of conjugal love are not so equivocal. A lover may be made a dupe by himself, and believe that he is in love when he is not: but a married man cannot be deceived; for enjoyment is the touch-stone of love. The true from hence derives a new flame; but the false is here extinguished.

IF after the experiment is made, a person finds himself mistaken; I know no other remedy for his misfortune, than PATIENCE. If it be possible, however, substitute FRIENDSHIP in the place of love; but I dare not flatter you that this will be practicable. Friendship between the married pair,

pair, is the fruit of a LONG and SETTLED AFFECTION, when time and possession have calmed every tumultuous passion. When love deserts the married state, hatred generally succeeds; at least coldness and indifference is the best that can be expected, even from tempers of the finest mould.

BEHOLD ALCIPPUS and CELIMENA, who have been married these six months! Though their apartments are at some distance, they visit every day; and even go so far as to embrace each other. This is certainly true; for it never happens but in the presence of the most credible witnesses. You will never see them guilty of the childish caresses and ridiculous toying, for which young married people are sometime censured; but they behave with politeness, respect, assiduity, attention, and, above all, the most perfect decency. Yet they never made an express agreement to live together in this manner; but each resolved upon it, by a happy kind of sympathy.

It is much more surprizing, to see the extreme coldness which subsists between LYSANDER and DAPHNE, after a thousand seeming proofs of the most violent passion. Never did love appear more ardent. Innumerable obstacles stood in their way, over which their courage enabled them to triumph. Bolts, bars, and walls, secured the fair prisoner. Three or four prudish jailors with a devout twang of the nose exhorted her to continence; and, proposing themselves for an example, invited her to sigh, like them, for no other husband than the spouse in the canticles: but a ladder delivered her, at once, from the cloister and these lectures. LYSANDER, whose father at the same time was endeavouring to disinherit him, preferred the interest of his heart to that of his fortune, and the possession of DAPHNE to the ties of blood.

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He fled with her, to vow at the foot of the altar an eternal fidelity. The first year is not yet past, and **LYSANDER** is already false. **DAPHNE** weeps, sighs, and laments: however she has comforters, who may one day help her fully to revenge his perfidy. But what can be the cause of this sudden change? The same which froze the passions of **ALCIPPUS** and **CELIMENA**. **LYSANDER** and **DAPHNE** too had mistaken for love, the powerful impulses of a warm constitution. This deceived them: and as they are both of impatient and impetuous spirits, their vexations and disappointments are as keen as their appetites were violent.

It would be too great an undertaking, to endeavour to trace the infinite number of different scenes which the marriage-state would offer to our view, if the darkness which conceals the secrets of that state was suddenly dissipated. What a variety of humours, caprices, freaks, and wild contradictions, would so many disunited pairs furnish; who, so far from being led astray by a false conception of love, have never thought this passion at all necessary to the forming this important engagement!

BEAUTY and coquetry have, in all ages, given birth to so many absurd passions, to so many troubles, commotions, and wars; that superficial thinkers, without sparing even that kind of love which is most just and rational, that which is founded on **ESTEEM**, have dogmatically pronounced it an unpardonable weakness. Avarice, finding in this ill-judged fantastic opinion something to flatter his partisans, did not fail to spread it abroad, and give it the stamp of fashionable authority: and, by his assistance, it made such progress, that it soon became an almost universally received maxim. It was then instituted, that, for the future, no man should take a wife

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inferior to himself; and the equality of their station was extended even to goods and chattels. Love was by this means proscribed and banished from marriage, and confined entirely to romances: so that if any one, either through inadvertency or a peculiar taste, suffered his heart to be inflamed by this passion; it became necessary for him to conceal it as much as possible, to treat his spouse in public with the coldest civility; and, whenever he happened to be in company with other ladies, to entertain them with much more respect than his own, on pain of incurring the censure and ridicule of the polite world. And as ill-chosen matches are by far the most numerous, they easily led the fashion; and this regulation, so conformable to their plan, has been ever since scrupulously maintained. Upon this footing marriage stands at present; except only, that such persons as have a sincere hatred for each other, are allowed to behave much worse. I have nothing to say to persons of this last class, on the duties of husbands and wives; for in wanting love, they want the most ESSENTIAL: how then shall they fulfil the rest?

A MARRIAGE contracted without tenderness, is a kind of rape; for to possess, when the mind does not consent, is to violate the laws of nature. The gifts of HYMEN ought only to be dispensed by the hands of LOVE; and whoever receives them from another, is no better than an usurper. I might here exhort these inconsiderate ravishers, to repair this fault by an after-act; that is, by endeavouring to love; and thus, to do that after marriage, which they ought to have done before. But it would be as absurd to advise, as to command a sensibility of mind. Those who do not love, and those who hate, ought to be regarded as

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incorrigible sinners; it is not, therefore, to these that I would address what I have to say on conjugal affection.

BUT would these hints be better addressed, if I proposed them to those, who having from the first instant properly cherished the glowing sparks of this passion, have extracted from that intimate knowledge which this union has reciprocally given them of each other, new motives to increase their mutual affection? These seem to have no need of a lecture on the continuance of love; for a tenderness thus strengthened by reflection, seems from its very nature to be formed for an eternal duration. But alas! the human heart is so variable, that no one can, without presumption, promise, that his flame shall always burn with an equal and constant ardour. Love is a fire, and will be extinguished either if water be thrown upon it, or if fuel be not supplied.

EURISTHENES loved his wife, and this love rendered him the happiest of men. He was sensible of his happiness; and one day in the fulness of his heart opened his whole soul to an old Druid, the depositary of his most intimate secrets; who, being himself weaned from the pleasures of which he now heard a recital, conceived a design, under a pretence of promoting the glory of GOD, to disengage him from those carnal ties which, he said, bound him to the world. "Brother," said this Enthusiast, "I groan for your blindness. You
 " sigh, but not for the Lord. Are you ignorant
 " that it is written, He that hateth not his father,
 " and his mother, his wife, and his brethren, for
 " GOD, is unworthy of GOD? Before the fall
 " of the first man your love, perhaps, might not
 " have been a crime: but sinful man ought to eat
 " his bread dipped in tears. Your spouse is a
 " daughter

“ daughter of EVE, that cruel mother who ruined us all: and yet, alas! you love her. Dread the fate of your first father: it was love that ruined him. You are pleased and touched with her tender affection and care, and yet this ought to be the chief ground of your fear; since by this she binds you to herself, and wishes from GOD a heart made for him alone. Consider seriously,—hell opens under your feet.” At the word HELL, the simple EURISTHENES trembled: his troubled imagination saw nothing but dæmons, fire, and sulphur. A fanatic zeal took possession of his mind; he regarded his wife as his enemy, took her caresses for snares, and her remonstrances for attempts to seduce him. And if any remains of affection pleaded for her in his heart, he fasted, prayed, and mortified himself, in order to stifle it.

As for METHYSUS, it is not by fasting that he has freed himself from conjugal affection. Three parts of his time are spent, with the glass in his hand, in those licentious retirements where intemperance and riot reign with absolute dominion, and where the waves of intoxicating burgundy swallow up at the same time his health, his honour, and his substance. There, every refined sentiment is treated as an idle chimera; tenderness is insipid; complaisance, slavery; and respect, meanness of soul. METHYSUS has at length learned the dialect of these despicable haunts of drunkenness: at first he spoke it by rote, as a kind of jargon that contributed to his amusement, not as a language that communicated his ideas; but he has now made farther advances, he has imbibed the spirit of it, and it is become expressive of the sentiments and disposition of his mind; he has lost all relish for those pleasures which are au-

thorized by reason, As to the ladies, he is perfect marble, especially to the modest, the wise, and discreet; and, unhappily for him, his wife is of this number.

THE tender passion of POLYDORE lasted twenty years; and at the end of this season had suffered no other alteration, than that which is necessarily produced by length of time, and the indolent ease of a heart that has nothing left to desire. This kind of affection is not properly love, but friendship; though it is a friendship too tender, ever to subsist between persons of the same sex. But as it irritates the desires less, it exposes married persons to great danger: and I advise those, whoever they are, that enjoy this dangerous tranquillity, to keep a watch over their eyes and their hearts, lest some new object again rouse their desires, and lead them by degrees to the blackest perfidy and ingratitude. POLYDORE became guilty. He confided in his being so long habituated to cherish no other object than his wife; and it was this confidence alone, that exposed him to betray her. Love when it is satisfied, does not increase with age. The sweet tranquillity which he enjoyed under the empire of HYMEN, made him imagine that his passions had lost their power: and therefore, being destitute of fear, he tempted danger, and perceived not the precipice till he fell from it.

VICIOUS habits, capricious humours, and opposite opinions, may disturb the best established love. Thus, a niggardly avaricious husband will conceive a disgust for that wife, who, thinking more nobly, imagines she ought to regulate her expences by their joint income. On the contrary, a prodigal will despise his wife, merely for being a good œconomist.

CALLIAS,

CALLIAS, who is as beautiful as **NARCISSUS** and as proud of that beauty, expresses by his looks, his discourse, and behaviour, that **ELVIRA** ought to think herself under great obligations to him for having condescended to give her his hand.

PHORBAS having read in some Turkish history an account, and perhaps an exaggerated one, of the despotic power which the descendants of **MAHOMET** exercise in their seraglios, behaves at home with the insolence of a sultan. He loves **ARTEMENE** in his soul, but thinks it inconsistent with his dignity to confess it; and had rather receive her humble submissions, than her most tender caresses.

THE devout **THEOTIMUS** believes the church to be in the extremest danger; he laments its approaching ruin; he visits the faithful, and exhorts them to support their tottering religion. The clergy have betrayed the good cause, and the truth will soon have none left to defend it. He looks upon himself as a second Atlas, formed to support the heavens which he thinks just ready to fall. How sweet would be the consolation, if at least his wife did but help to bear the mighty load! But the thoughtless infidel is untouched by his pious groans. She blindly follows the broad path, pointed out to her by her remiss guides; and believes that her salvation depends on her sincerely following the laws of her religion, and the advice of her pastor. **THEOTIMUS** has laboured, with all his might, to make her his convert; but finding it to no purpose, he at last bursts into reproaches: they revile, they anathematize, and, in short, they hate each other.

WHAT madman is that whom I see swelled with anger? What sudden emotion has enflamed his countenance? Why those fierce looks, that

interrupted voice, those threatening gestures? Alas! whom does he menace?—A tender wife, the faithful ARTEMISA, who loves him, and whom he himself loves: at least, till this moment, they have both given constant proofs of the greatest tenderness. Can we thus pass in a moment from love to hatred, from esteem to contempt; from complacency and smiles, to abuse and outrage? Yes, when transported by JEALOUSY; and this is the madness of ARGANTES: like the miser, who, the more he is enamoured of his treasure, is the more fearful of being robbed. ARGANTES suspects his friends, his relations, his domestics; even old men and children offend and disgust him; they all seem capable of seducing his wife; and this he dreads more than all the misfortunes that can fall upon him: and yet it is a misfortune that he believes most near. His fears troubling his senses, he mistakes his distrusts for infallible presages, his suspicions for realities. He has heard her, at a distance, talking to some one in a familiar manner, and from hence proceeds this furious rage. He advances with the utmost precaution, in order to surprize her: but he succeeds only by halves. He finds her alone in that chamber, in which he had heard two voices: but immediately casts his eyes on a pair of man's gloves. He is distracted at the sight; he seizes them, he tears them to pieces. She endeavours to speak, but he is deaf. He prevents all explanation by a torrent of bitter execrations, followed by menaces which are, perhaps, on the point of being put into execution; when an unexpected witness of her innocence enters, whose sudden appearance at once disconcerts and condemns him. It is his father-in-law, who stepping from the closet where he had concealed himself, on purpose to give an agreeable surprize to his

his son, comes forth to demand his gloves, and justify ARTEMISA.

How terrible a passion is jealousy! the deadly poison of all conjugal felicity! better were it that it should utterly destroy love, than thus change it into fury. There is, nevertheless, a kind of jealousy, which is the inseparable companion of a tender and delicate affection; a passion which excludes not esteem, a passion that neither injures nor offends: and this is a fear of losing the affection of the person beloved, from a thorough sense of its value. Thus, the fair-one may fear to displease the man she love, without calling his constancy in question; she may dread his growing cold, and yet be perfectly assured of his fidelity. This tender apprehension is a mighty spur, that awakens love, and gives it activity and precaution: and without this, it would languish through too great a security.

BUT a jealousy without love, appears a paradox not easy to comprehend; and yet nothing is more common. DORIMENA married CLITON; rather from complaisance than inclination; yet she falls into a rage, if he does but smile upon an amiable woman. An obliging word or action, an affable and polite behaviour to any other lady, is an offence, a crime which she can never pardon. If he be long absent, "he is false; and "she has long been very sensible, that he neglected her; tho' she really thought she deserved better treatment at his hands." Is DORIMENA become enamoured of her husband since their marriage? This would be a miracle indeed, and there is no room for such a conjecture. Marriage can never warm those hearts with the beams of love, which were before chilled with indifference: it confirms its purity, but kindles not the flame

flame itself, and very rarely augments it: or, in other words, it is the crucible to refine, not the cradle to rear it up to strength and activity. From whence then proceeds DORIMENA's jealous transports? Not from love; but a passion, which in some sort resembles it.

THE passions of the men are most frequently excited by a particular object: before their hearts can be inflamed, they must find an object proper to inflame them. But as to the women, the melting softness of that tender sex is INBORN; it is an appendage of their very frame: they love before they know it. To us, love is an amusement; to them, it is a capital affair. But if this innate tenderness is fixed on a particular object, and the glowing fire excited to a flame by the attracting charms of pleasure; like the rays of the sun collected by the burning-glass, it becomes more ardent, and its scattered beams, thus concentrating in a point, acquire a greater force and activity. It is also said to have this prerogative above ours, it increases by enjoyment; and for this reason the sex never experience that satiety and inappetency, which weigh down our hearts when our desires are gratified.

WOMEN, in general, love better than men. Nature, whose operations are always conducted by the rules of INFINITE WISDOM, has purposely imparted to them an almost inexhaustible fund of tenderness, mixed with the most exquisite relish of pleasure, that the consequences of marriage might be rendered less uneasy to them; their sufferings being soothed, and their pains compensated, by the sweet allurements of delight: and these, for the most part, hold the place of a love built on reflection. We never love but from choice; but we frequently see them discover an ardency

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of affection, even to that husband whom they have taken blindfold. This sensation, which is so like love that it is not easy to discern the difference, sometimes also inspires transports of jealousy; and from this source proceeds the rage of DORIMENA.

BUT what pretence has AMYNTAS to be jealous? Has he any right to command the heart of EMILIA? He hates and despises her. What then is her love or indifference to him? Love, indeed, is not what he requires of her; but as he thinks his honour affected by her behaviour, he would have her faithful; and judging of her by himself, he cannot believe that she is so. Ridiculous prejudice! how contrary to justice and reason! Shall AMYNTAS think himself disgraced, if EMILIA violates her conjugal faith? and shall he, who boasts that he has betrayed it an hundred times, triumph in his perfidy without the least imagined diminution of honour? How long is it since honour contracted an alliance with guilt? is it like gold and scepters, the prey of the strongest?

LOVE, and more particularly that of the conjugal kind, is nourished by love. When a lover endeavours to gain a heart, the least degree of hope will keep his flame alive; but when this heart is become his conquest, he has a right to expect a constant return of affection. The sacred bond of marriage strengthens the obligation, and constitutes the duty of love between the husband and wife, a duty of religion: but then it must be supposed, that this love is reciprocal; for GOD never commands impossibilities. It is so general a maxim among all nations, that love is essential to marriage; that there are very few who do not allow of a divorce, when contrariety of temper raises an invincible obstacle to love.

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IF you would live happily in the marriage-state, never enter into it without loving and being beloved; and render this love genuine and durable, by founding it on VIRTUE. If it has no object but beauty, a graceful air, or the bloom of youth, it will be as frail as these fleeting advantages, and like them it will soon vanish; but if it is fixed by the perfections of the MIND, it will then stand the test of TIME.

IN order to acquire the right of demanding love, endeavour to deserve it. After a union of twenty years, be as attentive to please, and as careful to avoid offence, as if you were now endeavouring to inspire that passion: for there is as great an advantage in keeping possession of a heart, as in first conquering it. I dare answer for the happiness of that union, where there perpetually reign love, honour, and a mutual condescension. But the tie will be greatly weakened by the want of any of these three requisites; and if the first be wanting, it will be totally destroyed.

SECT. III. OF PATERNAL LOVE.

DID not the reason of man, or rather the abuse of it, sometimes serve to deprave his natural instincts, we should have nothing to say on this subject. The brutes have no need of our treatises on morality to teach them to love their young, to nourish and bring them up; because they have no other guide than that of INSTINCT: and instinct, when it is not PERVERTED by the sophisms of a captious reason, will constantly answer the views of nature, and do its duty with unerring perseverance. If man, then, was in this point like other animals; as soon as the child should see the light, the mother would nourish it with
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her own milk, attend to all its wants, preserve it from every accident, and think no moments of her life better employed than those spent in these important duties. The father, on his side, would endeavour to form the manners of his son; he would study his taste and inclinations, in order to employ his talents to the best advantage, and to prepare him early for the service of his country in that station, for which he should appear best fitted by nature. He would, himself, cultivate this young plant, and think it the most criminal negligence, to abandon it to the discretion of an ignorant or, perhaps, a vicious governor.

BUT the power of CUSTOM, in spite of the impulses of nature, disposes parents to a very different conduct. The child is scarce born, when it is separated from its mother; she is too weak, or too delicate, or her circumstances are too affluent, for her to suckle her own child. In vain has nature diverted the course of that fluid which nourished it in the womb, and carried to the breast of the insensible parent, two rivers of milk destined for its sustenance. The voice of nature must not be heard, her gifts are despised and rejected; those whom she has enriched, destroy, at the hazard of their own health, what she bestows, by drying up the source of this life-sustaining nectar: and the tender infant is delivered up to a foreign and mercenary mother, who will proportion her care to the profit that attends it.

As for the father, he has too much business upon his hands to think of forming the manners of his son. His affairs will not permit it; and it is a care, from which he chuses to be entirely exempt. So many persons are ready to supply his place who will be contented with a moderate salary, that he would think it a bad piece of œconomy,

conomy, not to accept of their services; for they desire no more of his estate than the income of a day or two, to satisfy them for their labours.

MANY writers have already enforced the necessity of these two indispensable duties; that of the mother to nurse her own child, and of the father to take the charge of his education: but all they have said has been ineffectual. And will any thing I can say meet with better success? certainly not. However, I have at least given my voice, and protested against an abuse which I cannot but condemn.

“SUCKLE my own child!” cries CLELIA, “a fine employment positively! a most agreeable pastime! I love to sleep quietly; or if my slumbers must be interrupted, let it be by pleasure. In the day-time I receive visits, and return them. I dress; and to shew a gown in a new taste, I go to the polite circle, to the opera, and sometimes to see a comedy; I dance, I play; in short, all my moments are spent agreeably. Why, don’t you perceive, that I must bid adieu to all this, if I become such a fool as to take upon me the odious employment of a nurse.” Yes, it is easy to perceive, lovely CLELIA, by the plan you have drawn of your amusements, what it is that gives you a disgust to this duty; but from that beautiful breast of alabaster, which you with such complaisance expose to view, I see much better those reasons which should prevail on you to discharge it.

What mother would consent to receive of another, a child which she knew to be not her own? and yet, can that infant be truly hers, which, when it was newly born, was sent far from her; whilst for several years that continual loss of substance which every moment attends all animal bodies,

bodies, has been repaired by the milk of a stranger, which has metamorphosed and transformed it into a new child? No, this is no longer the son of CLELIA; it is CLAUDINA's, and is, as it were, born a second time from her milk. I am at a loss to discover what he can gain by this change; but I am sensible what he may lose. The milk he has sucked was not made for his organs; this, then, must have been an aliment less proper for him than the milk of his mother. Who knows but his constitution, originally robust and healthy, has not been weakened? Who knows but this transformation may have reached his heart, and that, as the body and the mind are so dependent on each other, he may not, merely on this account, become one day a coward, a cheat, a robber, a murderer? That fruit which is the most delicious when flourishing in its proper soil, will soon degenerate if transplanted to another. It is the same with animals: those dogs, so famous in England for their strength and fidelity, no sooner pass the sea, than they become the most stupid of all animals, without instinct, without strength, and without any ability for service.

LET us change the scene: let us search into the heart of the father; or rather, without searching into it, judge of it by his conduct. TRIMALCIO is president of a court of justice. The slowness and majesty of his gait, the haughty sternness of his brow, a gravity unalterable, and more especially the ample size of a judge's peruke, and the number of his servants, express in legible characters the quality of this great personage. One would imagine, that the salary of an office of judicature had the supernatural virtue, of giving the solemn dignity and majestic step of a hero. All the wit of Moliere, or the buffoonry of Scarron,

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would

would be insufficient to smoothe the wrinkles of his front. But the moment arrives, when he is to be stripped in some measure of this magisterial air, this thick covering which obfures his countenance. His son is brought from nurse. "See, my lord!" cries a foolish governante at a distance, "we have brought you little master." He rises, advances a few steps, and walks, for the first time, to meet a human creature. He takes him in his arms, fancies he traces his own features in the child's, and condescends even to embrace him. The infant returns his kisses and endearments with usury, and lisps the word, Papa; a name that sounds agreeably in the ears of TRIMALCIO. The more uncertain the right is that people have to this appellation, the more they love to hear it given them. The child thus fondly caressed, answers by wanton fooleries. Thus he grows bold and free from constraint; and the young chevalier drags about without mercy, tumbles, and unpowders that venerable peruke, which a little before had filled the bar with a respectful reverence.

FROM this fond reception, you are perhaps apt to conclude, that TRIMALCIO loves his son: but this circumstance is too slender to form a judgment upon. You will think more justly, if you examine what care he has taken to improve his understanding, to adorn his mind, and regulate his manners. But the whole extent of his tenderness was expressed on his son's first arrival, nor could it rise to a higher pitch. Can a president condescend to puzzle his brains with the education of his child? No, no, it is almost absurd to imagine it. The governor is already chosen, one who is neither a SENECA nor a BURRHUS; nor is he a man modelled by those illustrious masters, who, towards the end

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of the last century, formed the tender minds of our princes; but a person of the extremest complaisance, who is content with a salary of twenty pounds a year, who will take care not to fatigue his pupil, and will humour him in all his caprices and follies: these are the articles of the agreement:

“ You must treat my son with tenderness, Monsieur L’ABBE, with great tenderness,” said TRIMALCIO: “ I would not have him kill himself with study. He may learn a little latin, I am not against that: but not a word of greek; greek is bad for the sight. Look you, I don’t intend to make him a man of learning: I will have him a president like myself. But should I make a bishop of him, believe me, Monsieur L’ABBE, your bishops are no conjurers.”

THE Abbe exerted himself accordingly. What a happiness did he think it, thus to proceed under the inspection of a dunce, and to have nothing more to do, but to render the son equal to the father! And yet, easy as this undertaking may appear, it was indeed the utmost he was capable of. TRIMALCIO has many advocates, who will, I imagine, murmur against me: “ A man possessed of a public employment,” they will say, “ will have enough to do to turn preceptor to his own children.” But is this a reason that will sufficiently excuse him? A rich financier would, doubtless, have much to restore, should he resolve to return all the wealth he had unlawfully gained: must he therefore keep it?

THOUGH a father be the instructor of his son, he may be assisted in this important task by men of approved merit; and this is highly reasonable, since they will render his labours much more successful: but he ought always to be governor in chief, inspector, and superintendant. BUBALCUS

is, you will say, a father. He is an idiot, who like other animals has contributed to the production of a being formed like himself: but he is incapable of any thing more. He is without knowledge, without senses, without ideas. What share can a wretch, thus formed, have in the education of his son? Doubtless, the best thing he can do, is not to interfere in it. I am of the same opinion; and if any one of my readers can alledge a like excuse, I shall in that case be so far from contesting this point with him, that I will freely give him my dispensation: but I cannot, on this account, hold him exempt from endeavouring to search for the best masters to supply his defect, from encouraging them by a liberal salary, and from carefully enquiring into the progress of their pupil. If he has carried his stupidity so far, as to prevent his taking any concern in an affair of this moment, he is a monster whom the deformity of his soul can never excuse.

ARISTIDES, indeed, deserves greater indulgence. He is abroad in the service of the state, without any fixed abode or settled habitation. A valuable member of the commonwealth will be always ready to sacrifice his dearest interests, his fortune, his health and repose, to the good of his country; but even more than this is required of ARISTIDES: his whole time is employed; he is obliged to wean himself from his family, and to forego the sweetest, the most delightful employment, of forming with his own hand the minds of his children. I do not blame, but I pity him. I know the full extent of his tenderness. Without murmuring, he would abandon his house to the discretion of a servant, his estate to the mercy of a steward, and even his life itself to the dangers of war, did but the public welfare demand it: but

to be a father, and at the same time to see himself deprived of an opportunity of performing the duty of a parent! this he cannot think of, without the most tender and affecting concern. A father who is capable of instructing his son, is the best master he can possibly have: and the capacity of ARISTIDES is sufficiently shewn, by the judicious choice he has made of those to whom he has committed this important trust. But why, alas! does it so frequently happen, that abilities are given to those who cannot exert them, and leisure for exerting them to those who have no abilities!

THE duty of parents to their children, does not terminate in giving them existence: on the contrary, as long as they stand in need of their assistance, they have a right to demand it; for they are tender plants, that must be nursed with the extremest care till they have taken root: and here nature has sufficiently pointed out the separate offices of the father and the mother; for the same duties are not required of both. Nature seems to have peculiarly assigned to the mother, the nourishment of the animal frame, and all the various cares which relate to the body. But the employment of the father is of a much more noble kind; for to him is devolved the care of rearing the thinking immortal substance. But alas! too frequently, both these duties are but ill performed! The mother having with unavoidable pain carried the infant in her womb, is at last delivered from this by other pains peculiar to her sex. The obligation of nursing the new-born infant then succeeds, an obligation as indispensable as the other; but this trouble it is possible for her to avoid, and therefore the obligation is violated. The father on his side, is as defective in fulfilling the intentions of nature. He takes upon himself the office of the

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mother, and concerns himself only about the corporeal advantages of his children, their health, their ease, their table, and their pleasures; whilst the culture of their minds, a concern in itself so important and so superior to all others, is by both neglected. Upon this plan was LYCIDAS educated. He dances well, rides the great horse, and is a tolerable master of the sword. But as to every thing else, he is a composition of ignorance and vanity; qualities which are almost always inseparable. Though he has a low and grovelling mind, he expresses himself with an air of haughty sufficiency: he is filled with prejudices, and at the same time has the two opposite extremes of impiety and superstition; without a rule to guide, without a bridle to restrain, without morals to regulate the impetuosity of his passions. His manners are the copy of his present inclinations, whilst almost in every instance these inclinations are depraved. "Who is it he takes after," cries DORIMONT his unhappy father, who, as fifty years have slid away since his being a young man, has had time enough to forget his own youthful extravagances; "I am sure it is not me. I have been young as well as he, but I was never such a rake. Ah! youth in my time behaved quite in another manner."

If what you say be true, DORIMONT, fathers were not then the corrupters of their children; and that was because they loved them better. "Alas!" replies he, "if I have any thing to reproach myself with, it is for having loved my LYCIDAS too well. It is this love, carried indeed a little too far, that has made me blind to his faults and extravagances; it is this love which softened my mind, when I ought to have been resolute; this has held my hand, when I was going to punish

"punish him." What a strange idea must you then have formed of paternal love, if you are indeed so weak as to imagine, that it has made you fail in the most important duties of a father!

JULIA sees ARAMINTA. A fluttering joy sparkles in her eyes, she runs to meet her, she speaks to her with inexpressible eagerness, she caresses and asks her a hundred questions almost in a breath. From whence proceeds this sudden fit of tenderness? She hates ARAMINTA, and with her every amiable woman. Listen to her: "O my dear! where did you get this gown? Who is your mercer? What is his name? Let me see, let me embrace him. O the incomparable man! What a rich brocade! What beautiful flowers! What a regularity of design! What a choice of colours! What a variety in the shades! O ARAMINTA, I am—I am positively in love with this gown. I cannot express how well it becomes you." You imagine, DORIMONT, that JULIA is a very ridiculous character: but turn your eyes from JULIA, and view yourself. You love your son, you say; but what is this son? A being composed of body and mind, an image, an emanation, a ray of the DEITY, encompassed with a terrestrial veil, which serves to render him visible to the sight and firm to the touch. Now, which of these two opposite substances is the object of your affection to LYCIDAS? Is it his soul, that spiritual being whose origin is so noble and illustrious? But in order to justify this love, can you discover in it any marks of its native dignity? Is it not wretchedly sunk and degenerated? Where is its relish for virtue, its love of truth? If it still retains the lustre of its original grandeur, it is by these traces only that we can distinguish it: but, alas! these are all effaced,

effaced. It is so obscured, that its very existence can only be presumed from the covering of clay which conceals it. We see there organs, lineaments, and proportioned members, the same as in other bodies where we know a soul resides; but we have no better proof.

HOWEVER, deformed as it is, perhaps you will say you love it still. I should more readily believe you, if you had consulted its happiness with greater zeal; if you had made use of all your endeavours to restore it to its native purity, innocence, and virtue; but this was the least of your thoughts: you yourself were the occasion of their being destroyed; you dreaded lest the body of LYCIDAS should become emaciated, consumptive, and languishing, if you restrained his follies and caprices, if you repressed his anger, if you moderated his desires, if you enlightened his understanding. You might as justly refuse to dress a wound, for fear of spoiling the patient's cloaths. You have been in pain for the BODY, though it is little more than the garment of the soul; when the first and most essential concern ought to have been for the MIND. Once more let me enquire, what is it in this son that is the object of your love? You love what is not himself. This organized matter with which he is cloathed, is only a machine formed for his use; without which he can subsist, and which without him would be nothing but a little dust: but this is not your son; it is only his outward covering. Let us return to JULIA. Does she now appear so ridiculous, in being passionately fond of ARAMINTA's gown? or if such a love is fantastical, is yours much more rational?

KINGS have, with the strictest justice, been compared to fathers of families; for this comparison

son is founded on the very nature and origin of regal authority.

The **HAPPY SOLDIER** first the scepter sway'd.

says a poet* of the present age; a maxim unworthy of an equitable prince! But it must be observed, that this sentiment is put into the mouth of a tyrant, an usurper, and the murderer of his king: any other than a **POLYPHONTES** would have said,

The **TENDER PARENT** first the scepter sway'd.

The father was naturally the head or chief of the family: this family by multiplying, became a people; and, consequently, the father of the family became a king. His eldest son, without doubt, thought himself heir to his authority; and thus the scepter was perpetuated in the same house, till a **HAPPY SOLDIER**, or a **REBELLIOUS SUBJECT**, became the first stem of a new race.

As a king may be compared to a **FATHER**, so we may with equal justice compare a father to a **KING**; and thus ascertain the duties of the monarch by those of the chief of a family, and the obligations of the father by those of the sovereign. To **LOVE**, to **GOVERN**, to **RECOMPENCE**, and to **PUNISH**, are all the duties both of the father and the king. A father who loves not his children, is a **MONSTER**; and king who loves not his subjects, a **TYRANT**. Both the father and the king are the living images of **GOD**, whose boundless dominion is founded on **LOVE**. Nature made the father, that he might promote the interest of his children; policy made the king, that he

* **VOLTAIRE**, in his tragedy of **MEROPE**.

he might give happiness to his people. A man in his infancy is ignorant of his true interest, is unable of himself to furnish out the means of happiness, or to provide even for the support of life; so a blind, giddy, and turbulent people, without a chief to govern them, will form none but the most vain and ridiculous projects: their views will be confused; they will neither know what they ought to wish for, what to love, or what to fear; and they will seldom engage in any schemes, but those which will naturally tend to their destruction. It is as necessary, therefore, that both the family and the state should have a chief, as that an arch should have a principal stone; which, placed in the centre, connects, strengthens, and secures the whole assemblage. But if this chief should look upon the rest of the members with indifference, which can only proceed from an immoderate self-love, every thing then will be considered as having a relation to himself; their interest will be always sacrificed to his own; by their labour and toil he will increase in power and opulence; to confirm his tyrannic reign, he will hold them in bondage; and will look upon them as creatures formed for no other purpose, than to contribute to his happiness. But when, on the contrary, benevolence and love reign in the mind of the chief and dictate all his commands, there will thence arise between him and the members a free and easy circulation, diffusing to every individual health, vigour, and strength; and all will zealously concur in promoting the common good of the **WHOLE BODY**. The chief himself will here find a solid advantage; since he cannot better promote his own interest, than by treating his family, or his subjects, with lenity; for the head, tho' the principal

principal seat of life and sensation, will always suffer when joined to a weak and emaciated body.

THERE is the same resemblance between the GOVERNMENT of a kingdom and a family. The master who presides over either of these, has two obligations to fulfil: the one, to promote the practice of virtue and piety; the other, to shield his children, or his subjects, from troubles, disasters, and indigence. He should be conducted by the LOVE OF ORDER, and not by that tyrannical spirit which delights in putting the most submissive tempers to the severest trials. Both the child and the subject have their views too much contracted, to be capable of governing themselves; but yet they are clear-sighted enough, to discover the faults of those who govern ill.

A POWER to RECOMPENSE and to PUNISH, is the very sinews of government. GOD himself thus inforces all his commands; he terrifies by his threatenings, and invites by his promises; and every legislator ought to behave in the same manner: for it would seem hard and unjust, to threaten the rebellious, without encouraging, at the same time, the loyal subject by the most engaging promises. The Roman laws, which in this point were conformable to those of all other nations, in providing against the commission of murder by annexing to it the most severe penalties, bestowed the CIVIC CROWN on him who saved the life of even a single citizen.

THE two springs of the human heart are HOPE and FEAR. Ye fathers, and ye kings! you have every thing in your hands that can possibly move these two passions: but remember, that even justice demands, that you should be as careful to RECOMPENSE, as you are strict in PUNISHING. GOD has established you as his terrestrial substitutes

tutes and representatives, not only to dispense his thunders, but to diffuse around the genial blessings of dewy mists and falling rains.

SECT. IV. OF FILIAL LOVE.

AFATHER, whose dispositions correspond with the views of nature, is a tender and beneficent master; his children, consequently, owe him an affectionate esteem and a respectful obedience. Their submission is not like that of a slave to an imperious master; for though it is as indispensable as this, yet it ought to proceed from the free unconstrained dictates of a grateful heart. They obey, because they love their father, and from a consciousness of being beloved by him.

In the first ages of the world, the power of the father was unlimited: for as parents were never known to abuse their authority, it was not so much as suspected that they ever would do so. The father then enjoyed all the prerogatives of the sovereign; and indeed what hazard could there be, in leaving children to the discretion of a judge, whose severity was tempered with the tenderest affection? But as monsters will sometimes arise, some fathers were found without affection, and consequently cruel; nay, some were known to stain their unnatural hands with the blood of their own offspring. Their power then was restrained: a father was permitted to be an accuser; but was no longer allowed to be either a judge or executioner. Indeed the laws of nature forbid all harshness, violence, and transports of rage: but it is beyond the province of human laws, to regulate or take cognizance of mere domestic affairs.

HERE the parent being free from constraint, wicked unnatural fathers sunk into tyrants, and taught

taught their children to hate them, by ruling them with a rod of iron, and by making that life insupportable which they had given them. This race is not yet extinct; the present age furnishes too many instances of parents of this character. But I do not address myself to the children of such fathers, when I press the necessity of filial affection: for here I shall confine myself to the express terms of the law which MOSES imposed on the children of Israel; "HONOUR," says he, "your father and mother:" he does not say, "LOVE them." He spoke to obdurate wretches, a people who were hardly capable of feeling any of the tender sentiments, or of exciting them in others. He durst not, even in his famous tables, enjoin THE LOVE OF GOD. And, indeed, how could he do this? He had painted the DEITY so terrible, so cruel, and so jealous, that the people who had imbibed his doctrine, were struck with fear, and could no otherwise revere him, than as the Romans honoured the FEVER, a malevolent deity whom it was dangerous to put out of humour.

SOSTRATUS married SOPHRONIA, a lady young, beautiful, and rich; but his heart was only touched with the last of these perfections. And, indeed, were all the charms, all the commanding graces, which nature has diffused through that enchanting sex, united in one person, he would not have been more deeply affected; for as he believes himself formed in a much nobler mould, his vanity renders him incapable of love. The children whom he has had by SOPHRONIA, the fruits of a commerce in which love had no share, raised not the least tender emotion, and only served to indulge his inclination for arbitrary power. In them he beheld subjects whom he might rule at pleasure; and he

fancied that his reign began the instant he became a father; a reign the most odious and tyrannical, which was felt by its children in all its rigour, without deriving from it the least advantage. With what cruel barbarity did he daily increase the weight of his yoke! To what capricious humours, to what unjust and ridiculous commands were they obliged to submit, even without complaint! He was enraged at their remonstrances; which, even when most reasonable, were so far from being heard, that they were punished as most flagrant instances of disobedience. This imaginary monarch, not content with these severities, by a number of ridiculous projects, by his luxury, his pleasures, and above all his indolence, soon exhausted his moderate fortune; his estate became mortgaged, SOPHRONIA's jointure as well as her jewels were swallowed up in the general ruin. Yet his great soul, instead of being humbled by poverty, became only more fierce; vexation and disappointment served to encrease the natural malignity of his temper. His children were unprovided for, without education, without a fortune, and without friends, for who had ever been a friend to SOSTRATUS? In vain did they attempt, by several couragious efforts, to free themselves from the horrors of indigence: it was all to no purpose, since their father always took care to prevent their success. For he was so jealous of his own offspring, that he would have been distracted to see any of them more prosperous than himself.

WHAT now are the sensations, which these unhappy, abandoned, children ought to feel for their unnatural father? I have already told you; the lawgiver Sinai says, "Honour thy father:" nor can there be any case, any circumstance in
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life, in which children may be exempted from the performance of this duty. Submit yourselves to him because he is your master, even at the expence of your private interest; but never at the expence of your HONOUR, or your CONSCIENCE. Render him all the good offices in your power: for this is a duty which you owe to your most cruel enemies; and a father has, at least, this advantage over every object of hatred, of being a person with whose interest you are most nearly concerned: the hardness of his heart will not excuse yours. I am sensible, that you can have but a small degree of filial affection; nor do I think, that I ought to reproach you for this: but there is a kind of love which is due to all men; and this your father, as a man, has no less a claim to than others; and where all things else are equal, you certainly owe him the preference. But as to filial love, which is a much more warm and tender affection, it is not an obligation so universally binding as not in some instances to be dispensed with. No other affection is due to a father from whom we receive nothing but proofs of hatred, than that which we owe even to our enemies themselves; he is indeed to be treated as an enemy whom we respect, but this is all the distinction he can claim.

IF children do not discover an ardent affection for those that brought them into the world, if they do not prevent their desires, and adopt their sentiments; this is not, of itself, a sufficient reason to condemn them. Observe, before you judge, how they behave in other respects: do they walk in the paths of honour and virtue? If so, their coldness has without doubt a lawful excuse; and it is to be presumed, that as they feel not the delightful transports of an ardent affection, the crimes of the parent, his barbarity, or his baseness, has extinguished

it in their hearts. Examine also the manners of the father; and if you find these irregular and corrupt, the apology for the children is already made.

IF a person, on the contrary, who joins to an irreproachable life all the tenderness of a parent, finds the repeated proofs of his affection vain; if he receives no return from his ungrateful offspring, their crime is too evident: whatever be the foibles of his temper, his understanding, or his conduct, these are no excuse for their ingratitude! Bend your stubborn knees, unnatural children! and let your obdurate hearts melt into tenderness; he is virtuous, and he loves you: and, if thus entitled to your affection, you refuse it to him; can you tax him with injustice, if his love should be converted into hatred.

As for those perverse families, where they strive to out-do each other in vicious excesses, where the father gives the example, and the children even surpass their model; we ought not to be surprized, if, every one following his particular bent, the trunk and the branches should become divided in their interests: for union, love, and concord, are gifts only reserved for the societies of the virtuous. Virtue is, like truth, UNIFORM, SIMPLE, and INVARIABLE; for this reason, those that are attached to it, are confirmed in a steady and uniform concord: but a union among the vicious, can subsist no longer than while their INTEREST is united: for, thirsting after every thing that flatters their appetites, and having no certain object to fix their desires, nor any steady rule to direct their course, ever jealous, greedy, and insatiable; how is it possible, that with such various and separate interests they can long agree together.

VIRTUE is transmitted from father to son, with much more ease than the goods of fortune. These
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are subject to revolutions, which the utmost extent of human prudence can neither foresee nor prevent. But the seeds of honour, of virtue, and religion, early sown in the hearts of children, take root there, grow strong, and bring forth fruit: their effects are staple and permanent; and if, in some heedless unguarded moment, their virtue should become eclipsed or obscured, they will soon pierce through the cloud and appear again with all their lustre. If fathers were more careful to enrich their children with this invaluable patrimony, filial love would be much more prevalent. A virtuous son would not fail to love his virtuous father; and when he himself, in his turn, became a parent, the same charm acting upon his children, would secure their tenderness to him. Filial love, and the love of virtue, would MUTUALLY assist each other: the child would follow virtue, from love to his father; and his love of virtue would strengthen his filial affection.

PERIANDER is astonished, that not any one of his three children love, or even pretend to love him. "I have neglected nothing," says he, "to promote their interest. For twenty years have I toiled: I have watched, I have ruined my health, I have shortened my life to make theirs happy. I have planted, they will gather: I have suffered the fatigue of labour, they will enjoy the fruits of it. I was without wealth, they will be rich. For whom then do these ungrateful creatures reserve their affection? What would they have me do else for them? Have I forgot any thing that can contribute to their happiness?" You have forgot nothing, PERIANDER, but to teach them how to live well; or, in other words, to inspire them with VIRTUE. If an excess of frugality, or sordid a-

varice, be their fault, you may well be surpris'd; you have secured them from all temptations to this vice, by giving them wealth: but wonder not, that you cannot find in their hearts any relish for virtue; this you never inculcated, and it was doubtless from a fear lest they should become vicious but by halves, that you have thus plunged them in opulence. Blind, deluded parent! not to know, that to entrust riches to base and corrupted minds, is to put a sword into the hands of a madman. What can now oppose the torrent of their impetuous passions? As they are void of every sentiment of honour and virtue, nothing could preserve them from the most scandalous excesses but an inability of committing them. Your paternal care has set them free from this obstacle, by giving them riches. Admirable fruit of your wakeful hours, and all your boasted labours! With how much less trouble, might you have inspired them with virtue! and this you certainly would have done, had you not been a stranger to it yourself: but gold appeared to you to be the only source of happiness, and therefore this you procured for them. They are not less fond of it than you; and though they do not love you, they will at least imitate you.

TIME changes the duties of a son to his father. Whilst he is in his infancy, he ought to pay him an unbounded submission; for he has no right to dispute, while he is incapable of a rational examination. In the age which follows infancy, he begins to have a glimpse of things, his understanding opens, and he ought not then to be denied the liberty of making respectful remonstrances: but if these representations should prove fruitless, he has nothing else to do but to shew his obedience. When he, in his turn, becomes a man,
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he is then a competent judge of his own conduct, though he does not on this account cease to be a son; he still owes to his father respect and deference, but not a blind submission. Our laws themselves have provided against this: for the son, being of age, passes under a new kind of government; his country takes cognizance of his manners and behaviour; he begins to be inrolled among the citizens; and if he is under a monarchical government, the king is then become his father.

BUT the distinction of three ages has no existence under the reign of this ABSOLUTE FATHER. All the subjects of his government are incessantly under his tutelage, and are divided only into two different classes, people and magistrates. Those who compose the first are always reputed children, designed only for obedience; their advice is not taken, and it would be esteemed highly criminal if they should presume to give it. Magistrates, under which title I comprehend all those to whom the prince gives a share in the government, are the youth; and with these he will sometimes condescend to advise. Their suffrages are collected, but are regarded by the king no farther than as they please him. It is he that makes the law, and, as soon as it is published, all must be silent and obey. A father is frequently beloved only from instinct, or a sense of duty, if duty can ever be said to beget love: but a king who is beloved by his subjects, has much more reason to be pleased with their attachment; for he is never beloved but from reason and choice: this is rather friendship than filial love; or, more properly, it is a mixture of both: it resembles filial love, in the respect and veneration which accompany it; and it partakes of friendship, as it is free

free and disinterested, and proceeds from reflection; qualities which, being united, characterize what is called FRIENDSHIP, as we shall see in the next chapter.

CHAP. II. OF FRIENDSHIP.

IHAVE established it as a maxim in the preceding chapter, That no LOVE can be solid and permanent, which has not VIRTUE for its BASIS; and the same may be said of FRIENDSHIP. It is cemented not only by a conformity of taste and manners, but also by probity and sincerity.

It is highly proper, that we should distinguish the FRIEND from the COMPANION. A conformity of taste for pleasure, and for any thing besides virtue, may constitute a club, but cannot make a society of friends. That table-companion, who while he holds his glass seems to glow with such cordial friendship, if trusted with a secret on which even your honour depends, will thence take occasion to be merry at your expence, and you will soon, by his means, be rallied, abused, and affronted: deliver up your interest to him, he will sacrifice it to his own. After this you complain, that you have been betrayed by a friend; when it was only by a man who frequently eat and drank with you, and joined in the same diversions.

NEITHER should we confound the RELATION with the FRIEND: we are connected with the first, by necessary ties which reach not the heart; while the other is united to us by the stronger chain of a voluntary engagement, the effect of a perfect sympathy. It is a free and deliberate choice which conciliates friends; but relations are derived from nature.

GRATI-

GRATITUDE itself is not friendship. We are affected with the generosity of our benefactor; we take a pleasure in letting him see, that we are sensible of our obligations; and we ardently desire to have the power of proving this, by real services: yet, at the same time, it is possible that we may be far from liking either his temper, his character, or his conduct. Friendship is, indeed, a source of good offices; it brings them forth without pain, and feels the most extatic delight while it is pouring them out with profusion: yet it is not produced by good offices alone, though they sometimes give rise to it: they insinuate, it is true, a prejudice in favour of the benefactor, and we are therefore disposed to love the person from whom they proceed; and we actually do so, if, after studying his character, we find nothing in it incompatible with our own: but we should have loved him in like manner, had any other less interesting and less selfish cause given us an opportunity of thoroughly knowing his value. Gratitude is a duty: the antient Persians enjoined it even by a formal law; and decreed, that certain punishments should be inflicted upon the ungrateful: but, on the contrary, freedom and unconstraint are the very ESSENCE of friendship. It is a disinterested affection founded only on ESTEEM, and of all the passions most nearly resembles love: nor is there the least difference, if we suppose this last independent of the sex of the person beloved. If Platonic love is not a mere chimera, a question which I shall not pretend to resolve, it is nothing else but a friendship, which is neither increased nor diminished by the difference of sex of the two friends.

As man is composed of two parts, soul and body; so friendship is composed of two also, which
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in some measure resemble these, the internal sentiment, and the outward proofs and effects of it. I shall lay down no rules with regard to the sentiment itself, or the degree of its force; for an attempt to teach men to love, would be as great an absurdity as an endeavour to teach them to breathe: these actions are both equally natural, and it is the degree of men's sensibility which will regulate the strength of their friendship. But that which can more easily be taught, and what most men are ignorant of, is this, That he but ill serves his friends, who endeavours to do it by prostituting his honour and conscience. A friend cannot be too dear to us; for an excess of friendship never leads us into guilt: this must ever proceed from a mistaken affection.

HAS that officious lord, who is generally thought to have made so noble a use of his credit and influence, been of any real service to CALAIS? Did he act like a friend, in giving that honourable post to a man, who, on account of his incapacity, was soon deprived of it? By attempting to serve him at the expence of his king and country, he drew upon him the most mortifying disgrace. Will ARIDEUS, if he should ever be reclaimed from that shameful debauchery into which LYSIAS has plunged him, have reason to thank him for his pernicious counsels and infamous services? He that procures for another unlawful satisfactions, is a base corrupter, not a friend.

THE first rule in the choice of a friend, is, not to love him before you know him; and the next, which is not less important, is to chuse him only from among the society of the good and virtuous. The most long-lived plants are not those that grow the fastest: thus it is with friendship: that is commonly the most firm and durable, which grows
up

up but slowly; while that, which is hastily contracted, is more liable to be dissolved.

IN general, they suffer most from pretended friendship, who least deserve to suffer. It is very rare for the honest heart to prove distrustful; and more rare still for him not to be deceived, who is a stranger to suspicion. There are men of a character so open and generous, that there is no one but would be a gainer by making them their friends: but when these contract a friendship they risque more than others; for so many advantages arise from aspiring after their esteem, that they can never be certain that it is not courted with a view to interest; and a self-interested friend is never a true one. It is to these upright and sincere hearts, that I especially address my counsels on friendship; for what matters it if DECEIVERS are DECEIVED? It is to these that I recommend my advice, of proving the character before they place their affections. Lovers of virtue should have none but virtuous men for their friends; and on this point the proof ought principally to turn.

ALMOST at first sight, we may know if a man be of quick or slow parts, if he be gay or serious, clownish or polite, talkative or reserved, witty or stupid: we see almost all this in his eyes, in his attitude, in his gestures, and in his discourse: but we cannot so easily discover whether he has virtue and probity. It requires more time to be certain with respect to this last point; and till we are as well assured of it, as it is possible for us to be, we ought not prodigally to bestow upon him, from equivocal appearances, the precious title of friend. Are we at last well convinced that he deserves it, then there must be no reserve; we ought to enter with him into an intercourse of sentiments, of tastes, pleasures, and interests. Friendship is a spiritual marriage,

marriage, which establishes, between two friends, a mutual intimacy and perfect correspondence.

The necessary appendages of friendship are **CONFIDENCE** and **BENEVOLENCE**. The purse and the heart ought to be ever open to a friend; and in no case can we shut them, except in such as will justify our having no longer any regard for him. And, indeed, we run no hazard in trusting to a well-chosen friend either our secret or our strong-box; for we are certain, that he will use them both with discretion.

I. CONFIDENCE produces two effects. The one is such a perfect reliance on the prudence, the probity, the constancy, and affection, of the person beloved, as prevents every injurious suspicion: the other effect, which is indeed a natural consequence of such a reliance, is that openness and unreserve with which two friends disclose their most intimate sentiments, their thoughts, their projects, and in a word every thing in which either the one or the other may appear concerned: and this frequently extends even to trifles; because, between friends, trifles themselves become interesting. Nothing ought to be concealed, but the secret of another friend. That which we cannot, consistently with prudence, trust to an indifferent person, we may and ought to repose in the bosom of a friend. He has a right to read all that is written on your heart. You may reveal your faults to him, without being chargeable with imprudence; and enumerate your laudable qualities, without being guilty of an assuming pride: for the good you say of yourself, when talking to an assured friend, is rather the overflowing of your heart than vanity and boasting. A conversation with your friend is almost the same as the silent reflection

fection of your own mind, or a conversation with yourself.

II. As to the BENEVOLENCE which friendship inspires, it also produces two effects; INDULGENCE and GOOD OFFICES. 1. Such faults only as are inconsistent with the sincerity of friendship, ought to be deemed unpardonable: overlook, in your friend, all the faults in which his heart is not concerned, all those which do not prove that his affection for you is extinguished. An instance of neglect, of forgetfulness, a mistake, a witty sarcasm, should be disregarded, and reckoned as nothing: for to break with a friend, to betray, or insult him, are the only faults which friendship cannot pardon. Take care, however, of hating a perfidious friend; for all the vengeance which you can lawfully take of him, is to withdraw your affection. To continue to live with him on the foot of a friend, would be indeed imprudent; but to hate him, would be a crime: his having offended you, does not make him cease to be a man; and there is no man whom you are permitted to hate. If death had snatched him from you but one hour before you had discovered his treachery, you would have lamented his loss: a base action has robbed you of him; lament his having committed it, but do not hate him for it. He has done himself a greater injury than you; for to prejudice your interest, he has sacrificed his own honour. 2. Tho' friendship has nothing in it of a selfish nature, yet it is pleased with kindness and good offices: these are to friends, what caresses are to lovers; not reasons for beginning to love, but motives to love more affectionately: like a breath of wind, which, though it produces not the flame, renders it more ardent. There are so many ways of obliging a friend, that in what situation soever

we find him, some one of these is always practicable: seize, therefore, every opportunity that offers; and, if it be possible, wait not till he himself tells you in what instance it is in your power to serve him. Endeavour to know his wants, and provide for them before he himself has perceived them; and thus he will always be ready to foresee and prevent yours. What an agreeable contention, what a noble jealousy, is that of two friends who strive to prevent each others wants and desires by mutual good offices! We may indeed receive, without mortification, the succour of a friendly hand; for a blush would indicate a doubt injurious to the generosity of the benefactor: but it must be confessed, that the part which he acts is truly worthy of being envied: it is delightful to receive a proof of friendship, but how much more so to give it? Have a regard, however, to the delicacy of your friend, lest he should be confounded by too great a profusion on your part, and the impossibility of making a return; for you may, perhaps, disoblige, through a desire to oblige too much. Cover, therefore, your services, with appearances that may seem to dispense with his gratitude. Put him not to confusion, by the excess of your civilities: who knows but his gratitude for these obligations, may be a burden too painful for him to bear? There are certain minds which are high-spirited even to fierceness; and imagine, that the favours with which they are loaded, degrade them as much as they enoble him that confers them. We have seen some; and could we search into the secret recesses of the heart, we should, perhaps, find many more, who hate a benefactor from no other cause than his generosity itself. However this be, it is much better to offend by too much assiduity and bounty, than
to

to confine yourself, either thro' avarice or want of affection, to barren protestations of friendship. But would you give your friend a proof of friendship as strong as it is rare, be sincere with him in all your discourse; let the advice you give him, the remonstrances you make him, be the faithful expressions of your thoughts and sentiments. Dare to shew him truth entirely naked; or, if through condescension, you adorn her with some cloathing, let it be such as will set off her beauties without disguising them.

CHAP. III. OF HUMANITY.

BY HUMANITY, I understand the concern men feel for the human species in general, for this single reason, that they are men like themselves; without being united, either by the ties of blood, of love, or friendship.

IT is just that we should have a superior tenderness for a father, a wife, or a friend; but there is a sort of affection which we owe to all mankind, as being members of the same FAMILY, of which GOD is the CREATOR and FATHER. Let us illustrate this, by the circular undulations which the fall of a stone causes on the surface of a clear and tranquil water. The agitation in the center, by communicating itself a far off, forms a great number of trembling circles, the faintness of whose impression is in proportion to the largeness of their circumference, till the last seems to escape from our sight. Here is an image of the different degrees of our affections. We love, principally, that which touches us the most nearly; and less and less, in proportion to the distance. We consider mankind, with relation to us, as divided into different classes; every one of which, increasing

gradually, consists of greater numbers than the former: we place ourselves in the smallest, which is surrounded by others more extended; and from thence we distribute to the different orders of men which they contain, different degrees of affection, more or less strong in proportion to their distance from us; in such a manner, as that the last has hardly any share of it. These different classes may be ranked in the following order: a wife, children, friends, relations, men of the same religion; but this last class is nearer or more remote, according to the degree of fanaticism which prevails in the person who determines its place: next are those of the same trade or profession as ourselves: the other classes comprehend our neighbours, fellow-citizens, and countrymen: the last, which incloses all the rest, is the universal class of mankind; but this is most commonly reckoned as nothing. When the SPANIARDS, without the least colour of reason, massacred millions of AMERICANS, they doubtless never imagined that they ought to make any account of men, whom they had met with by chance in an unknown hemisphere; who were neither their cousins, nor their friends, nor Castilians, nor Catholics, nor Christians.

To love men, and to behave towards them with kindness, only from the single consideration of their being of the human race, is properly humanity. This sentiment engraven on the heart, assures us of the other social virtues, and proves that they also are imprinted there. He who loves another man, tho' he is in all respects a stranger to him, for no other reason but because he is a MAN, certainly will not fail to love him to whom he is bound by closer engagements, and who joins to the quality of a man, that of a FRIEND, a RELATION,

or

or a COUNTRYMAN. This temper will be an effectual restraint from any fatal excess of resentment, when we break with persons whom we have loved with a superior kind of affection. If we are highly offended by a wife, or a son, or by any other for whom we have a peculiar tenderness, we may lose that love we have hitherto felt for them; but we shall never cease to love them as our FELLOW-CREATURES. And thus a man of the greatest humanity, may cease to be a friend; but he will never become an enemy. Humanity is, with respect to the other social affections, what the first layer of colouring is to the picture; it is the GROUND on which are painted all the different kinds of love, engagement, and friendship: and, therefore, whoever wants humanity, will be a bad father, a bad son, a bad husband, and a bad friend. The sentiment of humanity, or the love of our fellow-creatures, may be discovered two ways; either by real effects, or by simple testimonies of affection. We have not always an opportunity of being of service to mankind; but we have it continually in our power, to let them see that we love them by exterior marks of kindness. Humanity manifested by real effects, I call GOODNESS; and when it is only discovered by exterior signs, I call it POLITENESS.

SECT. I. OF GOODNESS.

MORAL goodness consists of two parts: the first of which is to do no evil to others: the second to serve and do good to them.

I. WE MUST NOT DO THAT TO ANOTHER, WHICH WE WOULD NOT HAVE HIM DO TO US. This is the rule which determines what kind of treatment is forbidden by nature, with respect to

the rest of mankind : every thing which, were it done to ourselves, would appear hard, barbarous, and cruel, is comprized in the prohibition. But this maxim, so extensive in its use, is very much restrained in our practice of it ; for most men behave one to another, as if they were persuaded, that it ought never to take place except among friends. The particular inclination which the members of every body of men have for each other, is useful and necessary, as it promotes the common good of society. It is proper that the inhabitants of the same city, the subjects of the same prince, and the followers of the same religion, should be united in interest and sentiments ; but it is inconsistent with humanity, to confine all their affection to their associates, and regard all those who are not so as enemies. I do not wonder that a NORMAN should love a NORMAN ; for who are better suited to each other ? A PARISIAN may have an affection for a PARISIAN ; I have no objection to this ; for where will he find men of more candor and ingenuity ? But ought a FRENCHMAN born at Domfront, at Vire, or at Caudebec, to hate another for no other reason, but because he was born at PARIS ; or this last have an aversion to every NORMAN ? These hereditary hatreds of the inhabitants of one province or country towards those of another, have an infallible influence on all their proceedings. We who are born in FRANCE, believe ourselves superior to all the nations upon earth in the perfections of the heart and understanding : the most favourable sentiment we entertain for our neighbours, is compassion ; we pity them for being so far beneath ourselves. The FRENCH have a lively wit, they are bold and courageous, of a gay humour, of a friendly and beneficent character, they

they give strangers a better reception than they meet with themselves in other countries. But why then do this people, so extremely hospitable, in virtue of I know not what right which their lawyers call AUBAINE, seize upon the effects of a GERMAN, an ITALIAN, or an ENGLISHMAN, whom death has prevented from returning to their native country ?

PERMIT me for a while to digress from my principal design, which is the improvement of manners, to examine a practice so contrary to humanity in a political light : it will then, I believe, appear as unprofitable, as it is unjust : for the benefit which arises from the execution of such a law, is very inconsiderable compared with that which would accrue from the abolition of it. The incontestable advantages by which FRANCE excels all the neighbouring states, are the agreeable temperature of its climate, the fertility of its soil, and the wealth of its inhabitants. If it was not for this oppression which is practised towards strangers, we should see without doubt, in consequence of these advantages, a concourse from all parts of an infinite number of artificers, merchants, and men of all conditions : hence the number of inhabitants would be considerably increased ; emulation in commerce, and in arts of every kind, would receive fresh vigour ; and by this means the kingdom become more flourishing. Let it not be imagined, that this multitude of strangers which would flock into our provinces, would be a burden to the natives. In a country naturally fertile, and where labour and industry are in full vigour, the number of its inhabitants must increase its riches : since one man is sufficient for the nourishment of ten, what would then be the case if all were employed ? The recruits which would come from
abroad

abroad would be such, whose interest would not suffer them to be idle through a necessity of procuring a commodious establishment: for if we examine with the least attention, we shall find that all the vagabonds and useless hands we have among us are NATIVES, whilst the FOREIGNERS who have settled here are diligent and industrious.

A BLIND attachment to that exterior worship in which we are educated, is another source of hatred between those of different professions. This abuse arises from hence, that the various religions which divide mankind are not founded on the RELIGION OF NATURE. For want of having drawn from this pure source those sentiments of humanity which would form the whole universe into a society of friends; the different religionists make a pleasure and a merit of the most cruel persecutions, covering, with the name of a holy zeal, what most frequently is nothing else but a fondness for their own opinion, prejudice, bigotry, cruelty, and a religious madness. If we could reasonably hate any part of mankind on account of religion, it would be those who make an open profession of hating GOD. The declared enemies of a MONARCH are the enemies of his SUBJECTS. But in what system of religion shall we find this shocking sentiment inculcated? All have the honour of GOD in view, and all consequently honour him. If some mingle with the homage which they pay him, prophane, superstitious, or criminal practices, reason does not forbid our rejecting this impure allay: but it will not permit us to hate, but only to pity those who adopt them. Can there be any thing more ridiculous, than to hate a person only because he is deceived, especially when his intention is right?

THERE

THERE is a body of men whom we make no scruple of using roughly; these are malefactors, a term by which we commonly understand robbers and murderers. As to the last, we never hesitate to judge them worthy of death, in virtue of the law of RETALIATION, which we regard, upon I know not what foundation, as deducible from the law of nature; for I cannot believe that this sacred law, which, with respect to the duties of society, inspires nothing but tenderness, goodness, and indulgence, allows us to suppress wickedness by wickedness, and to punish homicide with murder. And indeed I have never yet been convinced, that GOD has permitted men to destroy one another. Does a citizen break in upon the peace and order of the society? You may hinder him from doing it, without hanging him on a gibbet. As to those robbers who do not kill, it is certain that they do not deserve death, even if judged by that law of RETALIATION which is thought of such weight against murderers; since there is no PROPORTION between a robbery which is sometimes of a very trifling nature, and that life which is unmercifully taken from them. But it is said, they are sacrificed to the public safety: employ them, then, as slaves, in some useful labour; the loss of their liberty will be a punishment rigorous enough for their crime, will sufficiently secure the public tranquillity, will redound at the same time to the good of the state, and will save you the reproach of injustice and inhumanity. But men have thought fit to make robbery the most ignominious and unpardonable of all crimes; for this reason, doubtless, because MONEY is the God of this world; and, next to life, there is commonly nothing more dear. When passion hurries you on to commit violence on another, instantly
cast

cast your eyes on him, to see the IMPRESSION of the DIVINE HAND and your OWN RESEMBLANCE; and this will be sufficient to calm your anger. Say not to GOD, what we are told CAIN said to him, "Am I my brother's keeper?" Yes, without doubt, GOD has committed him to your care; and not only forbids your doing him an injury, but commands you to serve him to the utmost of your power.

II. A PERSON who is friendly and beneficent to his relations, his benefactors, or his friends, may imagine himself generous, tho' he is insensible and indifferent with respect to the rest of mankind, and has not even CHARITY; a virtue much inferior to that of GENEROSITY, which is the summit and completion of all the other social virtues. For the practice of these, we need only avoid the faults which are manifestly contrary to them; but generosity removes us to a much greater distance from vice; since it leaves, in the interval between that and itself, all the virtues of mere precept and obligation. Generosity is a degree of perfection added to virtue, over and above the indispensable prescriptions of the law: unless we go farther than these ordain, we shall be only free from blame, but not generous.

CHARITY, or, which is the same thing, that general affection which is due to all mankind, is not a virtue of SUPEREROGATION. You meet with an unknown person wounded by assassins, you draw near and dress his wounds: but in this you only fulfil the dictates of humanity; for the need he stands in of your assistance, is a LAW which obliges you to assist him. An indigent person is pressed by the calls of hunger: but the relieving of his wants is only the payment of a DEBT: the poor are committed to the care of society, and

and have a right to be maintained by the superfluities of the wealthy. But complain not of the succour you lend them, tho' it be the price of your sweat and labour. It costs you something it is true, but it costs them much more; since to receive it under the title of an alms, is to buy it very dear. But would you learn in one word, how far those good offices which are due to mankind, ought to be extended; let this be your rule: **WHATSOEVER YE WOULD THAT MEN SHOULD DO UNTO YOU, DO YE EVEN SO UNTO THEM.**

SECT. II. OF POLITENESS.

Politeness is that continual attention which humanity inspires in us, both to please others, and to avoid giving them any offence. The surly plain-dealer exclaims loudly against this virtue, and prefers to it his own shocking bluntness and **GOthic** freedom. The courtier and the fawning flatterer, on the contrary, substitute in its place insipid compliments, cringings, and a jargon of unmeaning sentences. The one blames politeness, because he takes it for a vice; and the other is the occasion of this, because that which he practices is really so.

I ADDRESS myself to **ARNOLPHUS**: he suffers me to advance, while he sits immoveable in his chair. I bow: he surveys me from head to foot, and then cuts short the ceremonial, by crying out at a distance, "Who are you? what do you want?" "Your advice upon an affair, sir, says I." "Let us see, says **ARNOLPHUS**; come to the point; for I am in haste." On this I begin: "You know **EUPHEMON**, I believe." — "No: how should I know him?" "He is a gentleman
of

‘ of the younger branch of the family of’—
 “ What signifies what family, and what branch
 “ he is of? What is your dispute with him?”
 ‘ I have a piece of land contiguous to his’—
 “ Well, what of that land?” ‘ He pretends to
 ‘ appropriate it to himself.’ “ Would he buy it,
 “ or exchange with you for it?” ‘ He will do
 ‘ neither.’ “ In one word then, what would he
 “ have?” ‘ He would confiscate it to his own
 ‘ use, and pretends, upon I know not what
 ‘ foundation, that I am his vassal; and that,
 ‘ having failed in doing him homage, my fief de-
 ‘ volves to him.’ “ Is it my fault, if you have
 “ neglected it?” ‘ But it is false that I am his
 ‘ vassal.’ “ That may be, but do not imagine
 “ that you will be believed on your bare word.”
 ‘ I have records to vouch it.’ “ So much the bet-
 “ ter for you. Produce them.” ‘ There they
 ‘ are.’ “ I have not time to look them over
 “ now.” ‘ You may do it, sir, when you are
 ‘ at leisure.’ “ Well, I will consider of it.”
 ‘ When may I wait on you, sir, for your ad-
 vice?” ‘ I can’t tell.” ‘ But, sir, EUPHE-
 ‘ MON threatens me with a vigorous prosecution,
 ‘ and that quickly.’ “ Does he so?—Well you
 “ must both wait then.” ARNOLPHUS is a man of
 integrity, and a judicious lawyer: but of what
 service can his probity and capacity be to his fel-
 low-citizens, while he is thus austere and inacces-
 sible.

BIBLIUS is a grave and studious man; he has
 the happiness of being acquainted with all the an-
 cient authors, and is passionately fond of them.
 He came one day to the lovely LUCINDA’S,
 whom he finds surrounded by a circle of wits and
 admirers. He enters with a monstrous felt-hat in
 his hand, bows with a very ill grace, walks auk-
 wardly

wardly up to LUCINDA, treads on her slipper, rumples her gown, and then stepping hastily back, throws himself on a large couch. The company smile—this puts him out of humour: they take no more notice, but resume the conversation where it was broke off. It turned upon a question of gallantry, of which, upon the arrival of BIBLIUS, they had, suspended the examination. Every one now enters into the debate, and decides according to his particular taste; and, at last, they ask BIBLIUS what he thinks of it. “I am not accustomed,” says he bluntly, “to employ my thoughts on such silly stuff: but, in short, since I am forced to speak, I must own to you, gentlemen, that none of your decisions please me: I see plainly that you have read but little of ARISTOTLE, tho’ I can tell you he was the finest genius of antiquity; and to confute you, I need only borrow one syllogism from him.” “No, no, Mr. BIBLIUS, for LUCINDA’s sake,” says the young CLITANDER, “excuse us from hearing your syllogism, and speak plain French.” BIBLIUS however pursues his point, begins a long argument, and supports it with Greek and Latin citations from Homer, Euripides, Cicero, Seneca, and Lambinus; quarrels with every one of the company; laments their ignorance, and upbraids them with it. But a burst of laughter now breaking forth as in concert, from every corner of the room, interrupts our orator, who was already out of breath. On this he loses all patience, grows abusive, clinches his fist, and, shaking his head, leaves the room and runs to shut himself up in his college.

BUT ARNOLPHUS and BIBLIUS may perhaps be unpolite, only for want of a proper education:

the one has seen nothing but briefs, counsellors, law-books, and records; the other only classes of boys, raw scholars, masters of arts, and grammarians. Let us hear CTESIPHON, an enemy from principle to all the respect and complaisance used in society: he is going to make an ingenuous apology for his clownish bluntness, and to expatiate on the inconveniencies of politeness. “ You
“ may think as you please, says he, of my address, my countenance, my attitude, and all
“ those artificial rules of behaviour which are
“ called CIVILITY; I am in no pain about it:
“ I leave these important trifles to our young senators or our court Abbés. I would have people judge of me by my actions and not by my
“ gait; for I do not visit my friends to do honour
“ to my dancing-master. As to my manner of
“ living with mankind, I reduce it to this, to
“ speak the truth, to be serviceable to my fellow
“ creatures, and never to injure them. These
“ being my principles, I know how to constrain
“ and deny myself, if necessary to do any useful
“ services. I give my advice when it is asked,
“ in affairs that come within my knowledge; I
“ freely employ my credit and influence, and
“ sometimes my purse, to assist my friends, or
“ whoever has need of them: but I think myself
“ justly dispensed from a frivolous COMPLAISANCE, which can afford no solid advantage
“ to those who demand it. I am invited to dinner, to take a walk, or to a concert; just then
“ I had rather stay at home, and I accordingly
“ stay there. Play is proposed, I do not like it;
“ and therefore I refuse to play. A poet reads
“ to me his verses; they tire me, and I yawn
“ without ceremony. A ball is proposed; I find
“ myself inclined to sleep, and therefore go to
“ bed.

“ bed. I hate that studied complaisance, that
 “ constrained RESPECT, which, if not contrary
 “ to sincerity, are at least inconsistent with a
 “ frank and open temper. I seldom praise o-
 “ thers, and would never have them praise me;
 “ because praise is a kind of poison. I contradict
 “ the man who asserts a false fact, or advances
 “ a false principle; because he must be a liar, or
 “ a deceiver, who will not confute a lie or an
 “ error: and this I do, with a vehemence that
 “ adds a weight to my refutation. The rank of the
 “ person I attack encourages, instead of intimi-
 “ dating me; because the more considerable the
 “ adversary is, the more important it is to humble
 “ him. DAMON is vain, I mortify his pride;
 “ LAURA is a coquette, I reproach her with her
 “ intrigues; LEANDER is a hypocrite, I pull
 “ off his mask; BERTHOLDA is silly and affect-
 “ ed, I rally and mimic her; GORGAS loves
 “ his glass, I make him ashamed in public; CY-
 “ DALISA delights in scandal, I lay open and
 “ expose her other faults in order to cure her of
 “ this; LYSIMON affects to be thought learned,
 “ I examine and disconcert him. These persons
 “ would have been cured long ago, had every
 “ one behaved like me; but the dissimulation of
 “ the world renders them blind to their vices,
 “ and prevents their becoming virtuous by
 “ making them believe that they are already so.”

CTESIPHON, in this portrait, has not belied
 the frankness of his character: but is not this
 frankness, for which he professes such a value,
 carried too far? Any other, except a Cynic or a
 flatterer, knows how to join frankness with po-
 liteness; and without abandoning the one, to ac-
 count the other, as it truly is, a DUTY. But in

proving this, let us, for the sake of method, follow the plan which CTESIPHON himself has pointed out to us, and divide politeness, as he has done, into three branches; CIVILITY, COMPLAISANCE, and RESPECT.

ART. I. OF CIVILITY.

CIVILITY is a ceremonial agreed upon and established among mankind, with a view to give each other external testimonies of friendship, esteem and regard. This ceremonial varies with the different customs of nations; but all have one, of some kind or other. And it may reasonably be presumed from this universal practice, that it has its foundation in nature. Whence I conclude, that civility is a DUTY prescribed by the law of REASON. It is with respect to men, what external worship is with regard to the DEITY; a public testimony of our internal sentiments, the form of which is in its own nature indifferent; for the manner of addressing ourselves to persons in various stations, of saluting them, of expressing our respect, the terms we make use of in speaking to them, the titles which are to be given them, are all, originally, mere arbitrary formalities which CUSTOM only has established. These two things then are certain: the one that right reason and good sense require us to practise some kind of civility; the other that neither good sense nor right reason determine in what particular acts it ought to consist. The best manner of shewing our friendship and regard to mankind, as well as the least liable to suspicion, is that of serving them by all the good offices in our power; but an opportunity for doing this does not always offer: it was therefore necessary, that
certain

certain signs should be agreed upon, certain demonstrations, by which we might habitually show that we love, esteem, and honour them; and every nation has chosen those which are most conformable to the ideas and taste of the people: and therefore as all are originally indifferent, our choice must be determined by the various customs of the countries we inhabit. The FRENCHMAN, the TURK, and the PERSIAN, ought all to be civil: but there is one kind of civility for the FRENCHMAN, another for the TURK, and another for the PERSIAN. If men were pure spirits, capable of communicating their thoughts and sentiments without exterior signs, civility would be superfluous: what renders it necessary is, their not having this power. In vain do the Cynic and the clown declaim against civility, in vain do they treat it as a false and deceitful commerce, only proper to mask and disguise our true sentiments; for if they really had, as they ought, that affection which well-bred persons express by reciprocal signs, their civility would not be IMPOSTURE. It is true, there are more men who observe the rules of civility, than who pay a proper regard to the duties of society; but even by this counterfeited civility they furnish, though involuntarily, an argument in favour of the social virtues: for he who affects the outward appearance of virtuous dispositions, confesses that he ought to have them in his HEART. Nay, they who openly declare against civility, do not deny that we should feel for our fellow-creatures, friendship, benevolence, and respect: how unaccountable then is it in them, to desire that we should conceal sentiments so just and indispensable.

HERMODACTUS is, nevertheless, of this character. You may live ten years with him, before

he favours you with a bow, or an obliging word or look. You would judge by the seeming indifference of his air, that he believes himself the only human creature upon earth: however, dare but to encounter his forbidding temper, do but ask him to do you a piece of service, and you will, to your great astonishment, find him truly generous: but the favour being done, he will continue to live with you upon the same footing as before; always cold, constantly reserved, ever alone. Penetrated with a sense of your obligation, you break out into professions of your attachment, esteem, and gratitude; but these are all lost, for he sees nothing, hears nothing, and answers to nothing. In short, HERMODACTUS would have been a complete misanthropist, had he not been naturally beneficent.

ART II. OF COMPLAISANCE.

COMPLAISANCE is an honest condescension, by which we bend our wills to render them conformable to those of others. I say an HONEST condescension: for basely to give way to the will of another in criminal instances, is to be an accomplice in his vices rather than complaisant.

THE complaisance of which I here speak, consists then, only in not contradicting the taste and sentiments of any person, when we can forbear with innocence; in complying with the inclinations of others, and even anticipating them as far as we are able. This is not, perhaps, the most excellent of all the virtues; but it is, at least, extremely useful, and very agreeable in society.

SEE how greatly ALCIDAMUS is beloved, courted, and caressed. Is it for his probity? This virtue

ture only raises our esteem, without engaging our affection. Is it for his beneficence and readiness to do service to others? Those who are fond of his company, have not all been in want of his good offices. Is it because he is sprightly, humorous, and diverting? This could only make him agreeable, in those moments when gaiety is seasonable. No; he is beloved on account of that easy engaging disposition which makes his will not his own, while he bends, turns, and fashions it, so as to oblige all his friends. As he discovers what will give you pleasure, he almost prevents your desires; and does this with such a graceful ease, that in the very moment when he has no other end in view than your delight, you would imagine that he only followed his own choice and inclinations.

WE may give pleasure to mankind by a courteous behaviour, by a gaiety of temper, or by ingenious sallies of wit and humour; but not any of these ways of pleasing is of such universal use as complaisance. You can be courteous only to equals or inferiors; there are a thousand occasions in which your gaiety would be ill-placed; points and repartees do not always present themselves so readily to the mind as you could wish, nor are they always relished: but if you are of a good-natured and yielding temper, if you take a pleasure in contributing to the pleasure of others, I can answer for the friendship of those about you; for this is a perfection that will be valued at all times, in all places, and on all occasions.

RHODOLPHUS is a man of merit, and both a poet and a philosopher; and would not fail of being supportable in all companies, in spite of these two qualities, could he descend so far as to become complaisant. But how can he do this?

Com-

Complaisance supposes esteem: now, whoever cannot make VERSES, or has never read NEWTON or DESCARTES, is in his opinion no better than a piece of clock-work; an idiot, of which at most we can only make a labourer, a monk, or a farmer of the public revenues. He imagines himself of a species superior to other men, and glories that he is distinguished from them by the peculiarity of his maxims, sentiments, and inclinations. To condescend to humour them, would be to enter into their society; it would be mixing with them whom he regards as prophane.

AGLAURA has an amiable person, she has wit, understanding, and is naturally formed to please; yet, with all these accomplishments, she is shunned and hated. But why is this? The reason is, she has neither will nor sentiment of her own: before she can determine what to do or say, she must wait till some one has declared his thoughts or wishes; as soon as this is done she is of a contrary opinion, and will act in a quite opposite manner.

A R T. III. O F R E S P E C T*.

BY respect I here mean that regard and deference which is founded on the circumstances, genius, and quality of persons. We ought not, for example, to satirize lawyers in the presence of a gentleman of the law, especially if his probity is sufficient to protect him from reproach. And even supposing he deserves it, it is not always sufficient that a charge be well founded, to justify him that makes it; since it may be done at an improper time, and with a malicious bitterness: for though

* The FRENCH word EGARDS has no one word to answer it in our language. The proper meaning of it is sufficiently explained at the beginning of this section,

though truth is commonly painted naked, she has nevertheless disagreeable nudities, which it is sometimes proper to conceal.

You are in the presence of a great man, and every one is assiduous in shewing him marks of respect: conform yourself to the rules of custom; honour him like the rest; and behave not with the confidence of a Quaker, who would address him with *THEE* and *THOU*, and speak to him with his head covered. But you will revere him only in proportion to his virtues, his abilities, and personal merit; for all the pomp and lustre which surround him you consider only as smoke and wind. I grant that they are so: but what are the honours that I desire you to bestow on him, but wind and smoke? I desire you not to praise him, if he is only worthy of contempt; to flatter his taste, if he has none; to applaud his wit, if he is a fool; to extol his knowledge, if he is ignorant. You will run no hazard of forfeiting your sincerity, by bestowing upon him only a mute kind of homage. This is absolutely necessary; for that subordination which is so requisite for the government of the state, would soon be destroyed, if people, especially in public, were to honour the great only in proportion to their real merit.

HIPPIAS is, you say, a stupid wretch, without either genius, probity, or discernment. Cloathed in a poor monkish frock, he crept into an obscure cloister, where he was justly confounded in the throng of the recluse: at last the government of the monastery became vacant by the death of their chief; when an imprudent female devotee, of whose conscience he was become the director, undertook to decorate him with this poor pre-eminence: but her scheme failed; HIPPIAS was not thought worthy to govern even a society of monks.

monks. The humble penitent, piqued at this provoking disappointment, contrived to avenge herself in a very singular manner; and that was by procuring for him a bishopric. Take away from HIPPIAS, you may say, his crozier and his mitre, and he will then be a finished blockhead, unworthy of the least attention from a man of sense. This I readily confess: but as he is now actually in possession of this crozier and mitre, he deserves at least a respectful bow. Do not dispute such a trifle; I allow you liberty enough, when I dispense with your giving him your esteem.

AFFECT not an air of contempt before the afflicted, who are lamenting over their losses or disasters. Or if you groan yourself under some dreadful calamity, go not to fatigue, with your sad lamentations, those favourites of fortune who cannot remove the cause of your distress. It would be insulting over the grief of an afflicted widow, drowned in tears and lamenting the loss of a husband tenderly beloved, to come and tell her with an air of satisfaction, that your love will soon be crowned, and that speedily you shall be the happiest of husbands. You are running to inform MENALCAS of the favour the king has done you, in presenting you the ribbon of a certain order of knighthood: turn back; this favour has just been refused to him, and he will not be in a humour to partake of your joy. Some degree of wit, or rather of judgment, is necessary to render us capable of this manner of shewing our respect: an ordinary acquaintance with the world may teach civility, and good nature may produce complaisance; but a fool will be always a novice in the science of RESPECT.

DEATH snatched from the arms of FANNY a most amiable infant, the precious pledge of the
love

love of her deceased husband. A crowd of friends endeavoured to comfort her, or at least to give some diversion to her grief. ALICIA, a more fortunate mother, in her turn came to visit her friend, and brought with her the living fruits of her happy fertility, dear precious objects of her tenderness and complacency! and, unhappily for FANNY, the only subject of her discourse. She entered immediately upon a tedious recital of their pretended perfections, the sallies of their imagination, the penetration of their minds, the sweetness of their tempers, and the regularity of their features: she was still going on, and seemed as if she would never make an end, when FANNY, possessed with grief, interrupted her with these words pronounced with some emotion; " You " would be an admirable creature, my dear AL- " ICIA, if you had as much regard for your " friends, as you discover tenderness for your " children. You are a good MOTHER; but I " must say it, you are a bad COMFORTER.

The END.



